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P R E F A C E .  
THE following biographical sketches of aome 
of the principal characters in Central Asian 
affairs were written with the object of thow- 
ing a, little more light than we already possess 
upon a, subject to which we too often permit 
surselves to show indifference. They are based 
upon such information as can be gleaned from 
dl authentic books of travel, histories, official 
I documents, &c. &o. Where the description 
is more meagre than might be desired, the 
reader will, perhaps, remember that one of 
1 the  chief ,reasons for the scarcity of infor- 
i a * 
1 
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mation concerning the careers of native rulers 
and chieftains is the policy which has been 
persisted in, for years, by the Indian Govern- 
ment of discouraging, and throwing impedi- 
menta in the way of, exploration by Englishmen. 
Of late, too, there has been less energy shown 
than formerly in giving commissions to native 
explorers. 
I t  is unnecessary to say anything more by 
way of introductioll to what follows. The 
portraits speak, it is hoped, for themselves. I 
have endeavoured, to the best of my ability, 
t o  regard them from an impartial point of view, 
and to consider their meTits without reference 
to  the par t  they have played in the develop- 
ment of t h e  rivalry between England and 
Russia. In some cases I may appear to have 
awarded too much praise, in others too little. 
I have sought to  try them by a high standard, 
bu t  I have not, in a weak desire to exaggerate 
the figure of any of my ,subjects, strained my 
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test beyond what seemed legitimate bounds. 
I leave these portraits, with diffidence, in the 
hands of the reader, hoping that they may be 
found to possess soms interest and t o  convey 
a little instruction, yet not wholly free from 
the doubt that my clients might, could they 
be permitted to speak to us, represent them- 
selves in a, somewhat Meren t  light to that 
in which they appear to me. But I may say 
that I have striven to bring them individually 
before the English reader in as clear a manner 
as the state of our knowledge will admit. 
ERRATUM. 
p. 112, line 20, for Yalcoob Khan, read Yakoob Beg. 
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DOST MAHOMED. 
WHEN on the yuins of the conquests of Nadir 
Shah there arose, in the region lying between 
the Persian border on the one side, and the 
territory of Delhi on the other, an autono- 
mous state, generally called Afghanistan, the 
family of the Sudosyes attained supreme power 
therein partly through the peculiar reputation 
it had acquired in the eyes of the Afghans, and 
partly through the pre-emineat ability of its 
chief Ahmed Shah. Ahmed, who, as a general, 
emulated Nadir Shah, and, as an administrator, 
probably surpassed him, was the founder of 
what has been termed the Durani monarchy. 
His power descended unimpaired to his son 
Timour ; but in the following generation not 
only did the vigour of the ruler become re- 
1 
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laxed, but the union, which had been hastily 
patched up in a country which it was only pos- 
sible in those days for a great soldier to keep 
welded in one, also began to grow less firm and 
substantial. The civil wars between the sons, 
of Timour were an invitation to all the ambi- 
tious and intriguing brains in the country to 
combine for tho purpose of making the most of 
the prevailing confusion for the furtherance of 
personal designs. The invitation was generally 
accepted, and by one family it was turned t o  
excellent account. It is of the greatest membor 
of that family that it is our purpose, in this 
i opening sketEb of those individuals who have 
influenced the progress of events in Central. 
Asia, to speak here in some detail. 
Descended from a line of ancestry which 
scarcely yielded in importance among the Ab- 
deli Afghans to that possessed by the Durani 
Shahs, of the Sudosys family, Dost Mahorned, 
Baruckaye, son of Poyadah Khan, the leading 
nobleman at the Court of Timour, was one 
who, in any country and under drnost ally 
conditions, would have won his way to fame. 
The special circumstances of the hour were 
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beyond doubt most favourable to the attain- 
ment of the ambition he had formed a t  an 
early period in his career ; but even had the 
Sudosye dynasty remained supreme, and the 
Barucksyes content with their subordinate 
position, Dost Mahomed would have been cer- 
tain to have shown more than ordinary excel- 
lence and ability. The post of Vizier had come 
to be considered hereditary in his family, ancl 
although his youth was against him, there can 
be no doubt that he would in course of time 
have risen to that office. 
When Shah Zemaun imprisoned and slew 
Po~ndah ,  the Sarfraz* Khan of the Clays of 
Timour, the approach of the close of the autho- 
rity of the Xudosyes was signalled. Not only 
did that act of treachery, committed upon the 
peyson of a man to whom that ruler owed most 
of his authority, alienate much of the popular 
sympathy, but it also roused the leaders of the 
great Barucksye clan to more vigorous action. 
The sons of Poyndah vowed that t h y  would 
* Sarfraz Khm means (( the Noble Lord." 
1 "  
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4 OENTRAL ASIAN PORTRAITS. 
avenge their fatheT9s death, and on Futteh Ali, 
as the eldest, devolved the ~rincipal part in tho 
task that had been self imposed. 
Dost Mahomed was the twentieth of the sons 
of Poyndah. His mother was of Persian de- 
scent and a Shiah. She was consequently re- 
garded with but little favour by the other wives 
of that chief ; but notwithstanding her o~igin, 
she was the most favoured by her husband, 
whom she accompanied during sev~ral  cam- 
paigns. She was also the soldiers' friend. Dost 
I Mahomed shared in the privations which fell 
1 to the lot of the Barucksyes after the death of 
Poyndah, but, as he was a mere child, very 
little is known of his life at  this period. At 
one time we are told that Futteh Ali set apart 
a certain sum of money to provide for his proper 
education. The Dost was then about eight 
years of age. In 1800, when Putteh Ali was 
successfully supporting the cause of Mahmoud 
Shah, he made his first appearance in public 
life at  the early age of twelve years. At first 
it was in the capacity of water-bearer, and later 
on as pipe-bearer, to his brother Futteh. These 
offices constituted him a sort of body page to 
his abJ 
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his able brother, and they served to raise a 
bond of sympathy between them, rasely to be 
].let with between brothers in Afghan history. 
Prom this early age the Dost attached himself 
in a peculiar sense to the fortunes of his eldest 
brother, and Futteh Ali imposed implicit trust 
in the sagacity of the promising youth of whose 
fidelity he felt so well assured. Mohun La1 
says that '' he never went to  sleep until Futteh 
was gone to his bed. He stood before him all 
the day with his hands closed, a token of re-  
spect among tho Afghans. I t  mas not an un- 
usud occurrence that when Futteh Khan was 
in his sleeping-room, Dost Mahomed stood 
watching his safety." 
I n  the petty strifes which ensued between 
the three Sudosye brothers Dost Mahorned 
played a part only less considerable than that 
taken by Butteh. On several occasions it was 
due to the gallantry and skill of this youth, 
then only a boy of fourteen years of age, that 
the power of the Barucksyes was not over- 
thrown and the race extirpated. As he ad- 
vanced in years, the part he played in affairs 
became larger. It was held to  bo as necessary 
instance of the character of t h e  mall and of 
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to know what the Dost would do under certain 
circumstances as to ascertain what Butteh him- 
self intended. His reputation was enhanced by 
two decided victories, towards which his skill 
I 
, greatly contributed, over Shuja-ul-Mulk and 
Afghan customs, which still remain unchanged. 
After this, Dost Mahomed rose to higher posts 
in the service of t,he State, but he was still 
t 
content to be his brother's cup-bearer. A war 
his generals." 
That Dost Mahomed was far from possessing 
was at this period iu. progress with a rebellious 
I any scruples as to the methods to be employed 
i for the attainment of supreme power may be 
I' seen from the facts that he murdered several 
I I 
L leading men after a fashion not less remarkable 
for its treachery than its ferocity. His inurder 
1 of his elder brother's secretary was a striking 
governor of Cashmere, the11 an Afghan 'pro- 
vince, and while its fortunes were doubtful, it 
afforded the occasion for the following remark- 
* Mohun La1 gives the credit for these exclusively to 
the Dost. To Futteh Ali probably belongs the chief 
praise. 
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able speech from Dost Mahorned, who could not 
have been more than twenty-one years of age :- 
<'It appears to me that the victory gained 
-last year, the annihilation of the seditious 
chiefs, the confinement of Shahzadah Abbae, 
the repossession of Cabul, and the elevation of 
our King Shah Mahmoucl to  the throne of his 
forefathers, by the use of the sword, and by 
the wisdom of the members of our family, have 
been a sufficient source of gratification to those 
who are attached to our fortunes ancl to His 
majesty Shah Mahmoud. Not only this, but 
the  citizens, fearless of the attacks of the law- 
less followers of the late rebel Seyyicl Ashraf 
of Kohistan, sleep comfortably ; reform and 
improvement have been successfully introcluced 
into the agitated affairs of government. May our 
King Shah Mahmoud ancl my noble brother the 
present Vizier, as well as the rest of the chiefs, 
including myself, enjoy the fruit of our hard- 
earned authority I But I regret to say that the 
luxurious habits of the King, &c., bicl fair to 
cause that the present condition of the country 
be not a lasting one. One cause for every one 
of the above-mentioned individuals falling into 
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luxurious indolence appears t o  be that they 
forget the seditious ;onduct of Ata Mahomed 
Khan, governor of the rich valley of Cashmere, 
zuithout the possession of  which region no king 
of AJqhanistan has Been, or ever will be, able t o  
maintain a lmge m y  hcl the royal dignity. 
- " Notwithstanding the peace and pleasure 
which every one seems to enjoy, and that t o  
imitate them there is an open field for me also, 
yet the rules of sound and far-sighted diplo- 
macy, which are always wandering in my heart 
and brain, have not allowed me to  rest a mo- 
ment, and I shall never be easy until some 
mature steps are taken to punish the hostile 
obstinacy of Ata Mahomed Khan, the Governor 
of Cashmere, who turned the Government 
agent, as well as that of my noble brother the 
Vizier, with disgrace, out of the valley, and 
refused to pay the stipulated sum of tribute. 
It is not possible to defray the general ex- 
penses of the movements of an army under 'my 
noble brother the Vizier to check the restless 
spirits of the discontented chiefs unless the 
country of Cashmere be ceded to us." 
This speech led to  the despatch of a large 
that they 
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n .no /sing 
be, able t o  
dignity. 
1 pleasure 
~d that t o  
r me also, 
ted diplo- 
my heart 
rest a mo- 
lntil some 
he hostile 
Governor 
~vernment 
.other the 
alley, and 
)f tribute. 
meral ex- 
under 'my 
le restless 
inless the 
1 
)f a large 
expedition against Cashmere, which was com- 
pletely successful; but the vigilance of Runjeet 
Singli, and internal dissensions, prevented the 
reward of this vigorous action being perma- 
nent. The Afghan leaders withdrew from 
Cashmere, but only to find that their line of 
retreat had been intercepted by a Sikh army 
stationed at Attock. After a stubborn resist- 
ance, and the performance of almost incredible 
acts of valour by the Dost, the Afghans were 
routed and obliged to flee to Peshawur. Nor 
was safety to be found in that place. The 
shadow of civil disturbance was ag- in settling 
d o m  over Cabul, and the Vizier an:] his bra- 
ther were obliged to return to the capital for 
the purpose of maintaining their position. The 
expedition into Cashmere which had' promised 
to secure that revenue-producing province, 
the necessity of which was insisted upon in 
the speech just quoted, really resulted in the 
triumph of the Sikhs, who derived all the 
benefit to be obtained from the reverse suf- 
fered by the Afghans. Had there been no 
dyiiastic question in course of settlement, 
Futteh A.E would probably have returned with 
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fresh troops, but the war which now broke out 
between Shuja and Mahmoud effectually de- 
stroyed dl chance of such a course being 
taken. 
Shortly after this occurrence the state of 
affairs at Herat called the attention of Mah- 
moud and his Vizier to that province, where 
the Persians mere carrying on intrigues with 
the object of re-establishing their authority 
there. Futteh Ali and Dost Mahomed marched 
westwards at  the head of a large army. In 
the campaign that ensued a severe battle was 
fought at Kussan, where Futteh Ali was 
wounded. The result was doubtful, as both 
armies rest~med their former positions. Futteh 
Ali then intrigued to supplant Feroz, the ruler 
of Herat and a brother of Mahmoud, and he 
did not scruple to employ the meanest artifices 
for the attainment of his purpose. Unfortu- 
nately, both t'he Barucksye chiefs sullied their 
triumph by gross excesses. The Afghans can 
forgive the blackest treachery, and they evince 
no extraordinary indignation towards deeds of 
blood; but they are less disposed to colldone 
acts which shock the national sense of honour. 
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Dost Mahomed was the greatest offender of 
all. By as much as he excelled all his com- 
rades in valour and military skill, by not less 
did he surpass them in greed for spoil and the 
other I-ecompenses of savage battle. Having 
broken into Herat, having surprised and slain 
the guards a t  the gat,es, and having seized the 
person of Perez, he began to plunder all con- 
nected with the palace. Not content with this, 
he offered an inexpiable outrage Lo the sister 
of Kamran, who had married her cousill Prince 
Malilr Kasim. The band which fastened her 
trousers was fringed wit11 precious stones, alsd 
on her refusing to hand it over, he cut the 
band and took bit away. What monder that 
Kamran on hearing of this, as he did speedily, 
for his sister sent the profaned robe to him, 
should swear that he would avenge the insult 
on the person of Putteh Ali and the Dost? The 
keen eye of the Vizier detected the political 
blunder involved in the rash act of his young 
brother, and not only did he publicly repudiate 
a11 participation in it, but he took steps for the 
arrest ancl punishment of the culprit. These, 
it is not surprising to find, the latier evaded, 
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making his escape to his other brother, Maho- 
med Azirn, the Governor of Cashmere. 
But the revenge of Kamran did not  slumber 
because its chief object had fled. The power 
of the Barucksyes was dependent upon the su- 
premacy of Futteh Ali, and the greatest blow 
that could b e  dealt the individual was to smite 
the family by  sweeping the Vizier from power. 
Rnlnran came to Herat bent on the errand of 
avenging his sister's shame, a t  the same time 
that he asserted his own position i n  the realm. 
I u  that camp which mas still the scene of the  
rivalry of opposite parties in the State, it mas 
not difficult for the King's son to gather round 
him a strong paTty pledged to work out  his  
own ends. To all appeal*ance Kamran was the  
dear friend of Futteh dli, but behind his back 
he was plotting, .not less successfully than  
secretly, his destruction. Futteh Ali mas sur- 
prised and thrown into prison, where he was czt 
once deprived of sight. Ksmran then sot out 
for C a b d  mith his illustrious prisoner. T h e  
blinding of Futteh AJi mas the signal fo r  t he  
outbreak of a fresh civil mar. Dost Mahomed 
returlled with money and with troops from 
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Cashmere. Shah Shuja set hiinself up for a 
third time as ruler. Mahmoud lost his head, 
and made frantic but vain appeals to Putteh to 
induce his brothers to come to terms. The 
appeals mere unavailing. The nobla man was 
to be moved as little by promises as he had 
ahown himself to  be by threats. He said 
"since he had lost his sight he had lost all his 
influence over men." He was forthwith mur- 
dered by order of Mahmoud and Kamran, with 
every circumstance of oruelty that a malignant 
and disappointed hatred could suggest. 
I n  the moanwhile Mahmoud's party was 
losing ground throughout the conntry. Dost 
Mahomed had made himself master of Pesha- 
wur, and was in full march for Cabd, which he 
expected to take partly by force and partly by 
fraud. He succeeded in his object as well as 
he expected. The Bala Hissar was captured 
after a siege of a few days by mining one of the 
gates of the upper cihadel. This success was 
followed up by the disbandment of the army 
of Mahmoud, who fled with his son Kamran to 
Eerat. The Barucksye brothers, who all came 
forward to claim a share in tho spoil won solely 
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by the ability of Dost Mahorned, then parcelled 
out the country between them, and Ghizni was 
allotted as the share of the Dost. Altlhough 
he possessed one of the keys of the country, 
he was not content with either his share or  
his relative position towards the rest. The in- 
trigues of Dost Mahomed for the attainment 
of supreme power became the chief cause of 
disturbance in the state. He availed himself of 
every opportunity that offered for the extension 
of his influence, and he did not scruple to make 
the most of the disputes which arose between 
his brothers, as well as of the expiring efforts 
of the $udosye dynasty for the recovery of 
its rights. 
Mohun Lal, in his " Life of Dost Mahomed," 
appears to take an inexplicable pleasure in re- 
peating all the details-which rest only upon 
rumour-of various acts of atrocity which mnst 
be held to sully the fame of a man whom we 
would gladly accept as a true hero." These 
* I n  considering Asiatic character allowance must be 
mdde for national customs. This is in no case more 
necessary than in that of the Afghan tribes. An Afghan 
might he a hero, and yet commit deeds which would 
make an Englishman a criminal. 
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need not be specified; but taken into general 
consideration, they serve t o  shorn that this man 
had no scruples of conscience. No human 
weakness or sympathy stood between him and 
the. realisation of a design. One instance may, 
however, be given of the way in which Dost 
Mahomed strove to advance his personal in- 
terests at  this time. His elder brother, Mn- 
homed Bairn, had marched into Pisheen for ihe 
purpose of levying tribute from t'he Mirs of 
Ecinde, and he had specified four lacs of rupees 
as the sum he expected to receive from them. 
Dost Mahomed, who accompanied him with a 
considerable band of followers, notified to the 
Minister of Scinde that, if he were sent one lac, 
he would desert his brother and thus compel 
him to abandon his enterprise. His offer was 
accepted, Dost Mahomsd retired to  Candahar 
with his ill-gotten treasure, and Mahomed Azirn 
was compelled to leave the coffers of the Mirg 
of Scinde untouched. 
After thia Dost Mahomed withdrew to Pesha- 
wur, and for a short time he officiated as 
Governor of Eohat. He  was soon on terms 
again with Mahomed Azim, but there was dis- 
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trust between the brothers, as could scarcely 
have been otherwise, and Dost Mahomed re- 
ceived permission to go mheresoever he liked. 
H e  availed himself of this permission, and 
withdrew to Ghizni, of which he made himself 
master by a stratagem. If the means which. 
he employed were of a questionable character, 
he always appears, the end once attained, to 
have endeavoured to turn it to the best account 
for the interests of the people. Master of 
Ghizni, he " restored confidence and peace 
among the inhabitants." Bll Mahomed Azim's 
efforts t o  recover that town proved abortive. 
But Dost Mahomed, far from being coutent 
with tlie possession of Ghizni, was intent 
upon playing for a larger stake. During these 
years the Sikh danger had been a growing 
one, and Mahomed Azim, baffled in an attempt 
to defend the Peshawur valley against Runjeet 
Singh, returned to Cabul t o  die of disappoint- 
ment and disease brought on by exposure. 
The death of Mahomed Azim was the signal 
for fresh disturbances in  the state; but it is 
unnecessary to follow these in any detail. They 
resulted, however, in the establishment of the 
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Dost's authority ia Cabul itself. He then ac- 
quired Balabaglz and Jellalabad. This had 
scarcely been done when his attention was 
called to the south, where the Sudosye Shuje- 
ul-Mulk was threatening Candahar with a large 
force. He hastened by forced marches to the 
assistance of his brothers, who were hard 
pressed in that city, and, having drawn up his 
force ia front of the enemy, attacked without 
giving time to his friends, some of mholn were 
meditating treachery, to desert. The result 
justified both his foresight and his eneygy. 
His arms were completely victorious, and 
Shuja-ul-Mulk was again driven to take refuge 
within English territory. I n  this battle ABbczr 
Khan greatly distinguished himself, and indeed, 
in a sense, the victory may be said to have 
been due to his valour. 
On his return to Cabul Dost was proclaimed 
Ameer, thus being the first Barucksye to assume 
5~ supreme title. The Sudosyes had always 
claimed and used the royal style of Shall, but 
vhen they mere expelled the kingdom i;ho con- 
fusion which followed, in conseque~lce of tl~e. 
disagreement between the Barucksyes, pre- 
2 
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vented anyone aspiring to the chief place 
of all. The death of Mahomed Aaim and $he 
Dost's victory at Candahar smoothed the way 
for st Barucksye t o  assume the title of Ameer, 
of special significance in the eyes of all the 
followers of the Eaithful. His great want was 
money, and he spared no effort to  obtain as 
large a sum as he could from his subjects. H e  
even resorted to plundering foreign merchants 
in order to procure what he required. A gloomy 
picture is drawn of the state of Cabul during 
these early days of the administration of Dost 
Mahomed; and whether the man o r  the condi- 
tions of the hour were to blame, it is clear *that at 
this time he was not a benefactor to his people. 
He marked the commencement of his reign by 
the  issue of a new coinage, bearing upon i t  the  
stamp Dost Mahomed, Ghazi-conqueror over 
the  infidel before they were vanquished. 
All these measures were sanctioned and de- 
fended on the ground that they were taken for 
t he  prosecution of a war against the Sikh in- 
fidels ; and Dost Nahomed moved his army 
forward to Dacca, whence he addressed appeals 
to  t h e  fanaticism of the border tribes. H e  
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%hen marched through the Xhyber, and took 
up a position in the Peshaww valley. His 
(brother, Sultan Mahomed, however, deserted 
him, and the Sikh army, reinforced by Runjeet 
.Sin$ in person, took up a strong position in 
his front. B u t  although the fanaticism of the 
Afghans had been raised to a high pitch, there 
was little fighting; and. the opposing camps 
became the scene of plots and counter-plots, 
which were but an insignificant achievement as 
the result of the first campaign of one who had 
assumed t h e  proud title of Ghazi. To some ex- 
tent, however, he vindicated his reputation by 
the successful campaign of 1835, when his sons 
defeated Hur ree  Singh in a battle at Jumrood, 
in which the Sikh general was killed. The 
credit for this victory was given a t  the time 
to  Akbar Khan, but there appears to be little 
doubt that it should have been awarded to the 
Dost's eldest son, Maul, who, thirty years later, 
was for a short space de facto Ameer of Cabul. 
Notwithstanding that the Ameer committed 
many deeds which were probably not less im- 
politic than they were certainly cruel, there is 
no question, as clearly shown by the result, 
2 * 
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that he must have been a wise and prudent 
ruler. He  encouraged trade as it had not been 
encouraged in Afghanistan for many years be- 
fore ; and if he was harsh in his dealings with 
the chiefs of the clans, and the members of his 
own family, it was dou.btless because he knew 
that if be were not, the same law would be meted 
out to him as had been to his predecessors. 
Sir Alexander Burnes has left the following 
ciescription of tho reputation whicl~ Dost Ma- 
homed had acquired, and i t  would be difficult 
to imagine that it could be said with t ruth 
of any of the other chiefs who have made them- 
selves supreme in Afghanistan :- 
" The reputation of Dost Mahomed is made 
lrnown t o  a traveller long before he enters his 
country, and no one better merits the high 
character which he has obtained. . . . Tho 
justice of this chief affords a constant $heme 
of praise to all classes ; the peasant rejoices at 
the absence of tyranny, tihe citizen at the szfety 
of bis house and the strict municipal re&ula t I io  
regarding weights and measures ; the merchant 
at  the equity of the decisions and the protec- 
tion of his property; and the soldiers at the 
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regular manner in which their arrears are dis- 
charged. A man in power call have no higher 
praise. Dost Mahomed Khan has not attained 
his fortieth year ; his mother was a Persian, 
and he has been trained up with people of that 
nation, which has sharpened S s  understanding 
and given him advantages over all his brothers. 
I-Ie is doubtless the most powerful chief in 
Afghanistan, and may yet raise himself by his 
abilities to a much higher rank in his native 
country." 
The writer who has already been several times 
referred to, Mohun Lal, who appeaTs to me to 
have allowed his judgment as a historian to be 
warped by his desire to say what he thought 
would be most agreeable to his English pntrons, 
gives the following description of this ruler 
about the same period ; and it may be interest- 
ing to place i t  side by side with the one just 
quoted. In  some respects the English writer is 
the more impartial ; yet even unwillingly as i t  is 
given, Mohun Lal's tribute is a flattering one :- 
" In  the person, in the manners, and in the 
public proceedings of the Ameer there is mani- 
fest the existence of everything imaginable 
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most suitable to support his own view. He is 
calm, prudent, and wise in cabinet, and an able 
commander in the field. I n  treachery, cruelty, 
murder, and falsehood he is equally notorious. 
He  is no t  at all a popular ruler," but he is t h e  
first man in Afghanistan who knows how to 
keep his authority undisturbed, and to deal 
effectually with the vagabond Afghans. He is 
certainly very much liked in regard to one  
thing, namely, this : any man seeking for jus- 
tice may stop him on the road by holding his. 
hand and garment, and may abuse him for not, 
relieving his grievances. Whatever odium may 
attach t o  the Ameer of Cabul, it is an unques- 
tionable fact that he is the only person fit to 
rule Cabul." 
Much more might be quoted to the s i m e  
effect, but  enough has been said, perlia,ps, t o  
show that,  if the test of the result attained be 
applied, Dost Mahomed was even at this time 
a very successful ruler. 
Alone among the Afghan chiefs be had col- 
lected round him the semblance of an army. 
* This assertion is certainly a rqsh one. 
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His cavalry was computed a t  twelve thousand 
strong, his infantry st four thousand men, and 
he had an artillery train of from fifty to sixty 
field pieces, besides a large number of camel 
swivels. This considerable force was more or 
less trained, and divided into regiments. They 
ware paid regularly, and by that means were 
more firmly attached to  the person of their 
prince. Nor did he commit the blunder of at- 
tempting to create a militmy machine framed 
upon the model of the British army. He left 
the national customs intact, and trusted alone 
to the warlike spirit of the Afghan people, being 
fully content to secure tho maximuna of faithful 
service with the minimum of interference with 
indiviclual rights and liberties. By these means 
he created an armed force, well adapted for war- 
fare in a mountainous region, and one which, if it 
could not cope with a regular army, was at least 
as formidable after it had ostensibly been dis- 
persed as when it was drawn up in regular array. 
It was at this time, when Dost Nal~orned~s 
reputation had been heightened by the success at 
Jumrood, and the repulse of the attempt of Shah 
Shuja against Candahar, that the English Go- 
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vernrnent first came into contact with him as 
ruler of Cabul. The demonstrations made by Per- 
sia against Herat, the thinly concealed activity of 
the Russian agent at Teheran, and the opera- 
tions tha t  were in progress on the steppe from 
Orenburg-a11 these had served to stir the  
Indian authorities up to a great pitch of ac- 
tivity. It was held to be certain that Russia 
was on the eve of making a host'ile move in the  
direction of the Indus, and it must be remem- 
bered that, although much haa taken place in 
the interval, and avast extent of territory been 
annexed by Russia, the prinie object before her 
agents then was exactly what it can only be a t  
tlie present, via. the possession of Herat. It 
would be rash, therefore, for anyone to declare, 
because forty years have not sufficed to obtain 
for Russia the prize she coveted, that t he  
action of our authorities in 1838 was nn- 
justifiable. As a matter of fact, the result 
may be said t o  have afforded the fullest 
vinclication of the policy adopted; for it was 
our energy in 1838 and the following yeara which 
closed the  Persian door to Russia, and com- 
pelled her to take a long and circuitous route 
in 
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in order to reach the outworks of Hindostan. 
When those first Afghan wars of Keane, Pol- 
lock, and Nott are remembered, this much in 
their favour should not be left out  of sight. 
The mission of ,Sir Alexallcler Burnes to 
Cabul in 1837 was intended to cou~iteract 
these evil influences by placing the relations 
with that state upon a surer basis ; but in the 
meanwhile that embassy had been really de- 
prived of its value by the resolution that had 
been come to, to champion the f d e n  Sudosye 
dynasty in the person of Shuja-ul-Mulk, the peu- 
sioner of Loodiana. Dost Mahomed expected 
that the first proof that would be afforded of 
British sympathy towards himself would be the 
restoration of the Peshawur valley, and when 
he found that such a restitution formed no 
part of our plans he mas greatly disappointed 
and chagrined. He had also no direct interest 
in the Herat question at this time, and in 
letters writiten .to the Shah he expressed his 
willingness to become a Persian vassal. In  fact, 
if words in the East were ever anything more 
than au idle compliment, he actually called 
himself a dependant of the Shah. The mis- 
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sion of the Russian agent, Captain Vickovitch, 
further complicated matters, and at last Sir A. 
Burnes withdrew, leaving the impression o n  
the Ameer's mind that the English would 
afford him no assistance .in the realisation of 
his pe t  designs. His brothers at Candahar h a d  
entered into the closest connection with t h e  
Persian Government, and had accepted mithout 
hesitation the part which had been sketched 
out for them. Dost Mahomed, who was a t  
first fay from being unwilling to declare a 
hearty alliance with England, was compelled to 
come round to the same view; and had not the 
Rasso-Persian plot been thwarted by the pro- 
tracted defence of I-Ierst, i t  is probable that his 
alliance with tho Shah, and his acceptance of 
tho overtures brought by Vickovitch would have 
borne fruit in practical facts. 
The withdrawal of Burnes was the imme- 
diate precursor of a declaration of mar against 
Cabul. The reply to the intrigues of Persia 
and Russia was the concentration of the army 
of the Indus a t  Ferozepore. Negotiations then 
ensued between ourselves, Runjeet Singh, and 
Shuja-ul-Mulk for the restoration of the last to 
the 
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. Negotiations then 
, Runjeet Singh,  md 
oration of the last to 
the throne of Cabul; and the Tripartite Treaty 
was drawn up and signed. On the 1st of Oc- 
tober 1838 the celebrated Simla manifesto was 
issued, and the state of the relations between 
British India and Cabul passed from one of 
peace to one of open hostility. I n  that mani- 
festo, which mas both a proclamation to the 
Afghans, and a defence of the Government 
policy manufactured for home use, a large 
number of subjects was dealt with ; but among 
others mas, it is instructive to note, c c  the in- 
tegrity of Hsrat." 
It is unnecessary to do more than very briefly 
recapit~xlate the leading features of a war which 
has already been so often described. The army 
of the Indus marched through the Bolan, and 
entered Candahar without resistance. Two 
months later Ghizni was taken by storm. 
So great was the effect of this reverse upon 
Dost Mahomed that he lost all faith in his 
cause. His army disbanded, and he himself, 
leaving his artillery behind, fled to Bamian. 
Hard pressed in his flight by Outram, the 
Ameer did not stop for any length of time 
until he reached JKhulm, mhere he was well re- 
28 OENTRAL ASIAN POBTRAITS. 
ceivsd by  the Dsbeg chieftains. But even then 
it mas not proposed to make any permanent 
halt there. Some of the Ameer's followers 
recommended his taking refuge in Persia ; 
others, in  Bokhara. While his envoys were 
engaged in exploring the road to Maimene, and 
in paving the way for a journey to Bokhnra, 
the Dost went from Khulm to Kundus, where 
he entered into close relations with Mourad 
Beg, the Usbeg chief of that state. The reply 
salt by Nasrullah, the Ameer of Bokhara, mas 
couched in friendly terms, but Dost Mahomed 
hesitated to accept the invitation of one who 
mas a national enemy. But the road vid Mai- 
mene mas reported to be impassable, and the 
danger of being ctlptured by Kamran, the bitter 
foe of the Barucksyes, afforded an additioilsll 
reason for  accepting the offer of Nasrullah. 
When provisions began to grow scarce inKhulm, 
Dost Mahomed, accompanied by his sons and 
a considerable retinue, set out for the Oxus 
and Bokhara. 
Of Dost Mahorned's residence at ~ o k h a r a  
little need here be said. For a few days he 
was f&ted as became a royal guest, but then 
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For a f e ~ v  days he 
aoyal guest, b u t  then 
either the inconvenience of entertaining so 
large a, number of strangers, or some ulterior 
plan of forming the Afghans into a military 
colony, produced a change in the conduct of 
Nasrullah. Several of the Afghans, and notably 
Alcbas, endeavoured to leave the country. 
Collisions occurred between these and the 
Bokharan troops; and altogether the Afghan 
refugees were a source of considerable aanoy- 
ance to the ruler of Bokhara. Dost Mahomed 
mas at last confined to his house, and treated 
in all respects as a prisoner. It became his 
most ardent desire to effect his escape from the 
hands of a tyrannical ruler who might a t  any 
moment be seized with a whim to o r d a  his 
execution. At! a favourable moment Dost Ma- 
homed escaped from Bokhara t o  Shahr-i-Sebz, 
whence he made his way to Khulm. H e  was 
well received by the Usbeg chiefs of Bfghan 
Turkestan, a.nd he a t  once set about making 
preparations for a fresh effort to recover his 
throne.* 
* An interesting description of his life at Bolrha~a will. 
be found in,,Mohuu LaI's book. It must be ticken czc71ir 
grano salis. 
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Dost Mahomed found little difficulty in raising 
s considerable force of Usbegs out of the petty 
s t a t e s  beyond the Hindoo Koosh. His chief 
supporter in this campaign was Afzul, but 
his troops were for the most part Usbegs, 
a n d  it was arranged that if the adventure 
sbould prove successful, an Usbeg chief was 
to become his Vizier. His army advanced 
boldly enough t o  the attack of our outposts in 
t h e  Sighan valley, but at  Bajgah-the scene of 
several encounters before and since-his cavalry 
under  Afzul was worsted. I n  face of his su- 
perior numbers, our little force concentrated at  
Bamian, and Colonel Dennie with a small body 
of fresh troops from Cabul arrived to inspire 
n e w  courage int'o the half-wavering ranks of 
our sepoys. It was pre-eminently one of those 
occasiolls mhen boldness is prudence ; and 
Dennie was equal to the occasion. The large 
a r m y  of Dost Mahomed was attacked by the 
smal l  English force, and driven in confusion 
f rom the field. Had Colonel Dennie waited to 
receive the attack of the vastly superior num- 
b e r s  of his assailants, he would in all pro- 
bability have been defeated; but by taking the 
initiative 
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but by taking the 
initiative, he foiled the designs of his antago- 
nist. The principal result of this decided 
success was that the Usbegs deserted Dost 
Mahorned. For a short time it seemed as if he 
had found sure friends and a safe place of 
retreat, but the first breath of disaster showed 
those beliefs to be delusions. Dost Mahomed 
became an outcast and a fugitive. 
Travelling through the valleys, and along the 
declivities of the Hindoo Koosh, the Ameer 
made his way to the Kohistan, where the 
blunders of English policy had converted friends 
into enemies. O w  success at Tootundurrah- 
where Edward Conolly, one of a noble band of 
brothers, was killed-and the failure at  Joolgah, 
mere only the preliminaries to the final collision 
at Purwandurrah, where Dost Mahomed made 
a gallant oharge at  the head of his horsemen, 
routing the 2nd Cavalry, which refused to 
follow its officers. The hour which, as Kaye 
says, should have been one of triumph was one 
of humiliation, and this gallant action threw 
over the fall of Dost Mahomed a, gleam of 
romance and chivalry. Seeing that his success 
was sure to prove transitory, and that his o m  
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followers were doubtful in their fidelity, he 
resolved to  throw himself on t h e  generosity of 
the English. Riding throughout the night of 
the day which had beheld the first victory he 
hacl obtained in the war, he reached Cabul on 
the  3rd of November, and surrendered to Sir 
William Macnaghten in person. A few days 
afterwards he was sent to Calcutta, while his 
family remained at Loodiana. 
Lord Auckland settled on him a pension a t  
the rate of three lacs a year, and he. was 
allowed perfect liberty in his movements. He 
was, no doubt, greatly struck with what he sam 
there, and said that had he known the power of 
the English he would not have thought of 
acting in opposition to their views. Alter the 
conclusion of the second campaign in Afghan- 
istan in 1842 it was decided to permit his return 
to his country, and he thus began a second term 
of authority in Afghanistan. On this occasion he 
llnd the great advantage over the former in that 
the withdrawal of our army from the country 
signified a withdrawal of policy as well, leaving 
him free to deal with the internal condition of 
his state without any apprehension of external 
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pressure. But although he was loud in his ex- 
pression of friendship towards England, that 
did not prevent him entering into some kind of 
understanding with the Maharajah Shere Sin& 
for joint action against her. This may have had 
something t o  do with his conduct during the 
second Punjab war, when an Afghall contin- 
gent fought on the side of the Sikhs; but with 
that exception his relations with the Brii;ish Go- 
vernment after 1842 were those of friendship. 
The restoration of Dost Mahomed mas fol- 
lowed by years of grndua'l recovery 011 the part 
of Afghanistan, and as the country recovered, 
so did the Ameer's authority extend throughout 
the realm. In some of his reforms he was 
much obstructed by his son Akbal*, who had 
tasted the sweets of power during his father's 
absence, and was loth to  sink into a secondary 
position. His death, however, in 1849, removed 
this element of danger and simplified Dost 
Mahomed's task. 
After the close of the P ~ m j a b  war, and the 
annexation of that province by England, Dost 
Mabomed turned his attention more exclus~vely 
to the extension of his empire over Hcrat, and 
3 
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t o  the north of the Hindoo Koosh. I n  1850 he 
wrested Balkh from his former supporters, tlze 
Usbegs, and afterwards subdued Khulm, Kun- 
dus, and Badakshan. In 1855 the connection be- 
tween England and Cabul had been drawn more 
nearly together by the signature of "a treaty of 
amity," and in 1857 the bond was made still 
closer by the conclusion of a second treaty for 
the specific purpose of driving the Persialls 
out of Herat, which they had seized from one 
of those weak rulers who, after the death of 
Yar Mahomed, managed to obtain temporary 
authority in that city. On his death-bed, in 
1863, when he is supposed to have been about 
eighty years of age, he had the great satisfac- 
tion of entering Herat in triumph, and of in- 
corporating that town with the rest of his 
kingdom. The dissensions which had been 
produced by the desire to obtain possession of 
that much-coveted place had been one of the 
chief causes for disturbance in the etate. EIis 
final triumph there was the consummation of a 
life which had been devoted t o  the task of 
restoring Afghanistan to something of its ex- acf 
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during his long reign, a fresh lease of pros. 
~ e r i t y ;  he survived the Sikh power, which a t  
one time threatened to absorb his etate; he 
lived to become good friends with England, his 
former foe; and he left to his son and heir a 
kingdom which, if not as extensive as that of 
Ahmed Shah, was at least a splendid territog. 
I t  is difficult to arrive at  a decided opinion 
concerning the exact character of the man whose 
long career, extending over a period of more 
than sixty years, has hers been sketched out. 
Mohun Lal's biography, in which he styles his 
subject a hero and paints him a villain, doe8 
not certainly simplify the task. The miter 
whose opinion should have been the most vdu-  
able is consequently of little value to us, and 
we must form an opinion for ourselves from the 
ascertained facts which make up the hiatory of 
the period. The more closely Dost Mahorned's 
career is studied from the earliest time, when 
he served as page to his brother Futteh, the 
more evident does it appoar that he was 
actuated throughout by one idea. The youngest 
of the Barucksyes, he was in a sense the most 
ambitious, for whereas his brothers aspired only 
3 *  
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to the Viziership under a Sudosye king, or at- 
the most to independent governomhips in a 
Barucksye confederacy, he alwalys aimed a t  
first ousting the Sudosyes from the realm, and 
then making his own authority supreme and 
unquestioned therein. I n  this, after many 
failures, disappointments, and disasters, he suc- 
ceeded. His triumph came in the evening of 
life, but apparently it was enjoyed none the less. 
The Sudosye dynasty became a tradition, the  
Barucksye brothers disappea~ed one by one- 
leaving him alone to represent a family ancl an  
idea-the intrigues of the Persian mere beaten 
back, the apprehe~lsions of England were 
allayed-all was changed save the person who 
had a t  one time been the plaything of fortune, 
and a t  another the victim of circumstance. E e  
had conquered his enemies, or been conquered 
by them. He had always met them boldly, and 
in tho end he triumphed over them all by sur- 
viving them. H e  achieved a still greater triumph 
by surviving the political conditions which a t  
one time threatened his ruin. Never has a n  
Asiatic chief succeeded, and probably never 
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making his 
policy appear to be the policy of England. Yet 
he succeeded at  the least in doing this. I t  mas 
his policy which triumphed in 1842. Its vis- 
dom was ratified by succeas under tlie walls of 
Herat in 1863. I t  was the continuatioll of the 
same policy which was adopted from that year 
until 1869, and it remained in force, very 
slightly modified, dowu to the year 1875. Not 
only did Dost Mahomed make himself supreme 
in Afghanistan, and establish a fresh dynasty, 
not only did he secure all the objects at which 
he origillelly aimed, but he also obtained the 
triumph of his own policy, which was to keep 
his coulitry independent by inducing his neigh- 
bours to regard it with indifference. Whatover 
attraction the mushroom Barucksyes " may k 
have in the eyes of the observers is due exclu- 
sively Do tho genius of Dost Mahomed. I t  vas 
he who gave life to a cause that would but for 
him have probably remained in the background. 
This is really only his secondary title to con- 
sideration and praise; his first and principal 
being his steadfast and never-swerving adhe- 
rence to a programme which he had sketched 
out during the earlier days of his public career. 
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Alone among Asiatics of prominent mark h e  
had sufficient confidence in himself and his 
cause to adhere to his views, when to all seem- 
ing that adherence would cost him his throne,. 
his power, his life. This is his true claim t~ 
be considered a great man. Alone among 
Asiatics, of his age at  all events, he had con- 
victions, and he endeavoured to act up to them. 
He  had consequently a great advantage over all 
his rivals, for in everything he clid he had a 
great motive, whereas they for the most part 
were influenced by littlenesses beneath coa- 
tempt. Pages might be filled in discussing the 
character of this great man, but his chief merit 
consisted in tho simple fact that he saw farther 
ahead than his contemporaries. His ability 
and tact, nay, his very plausibility, served 
to render the acceptance of his views the less 
distasteful; but however their acceptance may 
have been brought about, they were accepted, 
and it was the policy of Dost Mahomed which 
mas held to be, for a quarter of a century, un- 
diluted wigdom in thie country. Others ob- 
tained the credit, but he was the fountain-head 
whence it sprang. As a general, Dost Maho- 
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med was probably inferior to bot,h Nadir and 
Ahmed, but the difficulties which hampered his 
progress were much more serious than those 
that beset the career of the Turcoman or the 
Durani. As a ruler he probably surpassed 
them. With many of the qualities of Baber, 
Dost Mahomed might at another period have 
left a deeper track in history ; but no English- 
man can afford to ignore a life which was at 
once varied and rich with profitable experiences. 
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THE LATE AKHOND OP SWAT. 
IN the moilntainous region which lies to the 
north of the Peshawur valley, and beyond the 
country of the Momunds, are the districts of 
Swat and Bajour. Tho hillmen who inhabit 
them are known far and wide for their fanati- 
cism and their courage. Seldom, incleed, has 
it happeascl that the explorer has been able to 
obtain admission mithin their borders, and they 
have continued to live on after their own primi- 
tive fashion, deaf to the entreaties of the Afghan 
rulers, and indifferent to the threats of either 
Sikhs or English. It mas among these tribes, 
ruled by chiefs whose claims to exercise autho- 
rity were admitted in a more or less loose 
manner, that the latest instance occurred of a 
priee 
spres 
quiri 
POWE 
rity i 
the c 
that 
fanat 
their 
it the 
pome: 
part I 
thirtj 
of thl 
the le 
amon1 
of the 
cell tc 
Abc 
name, 
first 
last o 
there 
from 
studie 
1 to the 
ond the 
bricts of 
inhabit 
r fanati- 
?ed, has 
I able to 
snd they 
n primi- 
! Afghan 
)f either 
e tribes, 
e autho- 
s s  loose 
red of a 
THB LATE AKEOND OF SWAT. 41. 
priest, whose reputation had been created and 
spread by the supposed sanctity of his life, nc- 
quiring into his hands an exclusive spiritual 
power which over-rode whatever secular autho- 
rity the native chiefs possessed. I t  is true that 
the career of the late Akhond of Swat is only 
that of the most successful of those religious 
fanatics of the Indian frontier who have turned 
their fanaticism to practical acconnt by making 
it the means for attaining worldly influence and 
power. But none the less, considering the 
part he played ill frontier politics during almost 
thirty years, is his history well wort11 the study 
of the politician and the historical student. At 
the least it  will show how easy is the passage, 
among the superstitious and fanatical hilhnen 
of the lands beyond the Punjab, from a hermit's 
cell to a chieftain's castle. 
Abdul Ghafur, such was the late Akhond's 
name, is supposed to have been born in the 
first years of the present century, or in the 
last of the eighteenth, but of the exact date 
there is no record. Before his first ret;irement 
from the world in 1823, he had, however, 
studied under the instruction of several learned 
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priests, but had never been able to master t he  
intricacies of the Koran sufficiently to hope for  
any exceptional distinction as a " mollah." H i s  
fa ther  was an inhabitant of a small village in 
t h e  Xwat territory, and until he had reached t h e  
age of sixteen Abdul's  ole experience had 
been that of tending his father's flocks 011 the  
hills and in the fertile valleys of that district. 
The boy, naturally ambitious and extremel~r 
acquisitive by disposition, was unable to brook 
t h e  irksomeness and solitude of h s  existence. 
I-Ie fled to Peshawur, then in the hands of t h e  
Sikhs, and passed some years there and at 
other places in the study of the doctrines of 
his religion. But, in 1823, he came to the  de- 
cision that he must adopt some other method 
of acquiring that power for whichhe so eagerly 
longed. He retired accorclingly to the lonely 
island of Beyka, which, created by one action of 
t h e  river Indus, has been long since destroyed 
by another, and there during twelve years he 
sojourned in perfect seclusion, broken only by 
%he periodical visits of devotees, who, attracted a t  
first by curiosity, came again and again, through 
a belief in his semi-divine attributes, and spread 
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throughout the Punjab, then groaning under 
the rule of the Sikh heretics, the fame of the 
hermit of Beyka. 
The reputation of his sanctity reached the ears 
of Dost Mahomed, nt that time established as 
ruler in Cabul and the adjoining districts ; and 
when that prince came t o  the resolution, in 1835, 
to declaye a war against the Sikhs, he not un- 
naturally decided to enlist the sympathy and 
aid of the recluse in his cause. Dangerous 
as was the enterprise upon which he was about 
to embark, considering the power and ability of 
Runjeet Singh, Dost Mallomed had reasonable 
hopes of being able to drive the Sikhs out of 
the Peshawur plain and beyond the Indus, and 
his first step was to invite Abdul Ghafur to 
quit his retreat and participate in the campaign 
that was about to commence for tho cause of 
that religion of which he had proved himself to  
be so enthusiastic a follower. With the sum- 
mons of the Afghan chief Abdul willingly com- 
plied, for he saw that the moment had arrived 
in his career when he was either to obtain the, 
object for which he had so long striven or to 
sink back into the insignificance from which, by 
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resolution of no ordinary kind, he had tempo- 
rarily emancipated himself. Of the result of 
this combination of secular force and religious 
fervour, suffice it here t o  say that neither o n e  
nor the other availed to turn the scale aga in s t  
the " big battalions " of the Sikhs. I n  the  war  
of 1836 Dost Mahorned's powor was g rea t ly  
crippled, and for offensive measures east of t h e  
Rhyber that power altogether disappeailed. . 
But Abdul Ghafur's determination was proof 
against even such a serious rebuff as this, a n d  
he resolved to separate his fortunes in a cer ta in  
sense from those of Cabnl, and to seek a f resh  
field for his influence in the mountainous t r a c t s  
stretching north of the Khyber towards Chi t ra l  
and Cashmere. To his natal hills, therefore, 
returned the once ignorant boy, now developed 
into a personage of no mean authority t h rough  
his own abilikies. His chosen followers, f ew in 
number, were formidable by reason of t h e i r  
energy, their fanaticism, and their implicit cre-  
dence in the supernatnral powers of their leader.  
With  this small nucleus of skilled and fa i th fu l  
administrators, he, who originally came in s o m e  
sense as a fugitive, grad~zally acquired sup reme  
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lled and faithful 
ly came in some 
cquired supreme 
control over the place of sanctuary t o  which 
the pursuing Sikhs had driven him. The exact 
form of rule observed among the Swatees has 
never been made very clear, but, whatever i t  
was, that of Abdul Ghafur, now becoming 
lrilown as t-he Akhond, or priest-magistrate, 
soon supplanted it both in Swat and Bajour. 
Long before the Byear 1850 the Akhond, into 
whose neighbourhood we were brought ill that 
year by the annexation of the Punjab, had 
become a power for good or for evil along the 
Indian frontier. He had a,ccolnplished his 
heart's desire of wide-spread notoriety a t  the 
same time that he had spread his secular autho- 
rity over no inconsiderable extent of country. 
He had dispensed with the alliance of Dost 
Mahorned, and he had set the power of the 
Sikhs at, defiance. But  in 1850 the presence of 
the English power within striking distance of his 
own almost inaccessible stronghold compellecl 
the adoption of a more circumspect attitude, and 
although in ollo of the first important border 
difficulties in which we were engaged he gave 
shelter to  refugees hostile to  us from our terri- 
tory, he never on any occasion declared a 
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'' jehad " against us. The years 1850-53 mere 
marked by great activity on the part of t.he 
Swatees, Otman Khels, and other tribes within 
our borders, and it was generally supposed that 
the Akhond was the moving spirit iu the league 
that was formed against us. He certainly gave 
shelter and made grants of land to refugees 
from British territory. 
During the ten years after 1853 he preserved 
a stricter neutrality, confining himself to the 
extension of his spiritual influence; and even 
a t  the worst stage of the Mutiny he is said to  
have given the advice not to enter into hostili- 
ties with us t o  those who sought his opinion. 
In this he did but copy the example set to all 
of Patkan race by Dost Mahomed. Six years 
after the Mutiny, the expedition sent against 
the Sittana colonists in Umbeyla roused him 
into fresh activity, and a league of c t  almost 
all the tribes from the Indus to Cabul" was 
formed against us. There is great difference 
of opinion as to the exact part played by the 
A.khomcl in this war, the fiercest of all our 
frontier campaigns ; but there is no doubt that 
he did actually join the tribes we were engaged 
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,s we were engaged 
with. Sir Neville Chamberlain mentions in his 
official despatches the arrival of the Akhond, 
and the measures which he took in concert with 
the Moulvie Abdullali, the leader of the Sittana 
fanatics. So great was the effect of this da- 
cided act on the part of the Akhond that it was 
found necessary to raise the strength of the 
English force to nine thousand men. After the 
two severe defeats at  Laloo and Urnbeyla, and 
the destruction of the village of Mulka, the 
Akhond fled back to Swat. Major James, the 
politlical officer accompanying the expedition, 
believed that he had only joined the Sittana 
rebels because he feared that if be did not, his 
influence would suffer to the advantage of that 
of the Hi~idoo Moulvie. It was his name, how- 
ever, which had made the rising so formidable ; 
but the complete auccess attained by the Eng- 
lish expedition read him a lesson which he never 
forgot. 
It is impossible to say what part the Akhond, 
wlio h ~ d  gained during the last fifteen years of 
his life a power both within and without our 
frontier not to be despised by us, played in the 
various border disturbances. He may have 
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been their prime instigator or their persistent 
disapprover. He undoubtedly was the oracle 
to which the hillmen had recourse with as 
much superstitious veneration as was mani- 
fested of old towards that of Delphi. Of what 
nature his responses were we know not, and 
it is very doubtful if now we ever shall h o w .  
He is represented as having discouraged Sllere 
Ali in his proposals for joint action against this 
t country, and to have also refused his approval I 
to the Jowakis in their hostility towards our- 
selves in 1877. If these assertions could be 
proved to be authentic, it would be natural to 
assume that  a perception of the power.of our 
rule had qualified his old religious and poli- 
tical antipathies. But, after all, these asser- 
tions may have been the mero voice of idle 
rumour, and the real convictions of the atmbi- 
tious Akhond may have been of s far different 
complexion. During the last few years t he  
question was further complicated, and certainly 
in our favour, by the jealousy felt by Shere Ali 
for the independent ruler of Swat. Bajour and 
Xwat are fertils valleys, and their strategical 
importance is very great. Shere Ali claimed 
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them as part of tbe Afghan- rnonarclly, and, 
although he was willing on various occasions 
to  propitiatle the Akhoad, he never relished 
the existence of an independent Power within 
his own dominions. These two rulers to s 
slight extent neutralised each other. They 
never concludecl an alliance either against us 
or anybody else. I n  the main they played at 
cross purposes and pulled in different direc- 
tiona, and we profited by their disunion. 
The spiritual authority of the Akhond often 
brouglit his pretensions into collision with tho 
administrative regulations of our Government ; 
for his influence was perhapa greatest among 
our subjects the Yusufsai. The decrees of 
excommunication which he fulminated against 
his rivals, and they were far from being few, 
were generally respected in the Punjab, and his 
opinion of the unlawfulness of bestowing fune- 
ral rites-jwzezn-on those who served an 
infidel government such as ours, was the cause 
of the retirement from our native service of 
many who would otherwise have remained with 
us. The authority of the Akhond was, therefore, 
in many ways, inconvenient to our officials. Of 
4 
50 UENTRAL ASIAN PORTRAITS. 
the domestic life of Abdul Qhafur little is. 
known. In the early years of his career h e  
preached and practised the virtues of celibacy, 
but with his installation as ruler in Swat he 
cast them aside, together with other prejudices 
of his period of asceticism. He left a large 
family, many of whom have arrivcd at  mature 
age, and, doubtless, desired to  perpetuate their 
father's rule. Only a very short time ago,. 
when an old man bordering on eight7, he 
married a young girl of eighteen, and it is, 
possibly, only our lack of information which 
would make us mention this as his last marriage 
ceremony. For a time, some of his personal 
authority descended to his son, but the most 
recent intelligence from Swat tends to show 
that the native chiefs are reacquiring exclusive 
power in that valley. I 
The death of the Akhond occurred in the 
beginning of the year 1878, at a time when the  
crisis on the Punjab frontier was becoming 
acute. His disappearance from the troubled 
scene in which hs had so long played a fore- 
most part turned undoubtedly to  the advan- 
tage of this country; but regarding the life of 
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Abdul Ghafur from the standpoint of his fellow- 
countrymen and co-religionists, it is impos- 
sible for us to withhold from him a very high 
degree of admiration. Whether at  heart a foe 
or a friend to mngland-which, perhaps, will 
ever be a piloblem-he always, it must be ad- 
mitted, had the courage of his convictions, both 
in adversity and in prosperity; and his personal 
intrepidity mas not less remarkable than that 
stoicism and pomer of endurance which earned 
for him so wide a reputation among the Ma- 
homedans of the Punjab and the neighbouring 
regions. Just as his career was but an irnita- 
tion of that of the great Afghan saint, Dar- 
wezah, so may he himself serve as the ideal for 
some future Pope in the lands that fringe the 
British dominions in India. The present state 
of Asian politics, and the actual condition of 
the Mahomedan religion, alike favour the pre- 
tensions of those fanatics, who, partly by craft 
and partly out of downright earnestness in 
their sentiments, obtain an ascendancy among 
their co-religionists. Of such Abdul Ghafur 
was the most recent, end in some respects he 
was also the most remarkable. 
4 * 
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SHERE ALI. 
TEE genius of Dost Mahomed was to a great 
I r oxtent inherited by the majority of his sons. 
I Alcbar Khan, our opponent in 1842 ; Hydei- 
I I Gholnm, for many years the heir-apparent; 
I .  Af zul, a successful soldier, and ultimately Ameer ; 
i ' Azim, not less successful in warfare, and, for a. 
brief space, also de facto Ameer ; Ameen, 
Alchram, both slain in battle, and Shereef,- 
wore all in their way remarkable, both as types 
of the Afghan character and for their personal 
qualities. But none of these brothers in- 
herited so much of their father's genius as 
Shere Ali, the late ruler of Afghanistan. Both 
as n soldier and as an administrator he ap- 
proached most nearly to the greatest of the 
a great 
IS sons. 
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Barucksyes. Like his fatlier, he was above the 
influence of adverse fortune. IIe never ap- 
peared more noble than when crushed by defeat. 
But the fortitude which he evinced in the face 
of disaster deserted him in his days of pros- 
perity. The temper of his mind mas as keen 
and polished as could be imagined, but he 
lacked that serenity which had made Dost Ma- 
homed as fopmidable a's s n  octogenarian as he 
had been in the days of his fiery youth. Essen- 
tially Sliere Ali's cliaracter was deficient in bal- 
last. He was great in his conception, but weak 
in his execution of a design. Ee  could nerve 
himself to bear stoically the greatest yeverse of 
fortune; but he could not achieve the same 
victory when fortune had showered favonYs 
upon him and he was nursed in the lap of 
prosperity. His biography, rightly regarded, , 
is of scarcely less interest than that of his 
father; and its teiiour is the more importslit in 
proportion as the Afghan question has increased 
in significance duriiig the last twenty years. 
Xhere Ali was born in, or about, tlie year 
1820. I-Iis mother, a lady of noble birth, mas 
the same who had borne to Dost Maholned 
54  UENTElAL ASlAN PORTRAITS. 
Akbar and Hyder Gholam. Of the better 
known of that rulep's sons Shere Ali was con- 
sequently the fifth. Of his early life little has 
been preserved save that as a young man he 
accompanied his fatlier during his enforced resi- 
dence in India from 1840 to 1842, and it is sup- 
posed that it was his companionship during that 
period which endeared him SO much to his sire. 
It is not necessary, however, to discover in 
the  selection of Shere Ali as his successor any 
peculiar farouritism on the part of Dost Ma- 
homed. By all the rules of Afghaii custom he 
became on the deatlz of his elder brot'hers, 
Akbar and Hyder Gholam, the proper heir. His 
claims were superior to the children of the 
former, and his other and older brothers, 
Afzul and Azim, were the offspring of an 
inferior wife. We know from contemporary 
reports that scenes of disturbance in the various 
cities where his sons officiated as governors 
marked the closing years of Dost Mahorned, 
and that  tho final triumph of that prince under 
tho walls of Herat but shortly preceded his 
death, when anarchy fell upon the rea.lm. The 
nomination of Shere Ali as heir apparent upon 
better 
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the  death of Hyder Gholam had warned the 
other sons that the disappearance of the Dost 
would be tlie fit occa,sion for the revelation of 
their individual pretensions ; and when the 
conclusive triumph of his reign was followed 
by the termination of the life of the aged 
Ameer, they a6 once made their preparations 
for disputing the inheritance with that younger 
son whom many of them despised quite as much 
as they hated. 
Dost Mahomed died a t  Herat on the 9th of 
June 1863 ; and a few days afterwards Shere 
Ali was proclaimed Ameer of Afghanistan and 
it,s dependencies. Those of his brethren then 
a t  Herat were compelled to acknowledge him 
as their lawful ruler, and to again swear 
,oaths of fidelity to him upon the Koran; and 
when he had taken this precaution, l e a ~ i n g  his 
third son, Yakoob Khan, behind as Governor 
of Herat, he hastened by forced marches to the 
eastern parts of his dominions." Nor was his 
* Much of the description of Shere Ali's wars with his 
brothers is taken from my " England and Russiain Central 
Asia." 
j ,  
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11 
! / I  promptitude unnecessary. His full brother 
I! ? Ameen Khan, a t  that time governor of Canda- 
6 1 har, was the first to appear in arms against him, I i 1 
and this example of fraternal jealousy found i n  
'Iik a, short time imitators in both Afzul and Azim. I ;  The year passed off, liomever, without any hos- 
1 1 tilities on a large scale, and in December our 
I 1, ' I  
, I  
Government officially recognised Shere Ali. 
During the winter of 1863-64 preparations were 
I 
being made in silence for the war that was to 
commence with the first appearance of spring. 
On the one side Shere Ali strove to put down 
opposition by a bold front, and to add to t he  
strength of his position by obtaining the sym- 
pathy and practical aid of our Government. In 
this latter object he was not very successful. 
On the other side, Ameen IChan at  Candahar, 
Afzul a t  Balkll, and Azim in Khurum, mere a l l  
preparing for the contest with not less energy, 
and thus Shere Ali found himself threatened 
on three sides by powerful foes. The cam- 
paign commenced in April 1864 with a simul- 
taneous advance against Azim in the south-east 
and Afzul in the north. The former of these 
was speedily overthrown by Shere Ali's general, 
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Mahomed Rafik, and compelled to flee into Bri- 
tish territory. In the northern campaign, 
fought out in the passes of the Hindoo Koosh 
round Bamian, the result was less conclusive. 
A drawn battle took place at Bnjgah, in which 
Mahomed Ali Khan, the eldest son and heir of 
Shere Ali, greatly distinguished himself. Both 
sides then showed themselves anxious for an ac- 
commodation, Shere Ali because he dreaded tho 
price of victory, Afzul because discouraged by 
the defeat of Azim. .A truce was arranged 
mithont much cli£Eculty, and the two armies, 
lately drawn up in hostile array, cntered Balkh i in company. For a brief space things wore 
I a peaceful aspect, but Abderrahinan, Afzul '~  
son, was detected in some act of treachery. 
This underhand plotting afforded Shere Ali an 
excuse for adopting harshor measures in deal- 
ing with his rivals. Afzul was arrested and 
imprisoned, and Abderrahman escapecl across 
the Oxus into Bokhara. Whatever blame may 
have attached to Shere Ali for this summary 
proceeding, there is no doubt that his triumph 
was almost complete at the close of his first 
campaign. With Azim and Abderrahman fugi- 
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tives, and Afzul a captive in his power, Shere 
Ali seemed t o  have crushecl all resistance to  his 
authority as soon as it had shown its head. 
Disaffection appeared to be triumphant i11 the 
south alone, where Ameen Khan held indepen- 
dent court at  Candahay. Futteh Mahorned, a 
son of Alcbar, mas raised to the governorship 
of Balkh, while the Ameer in person returned 
to  Cabul for the purpose of dealing with his 
last lival. But by this time the: year was dram- 
ing t o  a close, and military operations had to  be 
suspended until the melting of the snow. I n  the  
meanwhile Ameen Khan had been joined by his 
brother Shereef, and Jellaluddin, his nephew, 
the sou oE Akbar. In  the north, too, Abder- 
rahman, at the heacl of an army raised in Bo- 
khara, was again prepariiig to take the field. 
I n  the  commencement of the year 1865 Shere 
Ali's position again seemed serious, but still he 
might reasonably expcct to triumph over all 
his difficulties by promptitude and audacity. 
The army of Ameen Khan appeared in  the 
field several weeks before that of Abderrahman 
#could move, and ere Sherc Ali left Cabul it 
had attempted t o  seize the fortress of Khelat-i- 
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rtress of Khelat-i- 
Ghiljie by a coup de main. The resolution of 
the garrison foiled the attempt, and the Canda- 
har forces retired as Sherc Ali's army advanced 
towards them. At  Kujhbaz, near the town 
just mentioned, the rival armies halted in face 
of each other, and prepared for the struggle 
which was to decide this part of the campaign. 
On the Candahar side the three confederates 
already mentioned aild Surwar Khan, the eldest 
son of Azim, held command. On the Cabul side 
were Shere Ali himsclf, his eldest son Mahomed 
Ali Khan, and his best general, Mallorned Rafik. 
The battle commenced early in the moruing of 
the Gth of June, and during the earlier portion 
of the day Shere Ali's army seemed to be 
getting the worst of it. At  the crisis of the 
engagement he rode up t o  his eldest son, and 
tauuted him with want of courage. The story 
goes that, deeply st,uiig at  this accusation, Ma- 
homed Ali led a desperate charge into the 
thickest of the battle, and finding himself face 
to face wihh Ameen Khan, fought with him, 
until they slew each other. To his eldest son's 
bra~esy Shere Ali owed a victory when on 
the point of being defeated, and the death 
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of Ameen extracted all real danger from the  
side of Candahar. Within a week that city sur- 
rendered and became the base fro111 which most 
of Sliere Ali's subsequent operations were car- 
ried on. The chief importance of this success 
consisted in its restoring communications with 
Yakoob Khan, who, during all these disturb- 
ances, had maintained his father's authority in 
I 
Rerat. For the moment it seernod as  if dl 
Sbere Ali's troubles were about to cease, foY 
his arms had up to this point been uniformly 
successful, and in all directions. So assured did 
his triumph appear that the Ameer withdrew 
to Candahar t o  indulge in the luxury of grief 
for the loss of his eldest and favourite son. 
To Ibrahim Khan, his second son, but  o n  I 
the death of Mahomed Ali the presumptive 
heir, he  entrusted the northern campaign, 
which was to be carried on in the vicinity of 
Cabul itself. About six weeks after the battle 
of Kujhbaz, Abderrahmau crossed the Oxus a t  
the head of an Afghan army, and was a t  once 
joined by the forces which had been entrusted 
with the defence of Balkh. Shore Ali's go- 
vernor, Putteh Mahomed, fled through Barnian \ 1 
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to Cabul. During tho months of August, Sep- 
tember, and October, inaction prevailed on all 
sides, save that the army of Abderrahman mag 
daily drawing closer to Cabul. At  this lnolnellt 
Shere Ali's cause received a serious blow by 
the defection of his general, Mahomed Rafik, 
mhom Ibrabim Khan had wantonly insulted, 
and of his own brother, Shereef, mhom the 
Ameer had pardoned for his previous defection 
and then despatched wit11 reinforcements to 
Cabul. Azim had also joined Abderrahman, 
and the hostile camp again presented a united 
and formidable appearance to the embarrassed 
Anieer. 
The year 1865 closed ominously, but no blow 
had yet been struck. Courage and rapidity of 
movement can always do much against greater 
numbers, but the unfortunate Shere Ali still 
passed his time in Candahar in idle lamenta- 
tion. I n  Februa~y, Bairn, who had assumed the 
chief command, summoned Ibrahim Khan to sur- 
render, and, after some paltry skirmishing, the 
army of Shere Ali melted away, and the capital 
was given up. On the 2nd of March, Azim 
was installed as temporary ruler, while Ibra- 
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him wended his way with the evil ticlings t o  
his father at Candahar. With the occupation 
of Cabul, the second stage of this bitter con- 
test may be said to have closed. Shere Ali, 
victorious a t  Kujhbaz, lost a11 the fruits of that 
battle by his subsequent lethargy ; and then, 
by employing the incapable Ibrahim, had done 
much towards ruining his cause. 
The news of the fall of his capital roused him 
from his torpor like the sound of battle to  a 
war-horse. The black cloud which had partially 
obscured his reason for nine months, was dis- 
pelled by this unexpected disaster. Great 
efforts were made in Candabar and the southern 
portion of the state to raise and to equip 
another army; and he received from Yakoob 
Khan at Herat large reinforcements of brave 
troops. With such energy did Shere Ali de- 
vote himself to his task, that in the middle 
of April he felt in readiness to advance t o  
the relief of Ghizni, which still held out  for 
him. His army was computed to number some 
fifteen thousand men, of whom a large propor- 
tion was cavalry, and he had also twenty-five 
guns more or less effective. Ghizni was entered 
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in triumph on May-day, and once more the op- 
poilents were reduced to what appeared to be 
an equality. After a few days' rest in this for- 
tress, Shere Ali marched north against the con- 
federate enca,rnpment at  Shaikhabad. On the 
10th a general action commenced, wherein the 
impetuosity of Shere Ali proved unavailing 
against the tactical skill of h i m .  Ghiani at once 
opened its gates to the conqueror, and Shere 
Ali fled to Nanni with a few hundred followers. 
His defeat had been colllplete. All his artil- 
lery, stores, equipage, and most of his troops 
had fallen into the hands of the victor ; and he 
was left alone and as a fugitive to oppose the 
resistance of half-a-dozen conquering princes. 
Yet he did not despair. His adversity was 
! God's will, but human energy and determina- tion would still suffice to retrieve what had 
been lost through misfortune. With the fall 
of Ghizni Afzul recovered his liberty, ancl he, a s  
as the elder brother of Axim, was installed ap, 
ruler. Then there ensued a lull in the contest. 
Apathy ~haracte~ised the movements of the 
victors after Shaikhabad just as it had charac- 
terised those of Shere Ali after Kujhbaa, only in 
.-- 
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this case with less excuse. Afzul Khan reigned 
in Cabul, Ghizni, and the northern khanates ; 
Shere Ali in Candahctr, Ferrah, and Herat. 
i l l  I : )  firmed deba~lchee, was speedily supplanted in / 1 :  Balkh by Baiz Mahorned, another of the Baruck- 
I $  sye brothers. 
I l j  , Shere Ali remained at Candahar endeavour- 
:;i li !] There were two de ,fncto rulers, and the State 
ing to arm the levies which his own energy had 
gathered around him. All his overtures t o  
procure assistance from us in arms or in money 
mcre rejected, and he had slowly to construct 
his own artillery, and t o  collect muskets f o ~  the
recovery of his realm. In the meanwhile his 
enemies were playing into his hands. Azim 
had developed into n blood-thirsty tyrant, Afz~zl 
into a drunkard, Abderrahman into a dissatis- 
fied intriguer. During the reign of terror at 
Gabul, Azim, in s fit of passion, caused 
Mahomed Rafik t o  be arrested and murdered. 
This act of treachery alienated much of the 
popular sympathy from the side of the con- 
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federates, and public opinion began a t  last 
to veer round to the side of Shere Ali. The 
year 1866 passed away in preparations for the 
contest, but early in January 1867 Faiz Maho- 
med, now the ally of Shere Ali, forced the 
Bamisn pass, and advanced on Cabul. A diver- 
sion in his rear compelled him to return, and the 
imminent danger from this quarter disappeared. 
I n  the meanwhile more important events were 
in progress in the south. The armies of Shere 
Ali and Azim had encountered under the walls 
of Khelat-i-Ghiljie, and for a second time the 
fortune of war decided against the former. 
Khelat-i-Ghiljie and Candahar fell into the 
hands of Azim, and Shere Ali was expelled 
from all his possessions except those in the far 
west. 
The recognition of Afzul by our Govera- 
meat as Ameer of Cabul and Gandahar, 
must be considered to have been the inost 
important result 6f this victory. Azim was 
appointed governor of Candahw, and prepma- 
tions were made for the invasion of Herat 
and the final overthrow of Shere Ali's power. 
At this period a brief gleam of sunshine 
5 
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appeared to the distressed Ameer in the  
staunchness of Faiz Mahomed, who won a 
battle at  Bajgah in the neighbourhood of Ba- 
mian. An interview took placo in the moun- 
tains betweell Shere Ali and Faiz Mahomed, 
and a league was formed between them for the 
recovery oE Cabul. About this time Shere Ali, 
in disgust with our neutrality, made overtures 
to Russia and to Persia, which, however, came 
t o  nothing. 
Late in the autumn, when all hope of fo- 
reign aid had to be abandoned, the army of 
Shere Ali and Faiz Mahomed set out for Cabul. 
It had not proceeded far before Abderrahman 
caught the division of the Balkh chieftain in 
the defiles near Eila Alladad, and routed it. 
I n  the battle Faiz Mahomed was slain. This 
event occurred in September, and early in the 
following month Afzul died. His able brother 
Azirn succeeded him, and was recognised even 
by his nephew and rival Abderrahman. The 
Indian Government deputed a Valcil to reside 
at  his court, and he could fairly claim the title 
of Sovereign of Cabul by right of possession. 
His triumph was complete on all sides, for even 
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Balkh, after the death of Faiz Mahorned, had 
been occupied by Abderrahman. Surwer Rhail, 
Azim's son, was appointed governor of Can&- 
her, alld h i m  himself remained in Cabul. Par 
6hree years fortune had been uniformly aclverse 
to shire Ali, in co~zncil chamber anh on the 
field of battle. She was now, a t  last, when all 
things were at  their blackest, about to veer. 
roulzd to his side with he13 usual inconstancy. 
Up Lo this stage in the mar Shere Ali had: 
fought his own battles, and in contrast with 
his brother Azim's or his nel~liew's military 
capacitJy his skill had appeared to small advau- 
tagc. In the campaigns we have described he 
had been done well swved by his son Mahomed 
Ali and his general Mahomed Rafik, and with 
the death of the former and the defection of 
the latter all the burthen of maintaining the 
strife fell on his own shoulders. He had been 
uotoriously ill served by Ibrahim Khan. But 
now, when it seemed a;ll hope must be absn- 
donecl, he found a supporter and a champion in 
Yakoob Khan, his thircl son, then a youth of 
nineteen. Up to tliie moment the part the latter 
had talcen in affairs had been only of secondary 
.. 
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importance. He had performed the useful but 
somewhat inglorious office of sergeant-major 
t o  the army, drilling and despatching to the 
front the raw levies of Ferrah and Herat. Now 
he was to assume a more prominent rdls. Abd- 
errahman has been styled the Hotspur of the 
confederacy, but if that comparison be just, it ' \  
is far more appropriate to call Yakoob Khan I 
the Prince Harry of the rightful cause. I n  the 
,spring of 1868 Yakoob Khan set out from 
Herat to attack Candahar, and, without much 
loss of time, defeated Burwar Khan at  the 
battle of the Helmund and drove him out of 
the city. He then advanced on the fortress 
of Ghizni, which opened its gates. 
While these events were in progress Abder- 
rahman was bringing up reinforcements from 
Balkh, whichYakoob Khan, however, intercepted I 
by forced marches, and defeated with consider- 
able loss. Seizing the opportunity caused by 
the withdrawal of Yalcoob Khan, h i m  relieved 
tho garrison of the citadel of Ghizni, which 
still held out for him. But with tho defeat of 
Abderrahman victory was assured to $here Ali; 
and Azim, unable to retard the victorious pro- 
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gress of the combined armies of Shere Ali and 
Yakoob Khan, evacuated the town of Cabul. I n  
Balkh, however, the uncle and nephew plotted 
during the ensuing winter how to regain t.heir 
lost position. In the depth of winter along 
the snowy heights of the Hindoo Koosh the 
struggle was yet to rage for some months, but 
the end was no longer far off. A conclusive battle 
took place at Tinah Khan, near Ghizni, when 
both Abderrahman and Azim suffered defeat at 
the hands of Yakoob Khan. Shere Ali was at 
last triumphant, and on the 26th of January 
1869 he held public Durbar in his regained 
capit;al. I n  hia deepest distress he had found a 
heaven-sent champion in his third son, and to the 
abilities of that youth was it solely owing that 
the tide of war had been rolled backward from 
Heret. Azim meanwhile was flying through 
Seistan, but died of the privations he had un- 
dergone on his road to Teheran. Abderrahman 
fled to Balkh, mhencs he was expelled by Ibra- 
him in the spring of 1869. He found refuge and 
hospitality among the Russians at Samarcand, 
vhere he still resides in the receipt of a large 
pension from the Government of Tashkent. 
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With the close of tho civil war in Cabul it be- 
came necessary for this country to define afresh 
i ts  relations mith a Sovereign who, acknow- 
ledged in 1863 as Ameer, had been partially 
repudiated in 1867, and who in 1869 was again 
supreme, Lord Lawrence, shortly before the 
victory of Tinah Khan, had entered into direct 
negotiations with him and had sent him the pre- 
sent of twenty thousalld pounds with s promse 
of one hundred thousand pounds more. This 
gift arrived most opportunely after the exhaus- 
tion of the struggle, and undoubtedly did to 
some extent allay the irritability our previous 
vacillation had raised within him. Shere Ali 
then commenced the reorganization of his do- 
minions, and appointed Ibrahim Khan, who had 
not greatly distinguishecl himself in the war, 
to tho governorship of I-Ierat. Yakoob Khan, to 
vhose abilities Shere Ali hacl been so greatJy in- 
debt'ed, was placed over the enstera portioll of 
Afghanistan, includiiig Cabul. Having thus 
set his house in order, Shere Ali made the pre- 
paratJioiis necessary for a brief absence from 
his country. From Cabul he proceccled through 
the Xhyber to Jumroocl and Peshawur, and 
st: 
of 
bc 
', an 
t h  
de 
fla 
SHERE ALI. 7 1 
labul i t  be- 
efine afresh 
0, acknow- 
m partially 
1 was again 
before the 
into direct 
lim the pro- 1 
z a promlse I 
lore. This 
the exhaus- 
dly did to 
Ir previous 
Shore Ali 
of his do- 
,n, who had 
1 the war, 
)b Kha~z, to 
I greatally ia- 
portion of 
lving thus 
de the pre- 
lence from 
ed through 
awur, and 
thence to Rawul Pindee ; and visited the Earl 
of Mayo, encamped at Umballa to receive him. 
The Durbar held there was s most gorgeous 
ceremonial, and Shere Ali, impressed by many 
things during his journey through the Punjab, 
was certainly surprised and flattered by the re- 
ception ho found awaiting him at his destination. 
To an ordinary Oriental the pomp and glitter 
of that show would have atoned for muclz that 
was unreal and for doubtful expressions of 
friendship and alliance ; but Shere Ali was not 
an orclinary Oriental. The wonders of Weatem 
science and the imposing majesty of our 
strength were indeed strange things to the ruler 
of an ignoraiit people and an impoverished state ; 
but Shere Ali came not to be astonished or even 
t o  be fhted, so 1nuch as to be assisted, subsidised, 
and guaranteed. Now, to do aay one of these 
things in the way 111 which the afghan ruler 
desired we were not prepared. He had been 
flattered suffioiently, so we thought, in being 
treated as an independent prince, on a footing 
superior even to Scindiah or the Niaam. He  
was also granted a further present of money and 
a fresh supply of arms. But we did not in any 
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single particular comply with the precise de- 
mands which he made upon us. During his 
brief sojourn the conti~iual whirl of entertain- 
ment and display prevoiited anything more 
than an occasional manifestation of disappoint- 
ment at the barrenness of t,he result, but  
to liis mountain home he carried back the 
conviction, to be brooded over in secret, that 
nothing valuable could be extracted from this 
country without the performance of some ser- 
vice on his part, or the su r r e~ ide~  of sollie 
dearly -prized privilege. 
I n  the years following 1869 the impression 
seems more and more to have forced itself upon 
him that in relying on us he would be trusting 
to a broken reed. Yet from our point of view 
we had acted well towards him. We had been 
consistent with all our declarations. We had re- 
cognised with each turn of fortune thai son of 
Dost Maliomed who chanced to be uppermost, 
and not until fortune had conclusively shorn 
that of the brothers Shere Ali mas to be the 
s~~ccessful one did we make up our minds 
that he mas the most eligible candidate. What 
wonder, then, that Shere Ali should be far 
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~p our minds 
didate. What 
should be far 
from enthusiastic in support of our views, and 
rather sceptical of the value to him of that 
friendship with which we were so condescending 
as to honour him ? We had trimmed throughout 
all those years of anarchical misrule, and even at  
, 
the Umballa Durbar we were still aiming at  a 1 
double goal. Until we concluded a treaty with I 
him, bestowing some unequivocal mark of our i 
support, and from which it would not be pos- i ! 
sible for us  to go back, what guarantee had he 1 
that we mould not show ourselves indifferent to 1 
his fato if misfortune were again to fall upou 
him ? The Umballa Durbar was the formal 
confirmation of our recognition of him as da 
facto ruler of Afghanistan. That was all; i 
Shere Ali was in no wise strengthened against 1 
either Abderrahman or any other rival. What ! 
he wanted would have made him safe against 1 
dolnestio as well as foreign foes-a further sup- 
ply of arms, a regular allowance, and, above 
all, some proof of British support to flaunt in 
the face of inimical intriguers in the bazaars I 
of Persia and the Khanates. By a non-com- 1 
pliance with these demands we failed to secure 
his hearty goodwill. The meagre aid-for 
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in his eyes it was meagre-he received from i 
us in money encouraged him to commence im- 
provements in his civil and military systems, 
as  to some of which it is doubtful if they over 
went further than the incipient steps. It was 
not sufficient to enable him to complete them. 1 
The feeling generated in 1869 became \ 
stronger as time rolled on, and in many 
ways Shere Ali showed either caprice o r  ill- 
humour. The Seistan frontier question afforded 
him an opportuaity for  venting his griev- 
ances because our arbitrator* was too impar- 
tial in adjudicating upon the rival claims of 
Persian and Afghan. The intervention of our 
Government in 1814 in f avow of his son Y a- 
koob Khan, whom, by a breach of faith, too 
common in Afghan history to call for much 
notice, he had imprisoned in the Bala Hissar, 
was another grie~ance to be stored up in the 
treasure-house of his memory, until all his 
wrongs should amount to a bill of indictment I 
that would justify him in repudiating the Bri- 
tish alliance, and in casting in his lot with the 
* The present Major-General Sir Frederic Goldsmid, 
C.13., E.C.S.I. 
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&eat Northern Power. His overtures to us in 
1873 for what mould amount to a defensive and 
offensive alliance against Russia, which were re- 
jected ; our proposals to him in January 1877, 
which were tantamount to  his placing his king- 
dom at  our disposal as an advanced post, whence 
the career of Russia in Central Asia might be 
the better arrested t,o the mutual advantage of 
the two states of India and Afghanistan, which 
had no practical result-both these events 
tended to further inflame the mind of a ruler 
who was nothing if he was not passionate and 
suspicious. The occupation of Q~zettall by Brit- 
ish troops proved to tho milld of S here Ali that 
he mnst either retrace his steps, and adopt a 
more friendly policy towards the British Govern- 
ment, or proceed to greater lengths than ever, 
and leave no doubt as to his hostility. For more 
than twelve months he remained doubtful which 
course to pursue ; but the prospect of a war 
between England and Russia over the Eastern 
Question, and the arrival of a Russian embassy 
a t  his capital, decided him. The reception of the 
mission of General Stoletoff led to the despatch 
of the embassy of Sir Neville Chamberlain, 
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and the refusal t o  admit the English representa- 
tive into the country was tlie inevitable pre- 
cursor of war. During the progress of the 
campaign of 18'78 Shere Ali reinailled at  Cabul, 
until the defeat of his troops a t  the Peiwar 
warned him that his line of defence had been 
pierced. I n  a letter dated the 13th of Decem- 
ber 18'78, and addressed to the officers of the 
British Government, Ize announced his de- 
parture from Cabul with the intention of pro- 
ceeding to St. Petersburg, there to place his 
version of the question before a Congress. I n  a 
singularly boastful firman, dated the 22nd of 
December 18'78, and addressed to Omar Iclian, 
the Governor of Herat, Shere Ali announced 
several victories on the part of his troops, 
whose zeal brought on a day like that of the 
Day of Judgment." Although Shere Ali had 
' evidently supposed that he would be admitted 
without any difficulty within Russian territory, 
unexpected objections appear to have been 
raised, and during several weeks he resided at 
Takhtapul. He was suddenly takep ill there, 
and removed to Mazar-i-Shereef, where he 
died on the 21st of February 1879. 
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Of Shere Ali's internal administr a t '   on somc- 
thing must be said. Keen in observation and 
sllremd in j ~ldging the practical vi~lucqof things, 
he recognisecl that one of his surest safeguards 
against popular clisturbance mould bc to adopt 
the same preventive means as he had secn mere 
adopted by us. He accordingly issued an edict, 
forbidding any arms to be carried between the 
h o u ~ s  of 10 p.m. and 4 a.m. ; and he appointed 
watchmen in Cabul and somo of the other large 
cities for the preservation of life and property 
a t  all hours. He also sought to c u b  the power 
of his Sirdars by enabling the people to enter 
into direct communication wit11 himself, and 
with this view he revived the right of per- 
sonal petition. He also created a postal service 
throughout his state, and this is reported to 
have been the most successful of a11 his im- 
provements. I n  another way he attempted a 
great reform, doomed, however, to speedy failure. 
This was tho subst,itution of cash payments for 
payments in land or kind. The cause of this 
failure may mith reason be attributed to the ai*- 
bitrary manner in which tho money value was 
assessed. He also alleviated the punishments 
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previously in force, and sought to strengthen 
his rule b y  exhibiting general moderation, and 
b y  conciliating more especially the mass of 
the  peopls whom most of the previous rulers 
had negle~t~ed. I n  two respects he attempted 
changes in the native customs that were of less 
importance but weye eminently characteristic 01 
t h e  man. He requested that all should wear 
English-made clothes, and he set the example 
himself; but he absolutely commanded all the 
shoemakers of Cabul to get rid of their old 
goods and in the future to make nothing else 
than boots of a European pattern. In  dealing 
with his army he mas not less influenced by his 
experience of English customs than in those 
civil matters soma of which have been men- 
tioned. H e  divided liis troops into regiments, 
of which there were fifty-seven of infantry and 
sixteen of cavalry. Of the former, fifty were 
said to be properly armed, and each was com- 
puted to muster about six hundred and fifty 
bayonets. A cavalry regiment consisted of 
four hundred men. The Afghan regular army 
created by Xhere Ali numbered, thorefore, 
thirty-seven thousand foot and six thousancl 
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four hundred horse. In  addition to these, there 
were about eight thousand irregnlar cavalry, 
three thousand five hundred jezailjies, or irre- 
gular infantry, and a local militia of unascer- 
tained strength. The artillery comprised about 
one hundred pieces in service and one hundred 
and fifty in store. He established gun factories 
and powder magazines in the chief cities. Such 
was the army which Shere Ali created in the 
years subsequent to the Umballa Durbar. The 
recent campaigns show that Shere Ali was not 
justified in reposing confidence in the machine 
which he had so carefully created. His military 
reforms and attempts to organise a, standing 
army were mistakes when regarded from the 
point of view of Afghan cuijtoms and the na- 
tional character. Though giving him a momen- 
tary sense of strength, they sapped the founda. 
tions on which the power of an A.fghan ruler 
must always rest. 
Of the personal character of this ruler it is 
difficult to give for an English reader a sketch 
which, while it shall be accurate, is not open to 
the charge of being exaggerated. 13ut if it be just 
to take human nature as tho same all the world 
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over, and to apply to an Afghan chieftain the  
same test  that is employed in considering the 
career of a European king, it may be truth- 
fully said that as a sovereign Shere Ali had 
experienced depths of misfortune equal to  those 
sounded by Frederick the Great. With not less 
determination aria fortitude than was exhibited 
by that  great monarch, he made defeat and 
disaster the stepping-stones to victory and 
prosperity. Even after the rout a t  Shaikhabad, 
when everything seemed utterly lost, he assem- 
bled his remaining followers around him, and 
bade such as despaired of his cause go over t o  
his enemies. Por himself he was Ameer of 
Afghanistan, and so long as life remained t o  
him he would fight for the recovery of his 
rightful inheritance. The military skill of Ya- 
koob Khan and the gallantry of the levies of 
Herat were the visible causes of the turn in the  
fortunes of the war ; but behind them, moulding 
them into shape to produce great results, were 
the indomitable courage and energy of this 
never-despairing king. When victory finally 
came he appears t o  have used it with modera- 
tion. The long path which he had trodden 
I sic ne 
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through adversity and misfortulle had taught 
him the necessity for controlling that ungovern- 
able temper which had led him into acts of 
tyranny, bringing down upon him the hostility 
of his subjects. One of the most ti*ustworthy 
authorities on the subject, the late Mr. John 
Wyllie, describes his appearance at the time 
when i t  was uncertain whether peace had finally 
settled dowu over Afghanistan or whether only 
an armed truce hacl produced a lull, in t h e .  
following words :- 
" I n  his air there is all the dignity which, 
royal birth, coupled with a long experience of * 
misfortune, seldom fails to confer; and the.- 
habitual melancholy of his passion-ravaged 
couatenance is eloquent with the tale of that 
domestic grief whic11 four years ago shook his 
reason with an almost irreparable throe. But 
tho dominant feature is the eye, and its expres- 
sion sternness-the practised sternness of one 
never lrnown t o  spare any adversary that might 
be wisely struck." 
Other authorities have taken exception to 
this description on the ground that the chief 
characteristic of the face wa,s cruelty rather 
6 
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than sternness, and that in the eyes there was 
an expression of cunning mixed with timidity. 
Mr. Wyllie's version rests on a sounder and 
more probable basis in itself, and tallies more 
closely with a11 that is lcnown of Shere Ui .  
His career proves him to have been neithel- a 
monster of iniquity nor a paragon of virtue. 
In  the first year of his reign he indulged in the 
fmpulses of l i s  violent temper, ancl in the next 
6ve years he paid the penalty for the indulgence. 
During the last eight he appeared keen and cal- 
culating rather than high-minded and impulsive. 
He never showed doubt on the point that the 
best may to force the hand of the B'itish 
Government was to simulate an affection for 
R,ussia, and he acted according to his belief. 
I n  endeavouring to steer clear of any definite 
arrangement with either this country or with 
Russia, he compromised his good name among 
us, and it is possible that he went further than 
he was really disposed to do in his negotiations 
with Russian agents. During his later years 
he undoubtedly strove to formulate some plan 
of common action mitli the hill tribes on the 
Punjab frontier, and i t  would almost seem as 
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if, finding all other means abortive, he had in- 
stigated them to acts of hostility against this 
country. The vague promises of aid which he 
certainly gaye some of the clans in 1877 were 
magnified by the voice of rumour into a distinct 
engagement, and may have been instrumental 
in bringing about the troubles with the 
Jowaki Afreedees. But whatever Shere Ali's 
inconsistencies may have been, he could never 
wholly forget his father's advice that the true 
interests, both of his o m  country and his par- 
ticular dynasty, were to maintain friendly 
relations with the English. 
The reasons which gradually led him from a 
policy of doubtful friendship into one of open 
hostility towards this country have been speci- 
fied. They acted unfavourably on his character. 
His suspicious nature became more developed, 
and had he lived long enough he might have be- 
come in one respect an Asiatic Louis XI. But if 
we regard his career impartially, and forget bhat 
he became the foe of this country after h a ~ n g  
sworn to be its friend, it must be admitted that 
he possessed great abilities. He was certainly 
no unworthy son and successor of the illustrious 
6 * 
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Dos t Mahomed, and under more f avourable cil-- 
cumatancea might have done much towards 
perpetuating the Barucksye dynasty as the 
heir of the Durani monarchy. If he was not 
in the highest sense of the word a great man, 
he was certainly a remarkable one, and as sol. 
dier, general, administrator, and prince, must 
be classed among the foremost of his contern. 
poraries in the East. 
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GENERAL KAUFMANN. 
To describe General Kaufmann's career in any 
detail mould be to write tho history of Russia's . 
progress in Central Asia during the last twelve 
yews, the most eventful period in the whole 
course of her activity in that  continent. Pew 
details have come to light conceriling the early 
l5fe of this general. His name is to be found 
some &€teen years ago in close attendance upon 
the Czar, of whom he was a favourite aide-de- 
camp; and he undoubtedly owed to his winning 
manners much of his subsequent advancement 
in the service. But the gay young officer was 
neither overburdened with the good things of 
this world, nor was he of so unambitious a 
temperament as to desire to pass away his life 
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in idleness at St. Petersburg or Wilna. He. 
was known t o  be willing to accept any post, 
offering emolument and holding out a reason- 
able prospect of obtaining a military reputation. 
I n  1867 the chance offered itself, and the in- 
fluence of his friends, added to the attachment 
of the Czar, obtained for him the reversion to 
the newly created dignity of Governor-General 
of Turkestarz. 
The annexation of the northern portioil of 
Khokand in 1865 had led the St. Petersburg 
authorities to seriously consider their new posi- 
tion in Central Asia, and a commission, known 
as tho Steppe Commission, was appointed to 
inquire into the subject. I t s  deliberations led 
to the formation of a Governor-Generalship of 
Tnrkestan, with its capital at Tashkent, where, 
notwithstanding the increase in the extent of 
the dependent territory, it  still remains. It 
mas as the seconcl of these governor-generals 
that General Kaufmann went to Tashkent in 
November 1867. His selection for the high 
post to which he mas advanced occasioned some 
surprise. It also raised considerable envy in the 
breasts of those who had served in Asia. It is 
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txue that at that t.ime Twkestan was regarded 
more in the light of a place of exile than as a 
land to be coveted. Only the needy or the 
desperate were desirous of proceeding thither ; 
but there mere not wanting a, few ambitious 
men who saw au opening in Central Asia for 
their talents or their eliterpriso. To these it 
was a great disappoiutment that an unknom 
staff officer should be, as it  were, passed over 
their heads to an office for which it  could not 
be claimed that he possessed the necessary qua-, 
lifications. The prize was in their eyes a real 
one. It represented the just realisation of all 
their efforts. Ranfmaan had never been in 
Central Asie. To him it was a, terra iacognita. 
His military experience mas also very limited; 
and to place a t  his discretion operations of 
war with unknown peoples and conducted on 
principles different from those to which he had 
been accustomed, was in their eyes to commit 
tlie most egregious of blunders. Ullsnited for 
the work with which he would be entrusted, 
Kaufmann was in the eyes of the regular Cen- 
tral Asian officer held to be undeserving of the 
prize which they believed he would not appre- 
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ciate. As events turned, out Kaufrnann sur- 
passed the most sanguine expectations, and is 
now admittedly the champion of the Chau- 
vinist party among Central Asian authorities 
ia Russia. 
General Kaufmann's personal character was 
not such apparently as would redecill the 
shortcomings of his attainments and his ex- 
perience. His temperament was prone to 
over-confidence, and his vanity was excessive. 
With almost unlimited power placed in his 
hands and beyond the oontrol of the central 
authorities, Kaufrnann felt that he might carve 
out both an empire forL his master and a repu- 
tation for himself without placing any other 
fetter on his inclination thail the extent of 
his resources. He could also indulge his per- 
sonal vanity by the maintenance of a cere- 
monious etiquette and external state that moulcl 
not have been possible under any other circum- 
stances. This desire for display earned him the 
title of Yarim Padishah, or half-king. It founcl 
at  the same time expression and relief in the 
severe etiquette with. which he fenced himself 
around, and still more publicly in the salutes 
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1-fmann BUS- 
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which Bo required as the recognitioll of his 
presence, and in the escorts which he attached 
to the persons of his wife and family. 
These little weaknesses had the  greatcr im- 
portance, because they induced him to devote 
much of the time that shoulcl. have been passed in 
tho transaction of public business to the formal 
or  ceremonial side of his office, and much of 
the aclministrative labour had, coasecluently, to 
be performed by subordinates. A general laxity 
soon became perceptible in  the public service. 
D a ~ k e r  assertions were freely made, and it is 
geacrally believed that there has been much 
peculation prevalent in his administrative bu- 
reaux. However that may have been, there is 
some confirmation of the charge in the fact 
tlzat t h e  opinions of two cominissions of in- 
quil-y that were appointed have never been 
made public. General Tchemaieff, whose name 
is collnected with some of the most brilliant 
Russian exploits in Central Asia, but whose 
opinion is not clear of the suspicion of being 
influenced by jealousy of General Kaufmann, 
has been particnlarly active in the levelling of 
charges against the Tashkent administration. 
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Kaufmann has at least the defence that he 
is not worse than his class. I t  would be a 
matter of great difficulty to find a single 
bureau in Russia, free fro111 the taint of pa- 
triotism bcing blind where personal profit is 
conceyned. 
It was unavoidable that a man of the lavish 
disposition of Kaufmann, and filled with a very 
eager desire to win military laurels, should, 
when entrusted with the charge of an estate 
heavily encumbered and greatly impoverished, 
fail to adapt his ends to the means he pos- 
sessed. So long as he could indulge the freak 
of the moment or cailry out the design im- 
mediately before him, he reclred nothing of 
the cost or the consequence. As an adminis- 
trator it cannot, therefore, be contended that 
General Kaufmali~i has achieved a brilliant suc- 
cess. Under the most favourable supposition, 
his labours have produced but partial results. 
Year after year the expendituro has gone on 
increasing at a rapid rate. The Central Asian 
provinces are a burden to tlie imperial exche- 
quer, and the burden, with each fresh acquisi- 
tion, has become heavier instead of lighter. 
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The province of Kulclja mas the one posses- 
sion which proved in any may remunerative, 
and the Chinese have succeeded in reacquir- 
ing that fertile region. The military and the 
civil expenditure exceed the revenue by a 
greater sum than ever they did before, and 
the Government is compelled to resort to what 
can only be termed cooking the accounts to 
make the balance-sheet assume anything like a 
respectable appearance. For a very consicler- 
able portion of that deficit Kaufmann's extrava- 
gance has been directly accountable; but graver 
blame must be held to attach to the laxity 
of the supervision he exercised over his sub- 
ordinates. His indifference to matters of cletail 
led him very often to  neglect opportunities that 
more practical and experienced officers would 
have been prompt to seize, and this was espe- 
cially noticeable in matters connected mith 
trade. It is true that the opportunity is now 
afforded General Eaufmann to repair during his 
second, the blunciers which, in this respect, 
marked his first, term of power. But it is not 
likely that he will avail himself of tho oppor- 
tunity. The conqueror of Khiva will no doubt 
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hold it to be beneath him to investigate such 
paltry items as the expenditure connected with 
the administrative departments of Turkestan. 
It is not as an auditor-gene~al that Kaufmann 
has consented to return to Tashkent. 
It is much more unaccountable to find that 
Kaufmann did so little for the advancement of 
trade during his tenure of power, for Russia's 
programme of conquest has always been a 
double one ; extension of trade having scarcely 
been second to the absorption of fresh ter- 
ritory. There have been several Societies 
started at his instigation, but they have one 
and all ended in failure; and under his 
auspices Russia's trade in Central Asia has 
made the very slowest progress. The imp~llse 
of late given to the production of cotton 
has been due to some as yet unexplained re- 
vival of energy 011 the part of the native popu- 
lations. But when it  is remembered that f o ~  
twelre years Russia has had the complete con- 
trol of the trade of all the countries north of 
the Hindoo Koosh, and that she alone has pos- 
sessed the ability to carry on commercial 
intercourse therein, it is astonishing to find 
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astonishing t o  find 
how little has been done for its promo- 
tion. The Russian finances have sufferecl 
through the apathy of the ruling powers, and 
the State has not benefited by the impetus 
to trade which was expected to be one of the 
results of the Russian campaigns in Central 
Asia. General Kaufmann personally must be 
held mainly responsible for this lack of pro- 
gress, for tliere can be little doubt that, al- 
though the wealth of the Khanates was in the 
first place exaggerated, the original expec- 
tations of a great Central Asian trade were 
not 'without substantial justification. Had 
General Eaufmann devoted himself to the task 
that he should a t  once havebundei.taken, he 
would probably have obtained some very tan- 
gible result while he would have conferred s 
mope permanent benefit on his country than 
he has by the nulnerous wars which his am- 
bition produced. He did not avail himself 
of his opportunity ; and if the Russian rule in 
Central Asia were to be extinguished to- 
morrow, General Kaufmann's administration 
would not leave any memorial behind to dis- 
tinguish it from any of the barbarisms that 
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have risen periodically to imperial power in 
Central and Western Asia. 
When General Kaufmann arrived a t  Tash- 
kent in November 186'7, Russia, had only just 
planted her foot within the doorway of the 
Khanates. The governor-generalship of Turk- 
estan had been established by an imperial ukase 
four months before, and when Raufmann suc- 
ceeded Romanoffsky Bokhara and Khokand still 
maintained their independence, and Khiva was 
indifferent to, if not actually defiant towards, 
Russia. Historically speaking, the f d l  of Tash- 
kent in 1865 struck t.he death-knell of those 
states; but the final blow had yet to be delivered. 
From the first advance of General Peroffsky 
into the Kirghiz steppes in 1841 down to Tcher- 
naieff's triumph ai; Tashkent in 1865 it is easy 
t o  detect the main idea whi,ch pervaded the Rus- 
sian policy. I t  was nothing more or less than to  
take up aparamount position on the Syr Darya, 
which would give Russia a supreme voice in the 
arrangement of affairs in Turkestan. I t  was 
also generally thought in those days that the  
trade of the future would follow the course of 
that river. The very ease with which this 
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.ow the course of 
with which this 
consummation had been realised was provoca- 
tive of a desire to proceecl. to a greater length 
and to convert the Oxus also into a Russian 
river. That has been already accomplished, 
but the due result, it is now understood, cannot 
be attained until Merv has been occupied ancl 
the Turcomaus subjected. 
I t  is such considerations as these which lead 
observers to infer that  Russia will not recog- 
nise any permanent halting-place in her pro- 
gress towards Southeru Asia short of the sea. 
Towards obtaining that complete triumph liauf- 
mann has already done much, ancl he very 
possibly may yet have the good fortune to do 
more. I n  his first war he shattered the forces 
of the Ameer of Bokhara. He concluded it 
with the annexation of Samarcand and the 
Zerafshan valley. I n  18'71, mithout a war, he 
took the Valley of the Ili from the Tungan 
despot who had established his authority 
therein. I n  18'73 he triumphed over the long- 
offending Khiva, and as the result of that war 
he brought the Russiau frontier down t o  the 
Oxus, and made it a Russian river. Two 
years afterwards he overcame the most serious 
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rising that has ever taken place against the 
Russians, and he pacified the great state of 
Khokand by annexing it, and making it the 
Russian province of Ferghana. The man, who 
more than any other wished and wishes to emu- 
late the career of the great conqueror Baber, 
testified his admiration by reviving the pic- 
turesque name of that monarch's first province. 
If, therefore, General Kaufmann's personal 
government does llot deserve any special praise 
t ?I &en tested by the beneficent deeds performed 
under it, it is at  the least remarkable for the 
events which were crowded so rapidly one after 
the other into its brief space. The Russian 
historian will think of Kaufmann, not as tho 
weak and neglectful administrator who looked 
chiefly to his own comfort and glory, but as the 
general under whose auspices so many vic tories 
were obtained. He will not, at least for many 
a yea7 yet, inq~Gre how far General Kaufmann's 
acts were marked by prudence and by fore- 
sight. He will rest satisfied with the know- 
ledge that it was during his governor-general- 
ship that the three Khanates of Bokhara, U i v a ,  
and Khokand were humbled and either dis- 
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membered or annexed iu their entirety; and ~ 
that it beheld Russians dominant on the Tian I 
Shan and supreme in the councils at Teheran, 
at tlie same time that their influence was 
stealthily approaching Afghanistan and the In- 
dian frontier. The campaigns which resulted in I 
the seizure of Samarcand, of Khokand, and of I 
the Amou Darya district will be remembered in 
Russian history for all time, and the remem- 
\ brance will suffice to exclude consideration of 
I 
1 fhe point whether the exhibition of wisdom and 
&rue statesmanship, or of their reverse, marked 
Kaufmann's tenure of power. 
His policy towards Khiva and Bokhara, after 
he had defeated them in war, is sure to come 
1 in for a large share of praise, and even his in- 
I trigues with Shere Ali will be approved of on the 
I 
1 ground that they tended to embarrass England. 
The patriotic Russian will probably go still far- 
ther and expiless his regret that the necessities 1 
L 
of the moment should have prevented his Go- ) 
vernment from openly and at all hazards 
championing the cause of that Ameer. I t  
would be a mistake to apply too exacting a 
Gest to Kaufmann's administration of the Czar's 
7 
- -  - 
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dominions in Central Asia, although his return 
to power will of necessity cause a modifioation 
of the opinions which have been expressed 
concerning his career on the supposition that 
it had closed. His return to Tashkent gives 
him fresh opportunities. Who can say whether 
he will enhance or mar the reputation he has Sf 
already won ? 
The large part played by him in the develop- 
ment of the Central Asian Question has been I 
due to the peculiar circumstances of the case 
rather than to the ability of the man. His own 
vanity prompted him to endeavour by all means 
in his power to precipitate the advent of the 
crisis between England and Russia, from which. 
he hoped to derive great benefit. His over- 
eagerness on this point proves him to have been 
a weak man and one emphatically who did not h 
adjust his means to the end he had in view.. 
Just as he has filled a larger place in the past. 
history of the question than his personil abili- c 
ties or services would justify, so is it possible 
that we may hear more of him in the future 
because the time is ripening for the receipt of 
the reward Russia considers her due for the 
GENERAL KAUFMANN. 9 9 
labour of six generations in carrying on aggres- 
sive war beyond the Caspian and the Ural. I f  
Kaufmann's warlike achievements Lave as yet 
I been less remarkable than those of Tcher- 
naioff and Romanoffsky-and they certainly 
have been less than those of Peroffsky-it is 
I., quite cartail1 that his name will survive that 
of any of his predecessors, both on account 
of the length of his stay and also for the 
conquests obtained under his guidance. It 
would be absurd to compare Kaufmann with 
either Olive or Warren Hastings ; but  i t  may 
be expected that in the course of a few gone- 
rations this Russian general will bc regarded 
by his fellow-countrymen not only as the prin- 
cipal founder of the Central Asian dependency, 
but  as holding in their history precisely the 
same position that the founders of British su- 
premacy in Indin hold in ours. 
boo OENTRAL ASIAN PORTRAITS. 
THE LATE YAICOOB BEG. 
MAIIOMED YAIKOOB, a Tajik of the state of Kho- 
hand, was born at Piskent, a small but flourish- 
ing village fifty miles south of Tashkent, in or 
about the year 1820. The Tajiks of Khokand 
are not, nor have they been for a great number 
of years, the dominant race in that Khanate, 
although they are supposed by some to be the 
longer settled there than any of the other inha- 
bitants of Khokand and Kashgar. They are 
considered to be Iranic or Persian in origin, in 
contradktinction to their present T~lrkish rulers. 
The Tajiks have been driven by successive tides 
of illvasionfrom the plains to take refuge in the 
uplands of Khokand, and among the principal 
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of their settlements is Piskent, the birthplace of 
the late Athalik Ghazi. They are to be found 
also in most of the chief towns of this state; 
but it is in the hill villages that they preserve 
in the greatest degree the distinctive features 
of their race. His father, Pnr Mahomed Mirza, 
had been Kazi of Kurama, and had moved 
from that place t o  Piskent about the year 
1618. There he married a lady of an influen- 
tial family, and rose high in his worldly posi- 
tion. Yakoob Beg was the issue of this union, 
and he owed much of his advancement in life 
t o  the Bheik Nizamuddin, his mother's brother. 
His early years were passed at Piskent, where 
for some time he underwent the training for a 
mollah. The prospect of such s profession 
proved distasteful to one of his active tempera- 
ment, and he gave up the intention almost as 
soon as i t  had been formed. The most impor- 
tant event at this stage of his life was the 
marriage of his sister to Nur Mahomed Khan, 
the Governor of Tashkent. 
Mahomed Yakoob, following the custom of 
the more active Tajik youths, entered the mili- 
tary service of Khokand at  an early age, and 
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in 1845 he mas appointed Mahram, or charnber- 
lain, t o  the new Khan, Khudayar. Shortly 
afterwards he was made Pansad Bashi, or coin- 
mander of five hundred. By the year 1850 
he had so far advanced in rank that he 
was entrusted with responsible posts on the 
northern frontier, and was raised to the dig- 
nity of Koosh-bege-" lord of the family "- 
which may bo rendered deputy governor or 
vizier. In 1853 he had control of the garrison 
of Ak Musjid (White Mosque), a fort on the 
Syr Darya, when General Peroffsky appearel 
before its walls with a large Russian force. 
The summons to surronder was treated with 
scorn, and the Russian batteries were speedily 
constructod and in such a position as to 
easily overcome the slight resistance that  mucl 
walls manned by a few devoted men could 
offer. For twenty-five days the Russian fire 
swept over the insignificant stronghold, and 
during all those days the small garrison, en- 
cowaged by the example set them by their 
leader in their desperate straits, held out. 
Beveral assaults made by the Russisils before 
the walls had been levelled with the ground 
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were repulsed, and the Khokanclians had done 
everything to save their honour and to inspire 
a chivalrous enemy with respect for their cou- 
rage. After a bombardment of newly four 
weeks, the breach was a t  last declared practic- 
able by the Russian engineers, and the storm- 
ing parties were then ordered to be held ready. 
The garrison, recognising the impossibility of 
defending the fort any longer, agreed to sur- 
render, and sent a letter to General Peroffsky 
to that effect. The general was, however, en- 
raged at the obstinacy of the defence, and his 
ambition and vanity urged him to rest content 
with nothing less than a capture by storm. 
The fever for crosses of St. Anne and of 
St. George is an old disease among Russia11 
officers, and General Peroffsky was one cjf 
the most deeply amitten with the complaint. 
The letter was torn up, and the messenger 
sent back to the despairing garrison wit11 
the reply, "We shall take the fort by as- 
sault." The fort was taken the next day, and 
has ever since been knomn after the name of 
its captor as Port Peroff~lcy, That general has 
indeed perpetuated his name thereby in 
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these regions, but when the whole story i s  
told, it cannot be said to redound greatly t o  
his credit. 
The reputation that Mahomed Yakoob a,c- 
quired by-this brave resistance to the Russians 
stood him in good stead, for about the time 1  I!j 
that the Khoja Wali Ehan attempted to wrest 
Kashgar from the Chinese we Gnd him high in 
command at Tashkent. This was in 18.57, and 
soon afterwards he became commander-in-chief 1 
of the army of Rhokand. It is not clear what 1 /  
part he played in Wali's invasion of Kashgar, / I  
but it is certainly justifiable to suppose that i t  11 I
directed his attention to that quarter, and i: i 
made him inclined six years later to join in the 1 I 
enterprise of Buzurg Khan, the elder brother 
of Wali Khan. In  1863 Buzurg Khan, who 
had been living on the hospitality of Kho- 
kand, induced Aim Kuli, the regent of that  
state, to acquiesce in his leaving Tashkent to  
attempt to regain the kingdom of his ancestors. I 
I ,  But permission to make the attempt summecl ! 
up the aid he could obtain from Khokand. I I 
This was the first occasion on which Buzurg I I I 1 
Khan had come to the front as the representa- I/ 
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tive of the Khojas, although his father, Jehan- 
ghir Khan had, in 1827, attained a momentary 
success over the Chinese. Mahomed Yakoob, 
then the Koosh-bege Yakoob, received per- 
mission to accompany him as lieutenant, and, 
with only sixty-six followers, they undertook 
the invasion of Kashgar, garrisoned by a, 
large Chinese force. The position of the 
Chinese in Kashgar had been rendered very 
precarious by the rebellion of the Tungani 
dong their line of communications, and dis- 
affection to their rule, even in Kashgar, was 
scarcely concealed. I n  the more remote dis- 
tricts of the state the Kirglliz and other tribes 
obtained some successes over the military sent 
against them, and the invitation of one of 
these chiefs had first induced Buzurg Khan 
to enter Kashgar as a pretender to the 
throne. Notwithstanding the disadvantages 
under which they laboured, the Chinese were 
successful in all the earlier engagements; 
an attempt to seize Kashgar by a stratagem 
was foiled; and for more than twelve months 
the adventurers were unable to accomplish 
anything of importance. The Andij anis, or 
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merchant classes, however, veered round to 
the cause of Buzurg Khan, and about the 
same time that the Russian general Tcher- 
nnieff entered Tashkent in triumph, the Khoja 
kings were once more reinstated as rulers in 
Yarkand and Eashgar by the military skill of 
the f nture Athalik Ghazi. 
Buzurg Khan was not long seated on the 
throne of his ancestors before he showed that 
'he posscssed thcir hereditary vices and weak- 
nesses. Re was licentious and cruel, in addi- 
tion to being cowardly and irresolute. He 
possessed no redeeming quality in the eyes 
of the soldiery to compensate for his tyranny 
towards his subjects. He  was essentially a ~ o i  
fai~zbant, and his s~~ccessful general was his 
m n i ~ e  clu palais. His lieutenant was quite 
resolved to possess more of the external show 
of power than was compatible with a subor- 
dinate position, and availing himself of the cx- 
cesses of Buzurg, he deposed him before many 
months had elapsed after their triumph. It 
was said that this unfortunate prince was per- 
mitted to seek refuge in Wakhan or some 
other neighbouring state, but of this fact we 
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know nothing certain. It is quite possible that 
the tale of his having fled to Tibet and thence 
to Khokand was fabricated, and that the 
Athalik Ghazi adopted a surer method in 
deaIing with his rival. Towards the com- 
mencement of the year 1866, therefore, Ya- 
koob found himself an independent prince, 
in possession of the western portion of Kash- 
garia. His neighbours on the west and on the 
south were either friendly or neutral, and on 
the north the Russians, who might be con- 
sidered inimical to him, had not yet brought 
their frontier into dangerous proximity with 
his own. I n  Kuldja, and in the country lying 
to the east of his possessions, were the Tun- 
gani - the Mahomedans who had revolted 
against the Chinese, and who hacl established 
a certain irregular government of their own 
in Jungaria and in the cities of Aksn, Kucha, 
Urumtsi, and Turfan. The Tungsni were not 
prepared for the appearance of a new atate 
founded by a 'victorious army and general on 
their flank. They had, indeed, aspired to ex- 
tend the form of freedom they had secured for 
themselves to their fellow-countrymen further 
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west, and were displeased and perhaps alarmed 
when they found that Chinese ~uthori ty was 
to be succeeded by a power which seemed to 
possess military vigour. 
Before narrating the history of Yakoob 
Beg's relations with the Tungani, it must 
be stat,ed that when the Chinese defence of 
Eashgar collapsed, their troops were taken 
into the pay of the new state, some of their 
leading officers were re-appointed to their 
former posts, and Koh Dalai, their military 
chief, was entrusted with supreme control 
over them. So far as numbers went, the 
Ehitay troops in the service of Eashgar 
formed a numerous contingent, and natu- 
rally disposed to regard a war with the 
Tungani with peculiar favour. Being per- 
mitted to continue in the observance of their 
religious rites, they were probably among the 
most faithful soldiers at the disposal of Ya- 
koob Beg against every foe except a Chinese 
army. These troops served their new master 
well, nor did they prove false to their trust 
until after Yakoob's death, and the arrival 
of the Chinese before the gates of Kashgar. 
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Yakoob Beg, as he was now called, endea. 
vonred at first to arrive at an amicable under- 
standing with the Tungani, but, whatever the 
reason, with very partial success. Elis mer- 
chants demanded greater security in their 
journeys beyond Aksu, and a large portion of 
his army was eager to engage in hostilities. 
War was at last declared, and in several cam- 
paigns Yakoob Beg and his two sons overthrew 
the Tungan forces. Aksu was speedily con- 
cluered, and the whole country up to Turfan 
gradually passed under the sway of Kashgar. 
Before the year 1870 closed, the Tungan power 
had disappeared from the conntry south of the 
Tian Shan, its leaders and princes hadiibeen 
swept away with an unsp$ring hand, and the 
whole region round Turfan had been converted 
into a desert. The Chinese had found a most 
trenchant avenger in their own opponent; but 
in that year it must be admitted that there was 
no sign whatever that China would ever again 
be able to turn her attention either t o  Jun- 
garia or to Kashgaria. The Russians were so 
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alarmed a t  the rapid consolidation of this Ma- 
homedan state that they occupied ICuldje as a 
precautionary measure. There can be little 
doubt now that these opel~ations against the 
Tungani were very unwise, for not only did 
Yakoob exhaust his own resources in subduing 
them, but he also lessened the task the Chinese 
had to accomplish when they attempted to reach 
Kashgar, Under the actual circumstances the 
Tungani disliked the Kashgarian rule quite as 
much as they had the Chinese, and events 
@ showed that in many cases they hastened t o  
come to terms with the invader in 1877. 
With the close of these campaigns the 
external affairs of Kashgaria wore a more 
1 peaceful aspect. At  the hands of the Ameer 
of Bokhara Yakoob had received the title of 
Athalik Ghazi, which means Champion Father. 
H e  was also generally known as the Badaulet, 
I or the Fortunate One. By restoring the Sunni 
I 
i sect of Mahomedanism, he endeavoured to at- 
4 tract the sympathy of all true followers of the 
Prophet to  his cause, and his acknowledgment 
k of the suzerainty of the Sultan was rewarded 
I 
i i n  1873 by the title of Emir. His rule in 
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His rule in 
Eastern Turkestan was formally recognised by 
his neighbours, and was consolidated by such 
diplomatic overtuyes as those specified and the 
others which he made to the British Covern- 
I 
ment. More serious matters, however, claimed 
his attention. Before 1870 and their seizure of 
Euldja, the Russians had perceived the eacou- 
raging effect the creation of this new Mahornedan 
state would have on the general desire through- 
out their own possessions to throw off the i~zcubus 
of Russian domination; and although they took 
possession of their slice of the territory of the 
Tungani, they mere not satisfied in their own 
minds that it was a complete set-off to and equi- 
valent for the growing strength and reputation 
of Yakoob Beg. They resolved to learn some- 
thing more about this new state, and negotia- 
tions were set on foot with the view of coming to 
an understanding with the Athalik Ghazi, who 
they knew would not show much respect for the 
treaties which had been concluded wit11 China. 
As early as 1868 a Russian merchant had at- 
tempted to ent-er Kashgar, but he was obliged 
to return with the loss of his merchandise. 
The next year he renewed the attempt, and 
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having obteined an interview with the ruler, 
managed to produce a f avourable impression 
upon him, Others came, but without achieving 
permanent p o d ,  either for themselves or 
for future traders. Before long, too, a cause 
of dispute between the two Governments arose 
in the ill-treatment of a Russian mer- 
chant, and the Russian Government demanded 
the restitution of the sum of money in which he 
had been mulcted. After a very long delay the 
Athalik Ghazi handed the money over, but in a 
depreciated Chinese coin ! 
Although Russian officers had visited Kash- 
gar, and Kashgarian envoys proceeded to 
Tashkent, it was not until 1872, when Baron 
Kaulbars negotiated the treaty of commerce 
which bears his name, that any definite arrange- 
ment was arrived at between the two Goveru- 
ments. An ambassador was then despatched 
to St. Petersburg, and Yakoob Khan's rela- 
tions with Ru~lsia seemed to hold forth a better 
prospect for the future. He was either dis- 
trustful of the intentions of the Russians, or he 
wae inspired with an intelligible ambition to 
head EL great rising throughout Asia againet 
1 the ruler, 
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their authority, for his attitude again became 
the reverse of cordial. He assumed on all 
occasiolls a very dignified demeanour in his in- 
terviews with Russian officers; his letters to 
General Kaufmann were drdted  on the as- 
sumption of the writer's equality with that 
officer's master, the White Czar; and with the 
arrival of an English mission, in 1813, in his 
country he became still more independent, if not 
absolutely defiant. With a fine, but some- 
vha t  dangerous irony, when his situation is 
considered, he " desired permission from Gene- 
ral Kaufmann to  send an embassy to St. Peters- 
burg, t o  congrat~~late his brother, the Czar of 
Russia, on the marriage of his daughter with a 
Prince of England, the Emir's good friend and 
ally." 
Such a tone was not the best calculated to 
conciliate Russian sentiment, nor would such 
an attitude induce us to think very highly of the 
prudence of Yekoob as a politician. His refusal 
t o  admit Russian consuls within his borders 
mas founded on a far better reason, although 
more than anything else it rendered the 
Bussians less loth to proceed to  extremitie 
8 
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against him. In  1875 they had eit,her so far 
lost patience, or had become so impressed with 
the necessity of checking his power, that pre- 
parations were made for the invasion of his 
territory both from Khokand by the Terek 
Pass and also from Naryn. At  this crisis for- 
tune intervened on the side of Yakoob Beg, 
and the serious and wide-spread rebellion in 
Khokand required all the Russian resources to 
repress it. Kashgar was saved ; but if Yakoob 
Beg had been acting on a consistent policy of 
opposition to ,Russia, the time she was hampered 
by the Ehokandian war would have been 
his opportunity for uniting in a league the 
whole of Western Turkestan. He hesitated, 
did nothing, witnessed the complete overthrow 
of his native country, and beheld the only oc- 
casion on which he would have had any chance 
in a Russian war pass away unseized. His 
policy up to this point had been senseless and 
unmeaning, unless he was prepared to follow 
it up when the moment for action arrived. 
B e  was apparently unnerved by a sense of 
the desperate peril of the enterprise to be 
attempted. The greatest of men have not been 
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free from a similar weakness, but under simi,. 
lar circumstallces it has always passed off when 
the man has been truly great. The reputation 
,of Yakoob Beg was lowered by this abstention. 
His subsequent conduct seemed to show that 
he himself afterwards became convinced that 
Russian friendship was preferable to Russian 
enmity. 
It was only, however, on the eve of the 
Chinese invasion that he unreservedly aban- 
doned hi~l attitude of independence. He 
received Colonel Prjevalsky in a flattering 
manner, and treated the embassy of Captain 
Kuropatkine with distinguished honour. 'His 
envoy at Tashkent departing from the tradi- 
tion of all previous envoys sent by his 
master, sued for support against the Man- 
.chu army that had carried all before it in the 
country north of the Tian Shan. The change 
came too late t o  do any good. The Chinese 
had been on friendly terms with Russia for 
many years, and Yakoob Beg was, till quite re- 
cently, almost a declared enemy. The Russian 
Government now left its two neighbours to 
"ottle the question between themselves. 
8 * 
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I n  his last campaign during the early part of 
the year 18'7'7, the fortune of war turned wholly 
against him. The Chinese expelled him from 
his positions round Turfan, and routed him s 
second time at Toksoun, where their tactics baf- 
fled his skill, and their numbers carried every- 
thing before them. Within a few weeks after his 
defeat he died a t  Korla, closing a career which 
will always secure for him consideration and 
respect. A visitor to Kashgar has described 
his personal appearance as follows :-" He was 
a short, thickish-built man, with a countenance 
that seemed to have attained the most com- 
plete immobility of expression. Although on 
a first glance his face was one that would not 
claim your attention, a closer inspection showed 
it to possess signs of great resolution and 
firmness." He retained to the very last the 
active habits that had so long distinguished 
him ; in his dress he was simple, and his mili- 
tary training preserved him from those vices 
that had been the ruin of all his predecessors 
in Rashgar. Some of his journeys to the 
eastern portion of his extensive dominions 
would bear comparison for rapidity with the 
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ldity with the 
most famous performances of their kind; and 
his iron will and prompt, if unsorupulous, reso- 
lution for maily years enabled him to triumph 
over every obstacle. It is long, indeed, since 
so energetic a ruler appeared among the 
effete peoples of Asia. With yesources ridi- 
culously insignificant, and quite inadequate to 
enable him to cope with such powerful foes as 
Russia and China, he preservcd his indepen- 
clence for thil*teen years. He was spoken of 
in the capitals of Europe with respect ancl ad- 
miration, and t.he hopes and fears of two mighty 
countries were engrossed in the fate of his 
efforts to establish a stable goverament. His 
temporary success was insuficient t o  enable 
him t o  withstand the shock of a collision with 
an old empire like China, but he did all that 
lay in his power to produce a different result, 
and his failure is hardly to be ascribed to his 
lack of ability. As administrator, soldier, 
and prince, Yakoob Beg has left a name that 
will, a t  all events, provide our descendants at 
some remote period with a subject for histori- 
cal surmise as to what might have been if the 
fates had been less untoward. He possessed, so 
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far  as can be judged, the same qualities thati 
made Genghis, Timour, and Nadk the con- 
querors of Asia; but he lived in a changed 
wbrld. He was a great man, born several cen- 
turies too late. 
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KI-IODODAD KHAN. 
THE present ruler of the country of Belooch- 
istan, or, as he is better known, the Khan of 
IChelat, has proved the sincerity of his friend- 
ship towards England by his acts during the 
two recent campaigns in Afghanistan. It is 
true that much. of his independence has dis- 
appeared in consequence of his conversion to 
the British alliance ; but if such has been the 
case his power among his people and the 
great chiefs has become more vigorous then it 
ever was before. Instead of his authority being 
purely nominal, it is now reoognised from Mek- 
ran to Scinde, and even that troublesome chief- 
tain the Jam of Las Bela has refrained fro111 
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making any aggressive movement since Major 
Sandeman took up his residence at Khelat. 
I n  order to make the career of Khododad 
intelligible to the reader it is necessary to go 
back t o  our former wars in Afghanistan, when, 
for a supposed breach of faith, the Khan of 
that day was killed in defending his town 
against the assault of an English army. The 
name of that Khan was Mehrab. Not content 
with this success, our authorities resolved that 
an elder branch of the ruling family should be 
installed in pomer. Nawaz Khan was the name 
of the ruler we selected, but after a brief reign, 
he was displaced by Nasseer Khan, son of 
Mehrab. Although we had originally opposed 
this prince, he seemed to bear no malice, 
and adopted a decidedly amicable policy to 
wards us. After the occupation of Scinde 
this spirit of forgiveness or of prudence 
showed itself in practical acts, particularly in 
the Treaty of 1854, by the terms of which he 
bound himself and his heirs to admit British 
garrisons within his country whenever such 
a step should be held to be necessary by the 
Calcutta Government. . 
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Nasseer Khan did not long survive this pro- 
clamation of ' his friendly sentiments towards 
tho English Government. H e  died suddenly, 
and it was more than suspected that he was 
got rid of by foul play. His chamberlain, Gul 
Mahomed, who had been one of the most 
trusted of the advisers of the previous ruler, 
Mehrab Khan, and who had suffered greatly 
a t  the time of the storming of Khelat by the 
British troops, mas belie,ved to  have taken an 
active part in disposing of a ruler vho hacl 
gone so far in friendly relations with his 
country's natural enemies. Gul Mahomed 
was the leader of tlie anti-English party, and 
as such bitterly opposecl to the Treaty of 
1854. Two years after the signature of that 
treaty Nasseer died under circumstances which 
left little doubt that he had been murdered. 
Gul Mahomed, of mliose appearance and cha- 
racter Mr. Masson gives the most unfavollrable 
description, was the only man who would have 
dared to take this extreme measure, and the 
only one whose animosity towards the English 
was su5ciently keen to  encourage him to incur 
all the risk of putting himself, forward as 
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their adversary. He told Mr. Masson that he 
never saw or thought of an Englishman with- 
out blood coming to his eyes. This was the 
man generally credited with being the mur- 
derer of Nasseer, and the minister under 
whose auspices Khododad, the present Khan, 
commenced his reign. 
BIir Khododad Khan, youngest son of Meh- 
rab, was born after his father's death in 
1841. He was only fifteen years of age 
when he succeeded his brother as Khan. Gul 
Mahomed evidently expected that he would 
be able to mould the character of this youth 
to a fashion he approved of, and anticipated 
little opposition to his plau for thwarting the 
scheme lately formed for an Anglo-Belooch 
alliance. The years which followed the signa- 
ture of the Treaty of 1854 were apathetic ones 
on our part. General Jacob's vigorous pro- 
positions were little heeded, and no advancs 
of British troops took placo through the 
Bolan. The petty chieftains of Beloochistm 
and the intriguers of Khelat were thus left to 
their own devices. They might quarrel be- 
tween themselves, depose one ruler and create 
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another, as much and as often as they chose. 
The British Government concerned themselves 
not therein, and regarded the whole affair with 
indifference. But Gul Mahorned's power was 
incommensurate with the scope of his designs. 
The Sirdaw, whose position closely resembled 
that of the Daimios of Japan before the late 
reassertion of authority on the part of the 
Mikado, paid but a grudging obedience to the 
edicts of the Khan or his minister, and finally 
set them a t  defiance. Gul Mahomed had a 
hard task to perform, and a t  length it proved 
too much for his strength. The force of cir- 
cumstances was more than he coulcl resist. 
This was the state of affairs in Khelat when 
Khododad mounted the throne of his murdered 
brother. On the one hand a dissatisfied people, 
on the other a confederacy of turbulent chief- 
tains; in the palace a party headed by an 
ambitious and unscrupulous intriguer, in the 
country no devotion tbw@rds the ruler, and 
geheral discontent.at fobe tyranny, of the Sirdars. 
Under these adverse circumstance~l was Kho- 
dodad, a mere boy, called upon to t k  the 
supreme place in the state. In the disunion 
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of the country the new Khan found an un- 
expected stability for himself. His impor- 
tance was enhanced by the fact that the two 
principal rival parties in the state were so 
evenly balanced that the one which could em- 
ploy his name with the greater show of right 
was the one to which it seemed fortune would ' 
finally incline. Gul Mahomed was the leader 
of the one party, which, holding the " miri," 
or citadel, of Khelat, may be called the 
Palace party; and Mir Khan, the powe~ful 
Jam of Las Bela, the leader of tho other. 
During the year 1867 several attempts were 
made by the latter to seize the person of the 
Khan, and it was only the arrival of Lieu- 
tenant Macaulay, of the Scinde Horse, which 
prevented serious consequences accruing from 
the excited state of the public mind. In  No- 
vember 1857 Khododad, acting under the 
advice of Major, the present Major-General 
Sir Henry, Green, dismissed Gul Mahomed ; 
and thus twelve months after this crafty and 
ambitious minister had thought that the whole 
game was in his hands, he found himself in dis- 
grace and deprived of all powor. To Gul Ma- 
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Mahomed, who is still the most trusted of the 
Khan's ministers. 
But at this time the character of the young 
Khan was still only partially formed. Capricious 
, in common with all Eastern potentates in his 
likes and dislikes, he had not yet made up his 
mind that his Tvisest policy would be to throw 
himself heartily into the mms of the English. 
He owed his elevation to a man whose anti- 
British proclivities were notorious, and i t  is 
not to be supposed that he could wholly escape 
the contaminating influence of his example. 
The Sirdars showed their indifference to his 
authority by waging petty wars with each other. 
Sarawan and Jhalawan revealed their mut,ual 
hostility without equivocation, and the un- 
fortunate ruler exhibited at once the weakness 
and the irksomeness of a position of which he 
was unable to fulfil the duties. I n  1860 the 
Khan took the first active step towards making 
his authority respected by Ieading an expedi- 
tion against the chiefs on the borders of Mek- 
ran. The result was eminently satisfactory. 
The disturbed districts were pacified, and many 
126 UENTRAL ASIAN PORTRAITS. 
of the local Khans returned with the ruler to 
Khelat. But the effect of this fit of resolu- 
tion was nullified by an act of which i t  is im- 
possible to  say anything save in terms of con- 
demnation. 
Khododad had been engaged in marriage to 
the daughter of the leading Sirdar of Jllala- 
wan, Taj  Mahomed Zehai; but breaking off 
from  hi^ betrothal, which among the Brahooes 
is a most serious engagement, he married in 
1862 this chief's sister, and the widow of his 
own brother. Not only did this give a great 
shock to the national customs, but its effect was 
aggravated by the circumstance that the lady 
was the bitter foe of her brother. The powerful 
baron at once plotted his revenge, and, being 
joined by many others of his order, he headed 
a revolution in 1863 for the purpose of depos- 
ing Khododad, and installing his cousin, Shere 
dil Khan, in his place. The Khan was sur- 
prised in his camp near Qundava in Kachhi, 
and compelled to flee into Scinde, where he 
remained until the assassination of Shere dil 
Khan by the captain of the body-guard in 
May of the following year. The great Sirdar 
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of Sarawan, Mollah Mahomed Raisani, then 
stood forward as the champion of the cause 
of Khododnd, who was soon reinstated in his 
former position. The lull was not of long 
duration, and a greater danger than any before 
beset the Khan. 
The Sirdars of Jhalawan and Barawan com- 
bined against him, and the two powerful mag- 
nates, whose names have been mentioned, 
formed a plot, not only for his overthrow, 
but also for his assassination. They were 
not as successful as might have been ex- 
pected. Mahomed Raisani escaped to Can- 
dahar, but his confederate, not so fortunate, 
was taken prisoner, and died a t  Khelat in 
1867. The year 1865 continued to be full 
of dangers to the newly returned Khan, for 
scarcely had the rising just described been 
repressed, than another and more carefully 
organised rebellion broke out. The Jam of 
Las Bela, who, as the husband of the Khan'a 
sister, imagined that he had some chance of 
obtaining supreme power, allied himaelf with 
the chief of Wad& a place of some importance 
between Khelat and Bela; and the Khan was 
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end such troops as he could 
ooUect against these ambitious vassds. Fortune 
smiled upon his arms. Their followers were 
scattered, and they themselves were made pri- 
soners, only to be pardoned and released by 
their conqueror. The clemency of the ruler 
found bnt an ill return, for three years after- 
wards the same Sirdam were again in open 
rebellion, but the energy of the Khan foiled 
their machinations. 
In  the following year, however, the Khan 
was hard pressed. A considerable force ap- 
peared before Khelat, and but for the tact of 
the British Resident, Captain Hamison, who 
arranged the difficulty, i t  would probably 
have gone hard with Khododed. A few 
months afterrnards the Khan's troops were 
completely victorious in art oncounter with tho 
Jam's army, and that chief was glad to find 
safety in flight. The credit of this decided 
success was due to  tho Wartir Wali Mahomed, 
mho led the Khan's troops in the field. Another 
rising occurred in 18'71, and the same minister 
took an active part in repressing it;  but, un- 
fortunately, the later portion of the campaign 
ts he could 
ds. Fortune 
lowers were 
e made pri- 
released by 
of the ruler 
yems after- 
bin in open 
Khan foiled 
, the Khan 
le force ap- 
the tact of 
~rrison, who 
Id probably 
,d. A few 
troops mere 
her With tho 
glad to find 
this decided 
~li Mahornell, 
eld. Another 
me ministel 
it; but, un- 
he campaign 
ICHODODAD KBAN. 129 
had to be entrusted to an incompetent officer, 
and the rebels colltinuecl to cause disturbances 
in Kachhi and round the Bolan. These re- 
peated disorders, and the great danger which 
they gave rise to for a11 those who tyaded be- 
tween Scinde and Beloochistan, had reached 
such a pass, the authority of the Khan being' 
little more than nominal, that the Commis- 
sioner of Scinde, Sir William Meremether, on 
the authority of the British Government, 
intervened for the purpose of reconciling the 
conflicting pretensions of Khan and 'Sirdars. 
The result of the negotiations, mhich took 
place at Jacobabad, should have been to  
satisfy the demands of the Sirdars, and to 
consolidate the power and increase the au- 
thority of the Khan. But for some reason, 
far from clear, Khododad mas not me11 con- 
tent with the arrangement,, and did not hide 
his dissatisfaction. His old civility to the 
British Resident cooled, and hia trusted and 
faithful Wazlir, Wali Mahorned, fell into dis- 
favour. The latter mas obliged to flee for 
safety to the British Residency; but, after 
the Khan had been remonstrated with, the 
9 
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1' 
I Wazir was reinstated in office if not in: 
I favour. 
1 The anti-English party still retained con- 
I siderable influence in the palace, Khododad's 
I 
mother and sister being its principal sup- 
'i 
I porters. Although he had interviews with 
Lord Northbrook at Sukhur in November 1 
I 
I 1872, and with the Scinde Commissioner a t  
I 
Shahpore in February of the following year, 
it became clear that the Khan was more in- 
different than had been supposed to the Eng- 
lish alliance. He also conceived a personal 
w7 antipathy lor Major Emrison, and took into his 
I confidence inferior officials of bad character. At  
i last things reached such s point that the British 
1 
I oficer mas withdrawn, the allowance made t o  
I 
I the Khan stopped, and the Waair Wali Mahomed 
i left the country to take refuge for a second 1 time within English territory, The ill humour 1 
d 
1 of the Khan did not confine itself to sen- 
timent. It found expression in several raids 
committed within the Scinde frontier; and in 
1874 the border authorities tendered the advice 
i that a force should be sout to Ehelat to con- 
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l 
IITB. 
ice if not jg 
retained c o y  
ce, IKhododJ'$ 
principal BLIP' 
nterviewa vitb 
in Novembof 
!ommissioner at 
following yefir' 
~n was more in- 
)sed to the ED&' 
?ived a p e r s o ~ d  
and took into his 
ad charactor. 
t that the ~ r i t i s b  
lowance mado t o  
rir W ali ~ a h o m e d  
Jge for a second 
The ill humo~ul 
ne itself to son- 
1 in several raids 
frontier; ancl i n  
:ndered the arl~ica 
to  Khelat to corl- 
~ u l d  not tolcrata 
~ O D O D A D  KHAN., 131 
either apathy or a semi-hostile attitude on his 
part. Lord Northbrook declined to sanction 
this extreme measure. The Khan mas to be 
left entirely to his own devices, and deprived 
of the subsidy on which he had mainly de- 
pended; it being confidently anticipated that 
in a short time he would have to come round 
to his old line of policy. 
In  1815 he was compelled, by the necessities 
of his position, to make overtures to  us. His 
chief Sirdars were on the eve of open rebel- 
lion, and without money the Khan could not 
act vigorously against them. It was also said 
that the Ameor of Afghanistan had ljhown 
a disposition to profit by the severance of 
friendly relations with the Indian Government 
to advance the old claims of the Durania 
over the Khan of Khelat. But whatever the 
causes, Khododad is again found in friendly 
aommunication with the Scinde authorities 'in 
1876, and Major Sandeman's negoti t' lone re- 
st~lted in an arrangement which appears t o  
have placed the relations betweeu England 
and Khelat on a basis of permanent amity. 
The military occupation of Quettah, the paoi- 
9 "  
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fication of the Bolan m d  its vicinity, and 
the installation of the Khan as one of the 
feudatories of the Indian Empire, all mark the 
events since 1876 as being of a character en- 
tirely different from those that occurred before 
that year. They also conclusively prove that 
the day has passed by when the idiosyncrasy r 
of the Khelat ruler was a matter of prime im- 
portance. He has taken his place in the ranks 
of those native luminaries who surround the 
throne of the Empress of India, and his prin- 
cipal diatinct;ion will probably consist in being 
regarded as among the most faithful of the 
native princes. 
But it has not always been so, and this 
slight sketch of his career may have served to 
show that there have been times when he 
thought that his true policy was one of hosti- 
lity, and not of friendship, to this country. The 
old dreams of ambition are abandoned; and 
with the recognition of a practical necessity, the 
figure of Khododad has lost much of its romantic 
proportions. As an independent prince he vas 
a pictuilesque personage enough. I n  many re- 
spects he was not much above the level of an 
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untamed savage, but the traditions which the 
Brahoo warrior inherited sufficed to elevate him 
to a higher pedestal. It should also be remem- 
bered that the time may come when he may be 
anxious t o  change his new-found sense of se- 
curity for the old game of chance, in which, if 
there was greater risk, there was certainly less 
irksomeness. His Sirdars have evinced still 
more satisfaction than he has at the new 
arrangements-a fact which is at the least 
conducive to their stability; and with each 
year's continued tranquillity the probability of 
disturbance decreases. The personal character 
of the Khan becomes a matter of less importi 
ance, and while the Indian Empire can boast 
of one great vassal the more, i t  is a circum- 
stance of practical significance that the addi- 
tion of his estates to our Empire hns made 
us the immediate neighbour of the Persian 
kingdom. 
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THE political power of the ruler of Ehiva 
having practically disappeared, and , the hold 
of Russia on the state being much more dis- 
tinct in form than is the case with Bokhara, i t  
is both difficult and unnecessary to say much 
concerning a ruler who, although representing 
the oldest dynasty in Turkestan, possesses little 
or no individuality. If it were permissible to 
devote our attention to the past history of the 
monarchs of Khwaresm, or if it entered into 
the prorillce of this work to give a detailed 
account of the last Russian war with Ehivn, 
this sketch would, of course, expand to a, much 
greater bulk than we contemplate, our object 
r of Khiva, 
~d , the hold 
:h more dh- 
h Bokhara, it 
to say muoh 
representing 
,assesses little 
~ermissible ti0 
history of the 
, entered into 
ive a detailed . 
r with IKhiva, 
and to a mu oh 
he, our object 
being simply to narrate in a fern words the 
career of the present Khan. 
Mallomed Rahim Bahadur Khan succeeded 
his father as Khan of Khiva in tho year 1866. 
I n  Khiva, alone among Mahornedan countries, 
the rights of primogeniture exist. They are a 
relic of theiy Mongol ancestry. The present 
ruler is the eleventh in lineal descent of the 
same family, and, so far as can be ascertained, 
he was born in or about the year 1849. On 
corning to the throne he appears to have taken 
the reina of power into his hands at once, 
without submitting to the tutelage of any am- 
bitious official. An English officer* who had 
an interview with him describes him as looking 
.about eight and twenty in 1875. He is taller 
than the average of his subjects, CC being quite 
-6ve feet ten in height and strongly built." On 
the whole his personal appearance t e h  in his 
favour and is very pleasing. In fact he may 
be said to have velny prepossessing manners, 
and the traveller j1.t quoted says that the 
" Major Burnaby in (' A Rido t o  Ehive." 
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Spanish expression mz6y sinpafico (very en- 
gaging) may be applied to him. And despite 
the stories that used to be current in Russian 
circles of his cruelty towards prisoners, there 
is a collcurrence of evidence that not only was 
he a good-natured man in private life, and 
considerate in his dealings with his subjects, 
but that he also treated both his personal and 
national enemies with generosity. 
As regards the latter, the testimony of the 
Ruseian subjects who were detained in lUliva 
should be conclusive. There were twenty-one 
of these prisoners surrendered on the eve of 
the Expedition in 1873. The narrative of their 
enforced residence at Khiva proved highly in- 
teresting, from the fact that some of them had 
been captives for several years. Most of them 
had been captured by the Kirghiz on the Emba 
steppe, and had been carried off to Khiva to  
be sold. There they ha'd been purchased by 
the Khan for his own use, and he appears to 
have employed them, for the most. part, as 
gardeners in his pala,ce outside the walls of the 
t o m .  It is to this spot that he retires during 
the months of June and July; and hero at  that 
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he most part, as 
3e the walls of the 
t h d r e s  during 
; and here at tha t  
season of the year the Court is held in the 
open air undey tlie shade of fruit-trees and of 
vines. The gardens have been described as 
laid out in perfect order, and mincing much 
better taste than could be expected of a Cen- 
tral Asian ruler. This is, no doubt, to be 
attributed to the example and labours of 
these Russian prisoners, and it may 
ably be snpposed that the Khivans, after their 
departure, imitated their labours and strove to 
keep the gardens in the state of efficiency 
to which the Russian labourers had raisect 
them. 
At first the Russian prisoners were subjected 
to the same treatment as the Persian slaves, 
.which was none of the most lenient. Their 
diet mas limited, and harsh usage was resorted 
t o  with the object of making them become 
Mussulmans. But in a short time this came 
to the ears of the Khan, and he at  once put a 
stop to it, declarhg that no one shoulct be 
compelled to  change his religion. If the Rus- 
sian slaves were to .be converted, they must be 
so of their own free will. He also appears to 
have taken measures for the alleviation of their 
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hardships, and on numerous occasions they 
affirmed that he used to enter into good- 
humoured conversation with them. These tri- 
butes Lo the personal kindliness of the Khan are 
of particular value, as they were made a t  a time 
when it required great strength of mind on the 
part of a Russian subject to say anything in 
favour of the Khivan ruler, who, in official 
despatches and newspapers, was held forth to  
public obloquy as a, monster of cruelty and 
brutality. 
The political career of the Ehan may be 
.said to have commenced with those disturbances 
caused by the Ilirghiz attempting to shake off 
the authority of Russia. These risings culmi- 
natecl in the attacks on the chain of posts in 
tlie Uralsk region in 1869, but within a few 
months after the chief success of the insur- 
gents the Russians were congratulating them- 
selves that all the danger had passed away. 
This was not due to their energy or to the 
skill of their combinations ; but was accounted 
for simply by the fact that the movement, lack- 
ing a head, had died out of its own accord. 
I n  these events Mahomecl Ehan had played but 
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n had played but 
a minor part. Khiva, indeed, held towards the 
Kirghiz of that clay much the same relation 
that lklerv does at  the present t o  the Turco- 
mans; but its Khan had extended to the 
enemies of Russia only a benevolent sym- 
pathy, and not an active support. Before 
this period the Khan hacl receivecl communi- 
cations from General Kaufmann redpecting the 
raids carried on by Erghiz, who, crossing the 
$yr Darya, had onterea Russian territory. 
The replies sent by the Khan's orders to 
these representations were couched in a 
haughty tone. The offenders were subjects 
of Khivn, and consequently under his juris- 
diction alone; but the mids continued. But 
gradually the tone of his letters became more 
ai*gumentative, and the dispute changed into a 
frontier question. The appearance of the Rus- 
sians on the eastern shore of the Caspian had 
much t o  do with this change, and the founcla- 
tion of ~asnovodsk  by Colonel Stoletoff was a 
menace to Khiva, to which the Khan could not 
show himself indifferent. Tho year 18'70 wit- 
nessed an outbreak on a still larger scale than 
that which had occurred dulling the provioue 
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year. The Khan took a more active share in 
the war. It was his emissaries who stirred up 
both Kirghiz and Turcomans to a joint effort 
for the expulsion of the Russians ; and he sent 
a small body of Khivan troops to their as- 
sistance. 
A t  first fortune smiled on theiy enterprise, 
and the result was sufficiently encouraging to 
show horn different the result of all these Cen- 
tral Asian wars might have been had the de- 
fenders of their country been possessed of 
better weapons. In the vicinity of Mangish- 
lak the Kirghiz were most energetic. A Rus- 
sian detachment under the command of Colonel 
Rukin was surprised and cut to pieces. The 
officer in command shot himself" when he saw 
there was no hope left, and a few of the sol- 
diers were sent as prisoners to Khiva. The 
Kirghiz followed up this success by attacking 
several of the Russian posts on the Caspian. 
The Nicolai station was burnt, some light- 
* This act shows that the traditions of their Tartar 
origin are still a vital force among the Russians. A 
Manchu soldier woulcl probably have done the same, 
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urnt, some light- 
ships were destroyed, and a vigorous attack was 
made on the fort at Novo-Alexaudrovsk. The 
fort was on the point of surrendering to the 
assailants when reinforcements arrived from 
the Caucasus, and hhe Kirghizi were repulsed.* 
Military demonstrations on a small scale served 
to keep the f-rontier tranquil, and the friendly 
Kirghiz more than neutralised those of a hos- - 
tile disposition. The only question that re- 
mained to be treated was the chastisement 
of Khiva. 
Various projects had been formed and ap- 
proved of for the invasion of Khiva and the 
punishment of its Khan. I n  1870 the Czar had 
given his formal consent to a plan submitted 
by General Kaufmann for the despatch of an 
expedition against Khiva ; but various circum- 
~tances prevented its being carried into effect. 
Although deferred, the design was not aban- 
doned; and the Ameer of Bokhara at tempted 
litions of their Tart= 
long the Russiam. A 
ve done the samc. 
. * Ton Eelwald asserts that the fort waEl taken and 
destroyed, the garrison being put to the sword. Eis in- 
formation was, however, incorrect. 
to mediate betmeen the disputants. His over- 
tures mere not received in good part at Khive, 
where it mas held that the dignity of the Khan 
demanded that the negotiations should be 
carried on mith the Governor-General himself. 
The years 1871 and 1872 were passed in these 
idle negotiations on the one hand, and in active 
I 
milital~y preparations on the part of Russia on 1 1 
l 
I the other. The Kh'an took alarm at  the steady 
i concentration of troops upon his borders, and 
thinlcing that these hostile measures were due 
solely to the ambitious desires of the authorities 
et Tashkent., endeavoured to enter into negotia- 
tions with those at  Orenburg and Tiflis. The 
move mas an astute one, but it camo too 
late. Tho m v a n  expedition must be carried 
ant. The Khanate, which was identified with 
every Russian reverse in the past, must feel 
tehe weight of Russia's hand. In  his distress 
the Khan sent an envoy to India entreating 
British assistance. He was told the wisest 
thing his master could do would be (( to make 
I 
I pefice with Russia, obey her demands, and give 
no cause for further dissatisfaction." Con- 
1 ; sidering what Kaufmann wanted, Mahomed 
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Khan* may well hme exclaimed, on receiving 
that message of cold comfort, " But how ? " 
In the year 1873 everything was in readi- 
ness for an advance upon Khiva. The diffi- 
culty of the campaign was known to consist in 
the task of getting there ; so the strategists of 
Tashkent were busily engaged in selecting 
march-routes, and in deciding on positiolls 
for depbts. Their claims to the title of stm- 
tegists would appear doubtful in the eyes of 
generals a t  Berlin, because when these details 
had been carefully arrasged they were all 
changed a t  a moment's notice in order that 
an officer? might qualify for a decoration. It 
is unnecessary to follow the course of this cam- 
paign further than to say that in April 1878 
* Controversial politics are excludecl from these pages 
as much as possible ; but the historical student will 
derive instruction from contrasting the policy followed 
in 1872 with that adopted in 185940. In thosc ysars 
English  officer^, Abbott and Shakespeare, were the libera- 
tors of Russian slaves at Khivs. In  1872 we could only 
advise submission to Ruasian dictation. 
t General Troitzky, e bungling officer, who nea~ly met 
with disaster during tho Kholiandim war at Andijm, 
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everything -gas in readiness for the march, and 
on the 29th of Nay the Russian force arrived 
on the right bank of the Oxus. In five days 
General Kaufmann's division had crossed that  
river, jvhich divides Western Asia, into two 
distinct regions, differing in polity and race, 
and the destinies of which have been, and 
should always be, smayed by different circum- 
stances. 
The preparations made by Mahomed Khan 
appear to have been feeble in the extreme. 
Solne slight attempt was made to defend the 
crossing of the Oxus, but of so insignificant a 
imture that a few hours' bombardment suf- 
ficecl to ovel-come it. He seems to have in- 
dulged the hope that the surrender of the 
Rnssian prisoners rno~lld have turned aside the 
wrath of their Government. He wrote a t  this 
time, " If you want anything else, say so ; ac- 
cording to our ability we will fulfil it." The 
advance of the Muscovite battalions was not t o  
be stayed, and on the 10th of June Khiva fell 
into the hands of the Russians. A treaty of 
peace 7vns concluded with Mahomed Khan, 
who threw himself upon the generosity of h i~i  
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generofiit y of his 
conquerors, and after remaining a few months 
in oocupetion the Russian army withdrew. 
The most important of the terms exacted 
were-the cession of the territory on the 
right bank of the Oxus, the surrender to 
Russia of the exclusive right to navigate the 
river, and the abolition of slavery, in adcii- 
tion to the imposition of a heavy war in- 
demnity, and the disbandment of the whole of 
the Khan's armed forces. These terms made 
Khiva a vassal state. She is far more power- 
less in the hands of Russia than the Nizam 
or any of the Mahratta states is in those of 
England. 
Since that year the Khan, who is of an easy- 
going disposition, has become more and more 
subservient t o  the Czar. He lives happily, it 
is said, on his private income, and of late that 
income has been steadily increasing. One of 
his brothers is in a Russian cavalry regiment. 
Many of his relations and former ministers are 
to be met in the palaces of Moscow and St. 
Petersburg, whither, in a few short years, the 
present Khan may very possibly proceed to 
join them. Every day makes it more and more 
10 
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probable that the Khans of Central Asia will 
develop into Russian noblemen, and that men, 
whose hands are now only beginning to drop 
the reins of power, will disappear from the 
scene on which they might have played so 
bold a part, to take their place among those 
descendants of ancient or forgotten heroes, of ' I  
whom Prince Tchinghia* is, if not the most 
prominent, certainly tho most remarkable. I 
Among these Mahomed Rahim Khan, a de- 
scendant in another line of the greatest of 
conquerors, will be, for the sake of historical 
association, not the least noticeable. 
-- - - - - - 
* This prince is the son of the last Khan of the Bukeief 
Horde, who assisted the Russian Government very much 
in their denlings mith the Hbghi~. 
st* will 
Lb 
~ O P  
the 
o e  a SO 
-@*kose 
lP B of exoO ' 
jho most 
%able. naf - 
IZZET KUTEBAR. 
'WHEN Russia began to make her way from 
$he almost impenetrable forests of the ancient 
Scythia in search of more favoured provinces, 
,she entered upon a. course of which the initial 
:stage involved the overcoming of the natural 
diffic~~lties presented by the vast expanse of 
steppe land which stretclied beyond her filon- 
tier. But sparse as was the herbage, and 
limited as were the productions of " that'great 
sea of moorland," as it  has been called, there 
wore scattered over i t  in all directions myriads 
of nomad tribes, mho, wandering as a rule with- 
out any further object in viem than the search 
for pasturage, had sometimes, in past times, pro- 
duced conquerors of the first order, and given 
10 " 
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kings and dynasties to the states of Central 
Asia. With these G g h i z  tribes Russia had, 
at an early stage of her mission, established re- 
lations, which were far from being altogether 
of an unfi*iendly character. But  when the 
Czars of Muscovy began to encroach beyond 
the Urd, tronbles naturally ensued, for they r 
mere advancing into the camping-grounds of a 
people whose passionate love of freedom had % 
impelled tbem to leave their origind and more I #& favoured abode for one less advantageous near 
the Russian frontier. The relations of Russia 
with the three Hordes of the Kirghiz cannot 
be discussed here, although the theme would 
be a most interesting one; for the Rus- 
sians encountered, during the one hundred and 
forty years that they were engaged in over- 
powering them, a more gallant resistance than 
any they have since met with. It is our im- 
mediate object to sketch the career of one who 
was the latest, if not the most remarkable, of 
the robber chieftains of the steppe. 
I n  the year 1824 the Russian Government 
had changed the principle upon which it had 
hitherto gone in its dealings with the Kirghiz. 
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Their country mas then divided into three dis- 
tricts, and over each a Sultan Regent was 
appointed. But the Russian authorities bun,. 
gled the arrangements most grievously. Their 
regents were men of no mark, and the tribes 
paid little attention to rulers who were nothing 
more than Russian officers. The heart of the 
people still went with their Khans, leaders 
whose claims to authority had come down to 
them from remote generations, and it only 
required one of these to set himself up as an 
independent chieftain to bring to his banner 
hundreds, and sometimes thousands, of Kir- 
ghiz warriors. Some, indeed, of these Sultan 
Regents were Khans themselves, but when this 
was the case they were generally to be found 
at  the head of the revolts against Russian rule. 
Several of these have obtained a permanent 
place in history, and among them may bo men- 
tioned the great chiefs Syrym and Kenisar. 
But the subject of this memoir was neither 
a Sultan Regent by rank nor a, Khan by 
birth. He was essentially an adventurer who 
rose to prominence by dint of daring. Izzet 
Kutebar, the son of Kutebar the celebrated 
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robber chief of an earlier day, was born about, I 
the commencement of the present century. He 
assisted his father in several of his enterprises, 
and when on his father's death he became the 
most prominent man of his clan, he had already 
, 
won a considerable reputation among his fellow 
I tribesmen. In 1822 his earliest exploit, the plun- 
dering of a large Bolrharan caravan, had marked 
him out as one of moi*e than ordinary audacity, i' 
and in the years following, down to 1842, he 
had showti remarkable daring in carrying on 
raids within Russian territory, both upon the 
Kirghiz settlements, Cossack posts, and Rus- 
sian caravans. At the moment when the 
English officei-s, Abbott and Shakespear, 
were residing at  Khiva, this chieftain mas a t  
the zenith of his success as a leader of B ma- 
rauding bancl. Neither tho energy nor the 
rewards of the Russian authorities availed to  
circumvent the deeply laid schemes of this 
astute partizan. In 1544, however, he appears 
to have arrived at the conclusion that it would 
be better to come to a pacific understanding 
with the Russians, more especially as General 
Peroffsky mas beginning t o  show signs of that 
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activity which in a few years carried Russian 
arms to the Aral and the Jaxartes. Por a 
short time he even played the part of informer 
for the Russian officials, and gave them con- 
siderable information concerning the state of 
affairs at Khiva. He ingratiated himself with 
one of the Sultan Regents, who, believing in his 
sincerity, obtained a golcl medal from St. Pe- 
tersburg as a reward for his proffered services. 
- 
Before, however, this medal arrived from 
Europe, Izzet had thrown off the mask of 
friendship which he had assumed, ancl again 
figured as the terror of the steppe. Tho gold 
medal was reserved for some more deserving 
recipient." 
Up to this point, I ~ z e t  Kutebar had been 
simply i successful leader of robbers. ,He, 
The facts are far from clear. Rcference i~ made to 
this circumstance by Vambery and the Messrs. Michell. 
Prof. Gregorieff, in  his acrimonious criticism of the 
formcr's (' History of Bokhara," curtly says that ('Vam- 
bery has no idea of what he is talking of when he speaks 
of the gold medal given to Eutebrtrof." Certainly the 
Sultan Regent, Bai Mahorned, obtained one f o ~  him from 
the St. Petershurg authorities. 
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bad been, as he has been called by one Eng- 
lish writer, the Rob Roy of the Steppe. The 
reputation which he had acquired by his SUC- 
cesses in this character stood him in good 
stead when he aspired to play a greater and a 
nobler part. At the least i t  always brought 
men to his standard. No young Kirghiz brave 
mas loth to foIlow the Knight of the Steppe- 
another of the titles which have been bestowed 
upon this chief-whether the enterprise in hand 
were the pInndering of a caravan, the surprise 
of a convoy, or a sudden attack upon one of the 
numerous Russian blockhouses which dotted 
tho Kirghiz steppe in all directions. From the 
year 1847 until 1853, events progressed much 
after this fashion. The Kirghiz leader was no 
longer compelled to seek refuge each year in 
remote Khiva, but found that he was perfectly 
safe from the Russian attempts at pursuit in 
the northern portion of the Ust Urt plateau. 
In 3 853 the capture of the Khokandian fort of 
Ak Musjid raised the reputatlion of Russia t o  
a higher point than ever among the Kirghiz, 
and many of them were not much distressed 
at the blow which had been inflicted upon the 
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Khokandian Government. But Izzet Kutebar 
held aloof. He had not even cared to conceal 
his hostility towards the Russians while Peroff- 
sky's expedition was in progress. By his in- 
fluence several of the Ilirghiz clalls had been 
induced to decline to assist the Russian com- 
mander; and whon Ak Musjid had been taken 
and a Khokandian relieving army defeated, it 
was resolved that active measures should be 
adopted for his chastisement. I n  1854 a force 
was sent in pursuit of him, and for the first 
and last time Izzet was surprised and taken 
prisoner. This was, apparently, accomplished 
in  an unfair manner, for the Russian com- 
mander had previously promised him a safe- 
conduct to a conference. However, Izzet, 
on the strength of that agreement, and after 
making numerous promises of amendment, was 
permitted to depart. 
Instead of being overcome with the genero- 
sity of his enemy, Kutebar saw in the in- 
fringement of the understanding an additional 
reason for resentment. He threw himself into 
the arms of the Khan of Khiva and openly set 
the Russians at  defiance. He appealed to all 
I )  
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I 
I 
rl of Kirghia race to join in the wal* against the 
I infidel. He issued proclamations, the ring of 
1 which would have roused a frenzy throughout 
I the steppe that c o d  at an earlier day have 
I only been appeased after severe fighting. His 
I war-cry went the round of the auls, and in each 
'1 Xbitka it could not fail to rouse feelings that 
i merc dormant rather than extinct. '' Steeds j 1 and arms they have; have we not the like 3 
Are me not a.s numerous as the sands of the 
i 
ocean ? Wheresoever ye turn-whether tomaTds 
the east or the west, or towa~ds the north o r  
1 1  I 
the  ~011th-ye surely find Kirghiz. Where- 
I I fore, then, should me submit to a handful of 
~ltraugers ? " 
I I 
I His boldness met with its just recompense. The first successes in the desultory war which 
I I ensued were his. He routed a mixed body of 
Kirghiz and Cossacks sent against him. A larger 
force mas despatched against him. He eluded 
1 it, and carried on depredations in its rear. He 
I was on the shores of the Caspian one week; 
I ,  the next he was on the steppe. At one time 
I he and his band escaped by retreating through 
I 
a sandy morass, over which the Russians i 
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I could not march ; at another, when surrounded 
by three cletachments, he passed through one 
of the intervening spaces at  night-time. When 
the Russians thought they had the prize in 
their hands, he slipped between their fingers, 
and mas gone. There could, of course, be only 
one end t o  this warfare, but the process was 
exhausting, and the officials of the Czai- grew 
sick of the pursuit of one who seemed to be 
intangible. The year 1855 closed, too, with a, 
complete success for him. He swprisod on the 
Temir river a small band of Cossacks and Kir- 
ghiz allies, all of mhom, with the exception of 
one Cossack who escaped wounded, were 
slain. 
Although Kutebar himself always succeedod 
in escaping, the Kirghiz sugered greatly. Ths. 
great mass of his kinsmen had remained in-. 
different to his appeals, and had given the. 
Russians active assistance. During the years 
1856 and 1857 his places of refuge were be- 
coming fewer and fewer, his followers were 
dwindling in numbers and growing fainter in 
spirit. On the other hand, the Russim pur- 
suit was as keen as ever. In  his last extres 
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mities he had filled up the wells to retard the 
Russian movements, but this desperate remedy 
compelled him to seek other camping-places, 
some of which were near the Russian line of 
forts. I n  one of them he was surprised, and 
escaped only with a few followers. The Rus- 
sians had recovered from the Crimean war, 
and their tlvoops mere concentrating in greater 
force on the Syr Darya. The heart had been 
taken out of the Kirghiz. Their pomers of 
resistance were insignificant, and even the 
voice of Izzet Kutebar failed to bring any force 
around him. It was at this stage that the 
Governor-General of Orenburg, General Kate- 
nin, offered him honourable terms, which he 
at once accepted, and in 1859 Izzet Kutebar 
became a respected guest at St. Petersburg. 
The life of this Kirghiz leader forms one 
episode in that silent warfare which  ha^ been 
carried on witho~zt any intermission, during a 
century ancl a half, between the Russians and 
the nomads of the steppe. It clearly shows that 
these people had aspirations much higher than 
those with which they have been credited. It 
was Russia mhich commenced the war, ossen- 
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tially one of aggression. A position-inviting 
attack-was taken up within the Kirghia zone, 
':not for a day, not for a year, but for ever," 
as the Russian proclamations love to express 
the Czar's ~a t e rna l  affection for his new 
peoples. It was in vain that the Kirghiz hurled 
themselves against a barrier which was im- 
penetrable to their puny efforts. They did not 
fail wholly because they had no worthy leaders, 
for they had several; but because they were 
too disunited to combine. Of those leaclers, 
Izzet Kutebar was the mall who, with means 
quite insignificant, did most for the preserva- 
tion of his independence. He was a, born 
leader of men, and may be considerecl to have 
had in him the makings of one of those great 
soldiers of which the soil of Asia has in past 
times been most prolific. 
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ABDEBEAHMAN (BARUCKBYE). 
- 
LEADING at present the life of an exila in Rus- 
sian territory, banished from his country and 
removed from the sphere of active politics, 
Abderra1lman, or Abdul Rahman, Khan, the son 
of Afzul the eldest of all the sons of Dost 
Mahorned, is far too important an individual to 
be excluded from the portrait gallery of Central 
Asian celebrities. Eleven years have passed 
away since he. succumbed to fate on the field 
of Tinah Khan, but although he has sunk into 
the obscurity of a Russian pensioner, his career 
has very probably not yet reached its conclu- 
sion, and i t  is certain that the people of one 
portion of Afghanistan still look t o  him as their 
natural leader, This is due partly to his great 
C 
ABDERRAHMAN (BARUUKSYE). 
talents, and partly to the fact that when his 
party was victorious he imitated neither the 
indolence of his father nor the tyranny of his 
uncle Azim. 
Of his early life little or nothing is known. 
He is said to have been born about the year 
. 1830, and to have taken part in the second 
campaign in the Punjab, when &bar crossed 
us- . In 1863 the death of Dost Maholned mas the 
cnd signal for the outbreak of dist~urbances, which 
its, in the following year developed theuselves ill 
3013. civil war. The first campaign between Shere 
lost Mi, the rightful Ameer, and his elder brother 
1 t o  Afzul, closed with the discomfiture of the latter, 
tr d who was nothing loth to come to an under- 
;sed standing with his successful brother, A truce 
8 ,  ield was accordingly negotiated between them at 
into Balkh, and while Afz11.1 swore fealty to Shere 
reer Ali on the Koran, the latter took a similar 
oath that Afzul's liberty should not be inter- clu- 
one 1 fered with, This reconciliation lasted but a 
1 ;heir short time, and it is said that this was due 
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satisfied with the surrender of his father's pre- 
tensions. Be that as it may, the tranquillity of 
the camp at  Balk11 was very soon disturbed by 
the arrest of Mzul and the flight of Abdemah- 
man. While Shere Ali returned with his cap- 
tive brother to Cabul in order to encounter the 
rebels in other quarters of the state, Abd- 
errahman fled for safety to Bokhara, where 
he met with a kind reception. He remained 
i 
@&,6 there until after Shere Ali had defeated Ameen 
at Kujhbaz and driven Azim into English terri- 
tory; but when he perceived Shere Ali, far 
from following up his successes, to be sunk in a 
state of apathy at  Candahar, he crossed the 
Oxus with an irregular force and easily esta- 
blished his authority in Balkh. 
Abderrahman's success north of the Hindoo 
Koosh did not snffice to rouse Shere Ali to a 
sense of the dangers which surrounded him. 
With Cabul as well as Candahar in his posses- 
sion, he remained apparently of opinion that 
the moment for re-establishing his authority in 
the outlying portions of the state might be 
deferred until a more convenient season. Abd- 
I 
errahman measured the situation more cor- 
rectly. He saw the fatal mistake the Ameer 
was making in his delusion as to the stability 
of his, own power, and he resolved to take 
prompt measures for deriving the greatest pos- 
sible benefit from tlie blunders of his rival. 
He struck hard and he struck quick. In 
February 1866 he had been joined by Azim, 
and was in the close neighbourhood of Cz~bul, 
beld a t  that time by Ibrahim, Shere Ali's second 
son. On the 2nd of March the city surrendered, 
and Azim was installed arJ temporary ruler. 
This success was followed up by a decided 
victory a t  Shaikhabad, of which the immediate 
consequences were the release of Afzul and 
the capture of Ghizni. Afzul then became the 
recognised Ameer a t  Cabul, and his son was 
looked upon as the Hotspur of the confederacy. 
His right to this title was shown still more 
conclusively a t  the crowning victory of Ehelat- 
i-Ghiljie in the early part of 1867. 
Neither Maul nor Azim was proof against 
his unexpected good fortune. The former, 
proclaimed Alneer in the Bala Hissar, and re- 
cognised as such by the Indian Government, 
degenerated into a drunkard, and his death was 
11 
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peoipitated, if it was not caused, by the ex- \ 
cesses which he committed after his release 
from confinement. Aaim, without copying the 
indolent vices of his brother, had also become 
a petty tyrant. Much of his brother's faults 
be traced to his influence, and in the 
distribution of the chief posts, he secured the r 
most important for himself and his son. Seve- 
ral of the leading men in the country were 
cast into prison by his orders, and one of 
the most notable was put to death. Matters 
became atill worse after Afzul's death. There 
was a critical molnent when it seemed as if Abd- 
errahman would refuse to recognise his uncle as  
Ameer. By a violent exercise of his will, how- 
ever, he suppressed his personal feelings and 
took a formal oath of 'allegiance to his uncle. 
But he quitted Cabul in disgust, and retired 
to Afghan Turkestan, with the administration 
of which province his uncle entrusted him. 
While discontent with the authority of Aaim 
was rendering the most able of Shere Ali's op- 
ponents less enthusiastic in his cause, the latter 
unfortunate ruler was making another effort f o r  
the recovery of his rights with the aid of fresh 
:le. 
red 
;ion 
troops from Herat, and the then untried abili- 
ties of his younger son Yakoob. After his vic- 
tory on the Helmund, and the flight of Bairn's 
son from Candahar, it beoame necessary for 
Azim to collect all the forces within reach, and 
Abderrahlnan was accordingly requested to 
hurry up with his troops from Balkh. Yakoob 
Khan was, however, too quick for him. By 
forced marches from Ghizni he reached Bamian 
first, and there inflicted a severe defeat on 
Abderrahman. In  the winter campaign of 
3868, the latter was not more fortunate, being 
signally defeated by Yakoob at Tinah Khan. 
The civil war closed with that battle. Azim 
and Abderrahman escaped by Washir to 
Meshed, whence the latter travelled (( through 
the steppe of the Teke Turcomans to Urgentch 
Chiva)  ." * From that place he went on to 
Bokhara, whence he wrote to General Kauf - 
mann, requesting permission to reside within 
Rnssian territory. Abderrahman was accorded 
* Another version i~l that he fled to Ball&, an? thence , 
to Bokhara. Anim died on the road between Seistan and 
Xeshed. 
11 * 
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a friendly reception, but all his requests for 
assistance either in arms, men, or moral ssup- 
port, for the purpose of making war afresh in 
Afghanistan, were rejected. Instead of com- 
plying with these demands, the Russian Govern- 
ment allotted him a pension of twenty-five 
thousand roubles a year, and Mr. Schuyler 
has told us that for the last nine yeam he has 
been living upon one-fifth of his allowance, If 
so, he must have saved during that period 
close upon two hundred thousand roubles, the 
significance of this fact consisting in the cir- 
cumstance that in 1872 he told General Kauf- 
mann he could raise up an insurrection in 
Afghanistan if half that sum were given to 
him. 
During the eleven years that he has now 
spent in enforced exile, it is quite possible that 
Abderrahman may have deteriorated in mental 
vigour. Something of the sickness of despair 
must h&e weakened hiEt resolution. Mr. 
Schuyler's description of him conveys a very 
.favourable impression of his force of character ; 
.but then that was several yearEt ago and may be 
no longer applicable. Assuming, however, that 
for 
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Abderrahman still retains his old energy, 
there is little doubt that he has from the first 
greatly exaggerated his influence with the 
Bfghans. He was much in the habit of de- 
claring that he had only to come forward to  
bring the whole population to his side, and 
that Shere Ali's endeavours to prevent his name 
being mentioned in Cabul did but make people 
think the more about him. These random 
assertions had very little foundation in fact. It, 
is true that Abderrahman had done nothing like. 
his father and uncle to alienate popular senti- 
ment; but then he was comparatively an un- 
known man. His reputation as a ~oldier, which, 
had at  one time been considerable, had paled 
before that of his cousin Yakoob. There is not, 
the slightest reason for believing that the. 
Afghan people, who have no great affection 
for any of the Barucksye House, reserve. 
any special regard for the son of Afzul. He, 
practically speaking, vanished from their mind 
after his defeat at Tinall Khan. 
But  if in the eyes of the Afghan people he 
counts for little, it is different in the special 
province which was entrusted during many 
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years to his charge. I n  Turkestan, from Balkh 
ko Badakshan, his influence is considerable. As 
governor he is remembered as the best of the  
last generation. The exactions of his uncle, 
Paiz Mahorned, are still the highest contrast 
t o  the moderation of Abderrahman. As soldiers 
the Usbegs took a personal interest in his suc- 
cesses, and sy~npathisad with him in his defeats, 
for it was they who fought and bled under 
him. Since his flight, too, an additional motive 
has been given for their affection by his mar- 
riage mith the daughter of Jehandir Shah, ex- 
c h i d  of Baclakshan. For these reasons Abder- 
rallman could, no doubt, collect a considerable 
force in this region, and probably establish 
his authority in Afghan Turkestan. The 
first step has already bcen taken in such an 
enterprise by the success of his mife's near 
relation, Mir Baba, who has ousted Shere Ali's 
nominee f-rom Fa,izabsd, and is now the de 
facto ruler of Badakshan. I n  this fact lies 
Abderrahmaa's importance, and his value to 
Russia depends on the same circumstance. 
More than that, the man who can, without 
foreign aid, firmly establish his power in any 
l Balkh 
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Fer in any 
one portion of what is known as Afghanistan, 
is one who must be taken into serious account, 
for his influence might in a short time become 
lconsiderable in the other portions of the state. 
H e  might even aspire to play the part of a 
national champion ; and certainly, ~ 4 t h  Abder- 
rahman in possession of Balkh and his close 
.ally installed at  Faizabad, there moula be no 
peace of mind for the chief of Gab~zl, even 
khough he were under the shadow of British 
protection.* 
* Since the preceding pages were mritten, the descrip- 
-&ion of General Eaufmam's entry (17th November) into 
Tashkent on his return from Europe has reached us. 
Prominent among those waiting to receive him mas Abd- 
errahman Khan, who is represented as looking aged and 
obese. 
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KHUDAYAR KHAN. ' 
OF all the states of Central Asia, none has 
been more unfortunate in modern times than 
the state of Khokand. It was unfortunate in 
its internal affairs before the Russians had begun 
that career of conquest, in and beyond the 
country of the Kirghiz, which was ultimately 
to carry their banners in triumph to  the banks 
of the Oxus and the slopes of the Hindoo 
Koosh. Civil feud and foreign aggression had 
both left their mark upon the history of a coun- 
try that was youngest among the independent 
states of Turkestan. I t s  borders had expanded 
or shrunk in accordance with the character of 
the ruler, and although independence had gene- 
rally been the right of the hardy hillmen of 
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Khokand, Namaagan, and Andijan, it had some- 
times happened that even a wise ruler had 
been unable to maintain those positions on the 
Syr Darya, which gave him a secure frontier 
towarcis Bokhara, and which sufficed to maintain 
his reputation sufficiently to enable him to re- 
joice in his rights as suzerain over the people 
of Karategin, Shahr-i-sebz, and Kitab. With 
the rulers of Khiva and Bokhara, the Russians 
had not been too proud in times past to main- 
tain an  intercourse, which might have justified 
the belief in their eyes that they were tho 
equals of the Czar, but with Khokand there 
had been no such condescension. When Goneral 
Peroff sky found his victorious campaigns over 
the Kirghiz consummated, but had, through un- 
toward circumstances, to leave the crowning 
of his successes to those who came after him, 
Russia was brought face to face with the new 
power of Khokand, whose political existence 
had been scarcely less brief or uncertain than 
its military fame. The career of the man whose 
name is placed at  the head of this memoir, in- 
cludes all this period, which comprises the old 
and the new in Central Apian history, the time 
1 
3' {; 
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1, 
I ?  
li when Russia was not a Central Asian power a t  
i, 
t! all, and also that when her word was supreme 
I. in d l  things. It is quite true thzt, SO far as 
practical politics aye concerned, Khndayar 
I 
I '! Khan's influence has passed amay, but his 
reign, as embracing a longer period than that 
( 
I ,  of auy other ruler in Central Asia, is well worth 1 
, attention. A sketch of it will certainly repay 1 
: perusal. I I 
I 
> For some years-those critical ones which 
I witnessed the first appearance in the Khanates 
of British officers-Khokand enjoyed the rule 
of a wise and astute prince, Mahomed Ali 
Xhnu, not less renowned for his skill in war 
than his beneficence in peace. 
j j I n  the yeall 1842 Mahomed Ali was taken 
I 
I 1  prisoner in war and executed by his bitter foe / !I k 
! I Nasrullah of Bokhara. I n  the confusion which 
broke out after his death, his cousin, Shere i ' I  
! I Ali Khan, was proclaimed ruler; and he in turn 
F i  was succeeded by his younger sou Khudayar. \ 
1 1  
i 1 The real arbiter of the state was, however, the 
/ minister Mussulman Kuli, a Kipchak chief. 
4 During ten years Khudayar tranquilly ruled the I 
I r 
country, mainly through the ability of his 
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minister ; but in 1853, the same year that wit- 
nessed the appearance of Izzet Kutebar, the 
Eirghiz chief, the Khan, chafing--as jealous 
despots often chafe at the restraints iinposed 
upon their caprices by their wisest advisers-at 
his Vizier's expostulations, intrigued against 
I 
him. He even availed himsclf of the feud 
between Eipchak and Kirghiz to crush more 
effectus~lly the man to whom he omed liis throne. 
Mussulman Kuli was m~srdered by his orcier. 
Prom that year things in Khokand went 
from bad to worse. There were fresh in- 
trigues, under the guidance of another chief, 
Alim Kuli, who on several o~cr~sions drove 
Khudayar into exile. The only one to survive 
these constant changes in the person of the 
ruler of the state, these palace brawls, and this 
civil strife, was Khudayar himself. Binally, 
however, the death of Mussulman Kuli, and 
the outbreak of the strife for which that 
event was the signal, marked the crisis in the 
fate of Khokand. Those occurrences paved 
the way for an easy Russian triumph, and for 
the incorporation of the Khanate in the Russian 
empire. 
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The Russians followed up their successes I 
over the Erghi5 by making a direct attack I 
upon the territory of Khokand. They attacked 
and took in the year 1859 the Khokandian 
fortress of Chulak Kurgan, eighty miles south- 
east of Fort Peroffsky, and two years later 
on  they also seized Yany Kurgan, fifty miles 
nearer Khokand. After another interval of the  
1 
i 
same length an advance was made on a larger 6 
scale against the town of Turkestan, near the  
Syr Darya, and also against Auliata in the Kir- 
ghiz country north of tho Karn Tau mo~zntaine. I 
i 
Both of these operations had to be postponed I 
I 
I 
until the following year on account of the out- / / 
break of the rising in Poland. In 1864, however, : i 
i they were carried out with complete success, I 
: I 1 
, and the tvo  towns mentioned fell into the pos- I 
I I I 
, session of the Russians, while the intermediate a 
I I  'I 
1 'j country with its line of forts shared the same 1 1  fate. This was the first important success of I 
? / tho Russians in Central Asia. They had re- 1 
I 11 I 
I 1 mained inactive during ten years; they were ! I  now t o  reap the full benefit of the preparations I 1 t they had been so diligently preparing. The 1 
i ! credit of these successes belongs to Genera13 
i i 
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I Tchernaieff, who completed the task which Pe- 
I 
roffsky had commenced. The eventful cam- 1 paign of 1864 did not, however, close with 
these triumphs. 
The town of Tchimkent, which forms the 
apex of a triangle of which a line drawn from 
i the city of Turkestan to Auliata would be the  
base, was the next defence of Khokand on the  
f north ; and no effort was spared in making it 
as strong as ciroumstances would permit. A 
garrison of ten thousand men was left in it, 
and it was also fairly provided with a~.tillery. 
Tchernaieff, reoognising the importance of this 
place, and the danger whioh might arise from 
the presence of so large a hostile force in his 
neighbourhood, resolved to attaokit, and, if pos- 
sible, s e i ~ e  it by a coup de main. He delivered 
his attack with remarkable skill and boldness, 
and despite the courage of the garrison, who 
fought with great determination, and were skil- 
fully handled during the earlier part of the day, 
the town and fortress were carried at, what may 
be called, a rush. 
The Khokandians did not sucoumb under the  
intelligence that Tohimkent had fallen. Their 
174 C E N T R U  ASIAN PORTRAITS. 
national existence was at stake. They resolved 
to defend it manfully. The fortifications of Tash- 
kent were repaired. A large army was hurriedly 
collected and pushedformrd to that town, and 
the regent A i m  Kuli and his lieutenants took 
every precautian in their power to avert m ovep- 
throw. Again Tchernaieff thought there was 
prudence in audacity, and that by dealing an 
equally prompt blow against Tashkent he might 
fare as successfully as he had done a t  Tchimkent. 
According to one version, the one adopted by 
Mr. Schuyler, be delivered an assault upon the 
oity, which was repulsed with serious loss to  
the Russians-sixteen men killed and sixty -two 
wounded. The Ehokandian troops, under the 
late Yakoob Beg of Kashgar, attempted t o  
follow up their success, but were checked a t  
the village of Ikan by the valour of a small 
detaohment of Cossacks. Here, again, the 
Russians lost severely, and the Cossacks nar- 
rowly escaped annihilation. Another version 
merely says that there was a battle in the open 
field between the Ehokandians and the Rus- 
sians, in which the latter mere victorious, but 
with such heavy loss that they were compelled 
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to retreat. This version is derived from 
native Khokaadian sources, and is given by Dr. 
Bellem in his historical portion of the Report 
on Mission to Kashgar." Ia either case the 
Russian design against Tashkent failed, and 
Tchimkent for some months longer remained the 
t most advanced post of Russia towards the south. 
At  this crisis of their fate the internal feuds 
in the country, and the encroachments of their 
I 
old rival Bokhara, still further detracted from 
the vigour of the resistance of the Khokandians. 
While Bokhara wag westing the town of Khod- 
jent from the Khokandians in the south, Tcher- 
naieff was tightening his hold upon Tashkent 
in the north. I n  April 1865, having cut off 
its principal water-supply from the Cherchik 
river, he elliered into intrigues with a, party of 
the citizens, who had little sympathy for the 
government forced upon them by Alim Kuli. 
Early in the month of May Alim Kuli arrived 
in person with reinforcements, and a battle was 
fought outside the walls, in wlzich, of course, 
Tchernaieff came off victorious. There is an- 
other discrepancy of authorities on this point, 
but  it ' seems probable that Alim Kuli attacked 
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the Russian camp on the 21st of May, and, 
although at one moment fortune appeared ad- 
verse to the Muscovites, the attack was repulsed 
on all points. The victory itself derived most 
of its importance from the death of Alim Kuli, 
for he was the last defender of the country. 
Khudayar had played a very secondary part 
in all these troubles. 
The further conquests which Russia made on 
Khokandian soil were snatched rather from Bok- 
hara than from Khokand. With the capture of 
Khodjent in 1866 there followed a peace of nine 
years' duration between Khokand and the 
Russian generals. Tho rebellion which broke 
out in that Khanate in the winter of 1875, 
under the auspices of Abderrahman Aftobatcha, 
son of Mussulman Kuli, against the authority 
of Khudayar, afforded General Kaufmann the 
excuse for the absorption of the remaining por- 
tion of the Khanate for which he had long been 
seeking. The independence of Kholrand com- 
pletely disappeared in April 1876, when it 
was changed into the Russian province of 
Ferghana. 
Khudayar Khan became a Russian pen- 
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sioner, and for some time resided at  Orenburg, 
where he occupied his time and turned his 
money to good account by engaging in business 
as a horso-dealer. At last, pining for liberty, 
he fled in December 18'77 to the steppe, and 
took refuge in Afghanistan, whence it was re- 
1 cently reported 110 had made his way into India. 
i It is impossible yet to say whether he has seen 
I the last of his strange vicissitudes. He was an 
I inclopondent ruler before the Russians had 
reached the Jaxartes and their task of Celltral 
Asian conquest had begun. He alone among 
the eminent of his compatriots has survived 
four or five civil marts, which aimed at  his de- 
struction above every other object, and the old 
feuds of ICirghiz and Kipchak have become a 
mere tradition. Ho has escaped assassination 
and dcath at  the hands of open and concealed 
enemies ~vhcn every other membor of his house 
has been less fortunato ; and although neither 
he nor any other Khan can hope to mitiless 
> the fall of Russia's power, ho may yet live long 
E enough to sco its curtailment. 
Of his personal cliai~~cter it is impossible to 
1- 
say much in his fnvouy. In his early days 
12 
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he mas a confirmed debauchee, and in his later 
he became a tyrant. Ho appears also t o  have 
been singularly deficient in judgment, and never 
t o  have profited by experience. He was cer- 
tainly one of thoso whose conduct served to 
bring the native Khans of Central Asia so much 
into disrepute in this country. Compared with 
the aspirations of the bold people of Khokand, 
who are essentially the most freedom-loving of 
the populations of Turkestan, the figure of their 
ruler must appear to be slight andinsignificant, 
but its actual importance is sufficiently obvious 
t o  justify this brief sketch. 
ABDERRAHMAN AFTOBATCHA. 
AMONG the most prominent of the minor cha- 
racters, who have stood forth within the last 
$en years on the platform of Central Asian 
affairs, must be placed Abderrahman Eadji, 
Aftobatcha, or ewer-bearer, at the court of 
Khudayar of Khokand. It is only four years 
since he headed the most desperate effort 
that has yet been made to free Central Asia 
from the thrall of Russia. For a brief space 
he figured as the champion of national liberties, 
and it was his energy which rendered the con- 
quest of Ferghana one of the moat arduous 
campaigns upon which Russia has up to the 
present time embarked. 
Abderrahman was the son of Mussulman 
12 * 
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Euli, the Kipchnk chief and minister, who was 
mainly instrumental in placing Khudayar on 
the throne. During his earlier days he was the  
sworn companion of that prince, and stories 
are told of how he begged money for the young 
Ehan from his father, who was afraid to trust 
him with any lest he should set up a rival 
party to his own. This boyish friendship be- 
tween Khudayar and 'his courtier long aon- 
tinued, and the connection was rendered t he  
closer by the marriage of the Aftobatcha to  the 
Khan's sister. af ter  the murder of Muesull 
man KuLi in 1853, the same relations were 
maintained between his son and the ruler as of 
yore, and shortly after the close of the first war 
with Russia Abder rahan  proceeded on a con- 
fidential mission t o  Constantinople. It was 
formally announced that he had only gone on 
pilgrimage to Mecca, but the people refused to  
believe this, and it  was generally supposed that  
Khudayar had freed himself from the presence 
of the son in the same way that he had already 
got rid of the father. I n  the year 1873 the  
Ehan was obliged by his internal necessities t o  
increase the taxes raked from the Ears Kir- 
ghiz, but the nomads resented the decision of 
the Khokandian authorities. They maltreated 
the tax collectors, and when troops were sent 
against them they retired into their mountain 
fastnesses. At  this moment, when a Kirghiz 
war increased the Khan's other difficulties, 
Abderrahman Aftobatcha suddenly returned. 
He was received with an effusion of popular joy 
that may be attributed to the remembrance of 
the good services which his father had rendered. 
The public mind was in a disturbed state, for 
the expedition against Khiva had commenced ; 
and the little confideilco felt in Khudayar's 
ability added t.o the entl~usiasm of the popular 
greeting accorded to Abderrahman. 
Khuclayar a t  once appointed him to the 
command of the force which had been ordered 
against the Kirghiz, but the Khan's treachery 
defeated both the wise policy and the skilful 
measures of his lieutenant. A deputation from 
tho Kirghiz proceeded to the town of Khokand 
with the object of comiilg to an understasding 
about the difficulty that bed a~isen, but no 
sooner had i t  arrived than all its members were 
executed, This wanton breach of faith added 
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fuel t o  the flame, and the Kirghiz combining in all 
directions, compelled the Khan's forces to retire 
into the plains. So great was the unpopularity 
of Khudayar a t  this time, that many Kip, 
chaks joined the Kirghiz, and tho troubles 
a,ssumed all the proportions of a civil war. 
Abderrahman was the only prominent person- 
age who remained true to Khuclayar, and after 
.I 
i doing all in the power of a good soldier to retard 
1 
"@ the advance of the insurgents, he shut himself 
/ I  up in a small fort near the town of Namangan, 
I Winter put an end to military operations, and 
1 the contest was deferred until the following 
i I year, 1814. 
1 : During the minter months a plot was formed 
i I for the deposition of Khudayar, and the eleva- 
;I ' tion of his second son to the throne. I t  failed, 1 i however, and only a few petty disturbances marked the year 1874. This comparative 
! lull did but preface greater troubles in the $ 1  
I following year. Up to this point Abclerrahe 
man had remslinecl faithful in his support of 
Khudayar ; but now, either disgusted with the 
weakness and treachery of that prince, or aca 
tuated, as Mr. Schuyler seems inclined to infer, 
7 
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by a desire to avenge his father's death, he, too, 
abandoned his allegiance to the Khan, ancl put 
himself at  the head of the rebels. They hailed 
his arrival in their camp with acclamations, 
and Rhudayar, deserted by his army, fled for 
safety into Russian territory. This resolution 
I was come to at a moment whon a Russian mission, consisting of Colonel Scobeleff and the late M. Weinberg, was resident in his capital ; 
but i t  was only carried out after great dangers 
had been incurred in the flight from Khokand 
to Khodjent. The Khan's eldest son Nasrecl- 
din was appointed his successor, but all r e d  
power mas vested in tho hands of Abderrallman 
Aftobatcha. 
It is difficult; to arrive at  a definite opinion 
with respect to Abderrahman's policy. He, pro- 
bably, thought; that in aggressioll lay the surest 
moans of consolidating what he had obtained 
possession of. It vns uot cnougll in his cyes 
to hwo cast out the Kllan. I n  order to ensure 
the stability of his success, it had to Iso followed 
up by an attitude of proc1:timed hostility to, if 
not of open war against, tho Russixns, who had 
boen identified by tlie people, whether rightly 
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or  wrongly, with the cause of Khudayar. At 
first the new Khan made friendly overtures t o  
t h e  Russian authorities, and General Kauf - 
mann promised to recognise Nasreddin, who 
was co~lsidered to hold Russian sympathies, on 
.the condition that he would adhere to the  
tr.c!aties already concluded between the two 
countries. It is not known whether the  
amicable expressions of the Russians awoke 
a sympathelic echo in the bosom of Nasred- 
d i n ;  but these views did not chime in with 
t h e  intentions of the bolder spirits of the . 
party at that moment supreme in Kholcand. 
Disturbances took place along the border, and 
a general proclamation went forth calling upon 
all true Mussulmans to rise against the Musco- 
vites. A remarkable document was drawn up, 
and presented to the Czar's officials, calling 
upon them either to become Mussulmans, o r  t o  
abandon the territory they had wrongfully ac- 
quired. These events, of course, resulted in a 
declaration of war. 
The leading idea of Abderrahman's plan was 
by making a bold display to attract to his 
standard all tho disaffected among the subjects 
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of tho Czar in Turkestsn. He also hoped t o  
obtain direct assistance from the Ameer of 
! 
Bokhara, and there are goocl reasons for be- 
lieving that he had obtained a distinct promiso ! 
I from Yakoob Beg, who at  the time mas himself 
i' threatened by a large Russian force concen- 
Jd 
trated in close proximity to his northern frontier. 
The Kholcandians, therefore, boldly crossed the 
frontier. Much alarm naturally prevailed, and 
I considerable panic manifested itself, even in 
Tashkent itself. It was said that on a certain 
day the population of the native .I;omn would 
I 
i rise, and that an attcmpt mould be mado to 
, massacre every Russian ill the country. These 
exaggerated terrors appear, regarded by tho i; light of subsequent events, to have been absurd ; 
I but at  the time they were not wiillout founda- 
tion. Tho eneilgy of General Go1ova;l;cheff and 
of Golollel Scobeleff sorvod to allay the pro- 
wiling anxiety. The danger did not, hornover, 
I pass away mit'tiout leaving several tokens of its existence behind, Post-houses were burnt down, t 
I telegraph wires cut, and several officers sur- 
! prisod and murdered on the high-roncis. 
t The greatest peril, homovor, lay not in tho 
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neighbourhood of Tashkent, but a t  Khodjent, 
to the capture of which place Abderrahmnn d h  
voted his chief efforts. He had evidently de- 
cided on this move with the object of influencing 
t,he actiou of Bokhara. Prom the night of the  
20th until the 23rd of August, the Russians 
were engaged in defending their post, and it is 
doubtful if they mould have succeeded had they 
not been joined by the garrison of Ura-tepeh, 
which had surrendered to the Khokandians. 
On the last of those days the Russians assumes 
the offensive, and defeated t.he Khokandians in 
the open. Reinforcements arrived from Tash- 
kent a short time afterwards, and all danger 
vanished as quickly as it had arisen. On the  
1st of September a movable colu~nn under the 
commaud of Golovatcheff and Scobeleff, and 
accompanied by General Kaufmaau in person, 
numbeying nearly five thousaad men, left 
Khodjent for the purpose of carrying the war 
into the enomy's country. It was understood 
that Abclerrahman's forces had taken up a 
position at  Makhram, a small fortified place on  
the road to Khokand. Considerable skill had 
been shown in improving the defences of t h e  
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place, and the surrounding country had been 
flooded by the diversion of the canals used for 
the purposes of irrigation. Despite these pre- 
parations, the resistance offered by the Kho- 
Bandians proved very faint-hearted once the 
Russians had turned their position by a skil- 
fully executed flanking movement. The army 
of the Aftobatcha melted away at the slight- 
est collision with the Russian troops, only,, 
however, to collect agaill as soon as a safe 
distance intervened between it and tho ad- 
vancing enemy. The effect of this success,. 
though not so great as was representecl by 
the " Tashkent Gazette," was very consider- 
able ; and added to a proclamation that the. 
obnoxious Khan Khudayar would not be re- 
storeci, had the beneficial result of inducing s 
large number of the people to return to their 
homes. A week after the battle of Makhram, 
Khokand fell into the hands of General Kauf- 
mann, and the young Khan Nasreddin, if not at 
prisoner, was placed s t  least under the closest 
surveillance. 
But if Nasreddin was in his hands, Abderrah- 
man was at large, and it became necessary f o r  
i 
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General Kaufmann to take prompt measures 
against him, as he was busily occupied in  
raising up fresh elements of hostility in the  
eastern districts of the country. At this ~ e r i o d  
the subject of our sketch showed that he  
possessed great capacity aa a partizan leader. 
Partly by compulsion and partly by persua- 
sion, he brought the authorities of Margi- 
Ian, Andijan, and other large towns round 
to his way of thinking; and at  Margilan, a 
town due east of Khokand, Abderrshman in- 
tended making a final resistance, but his fol- 
lovers again disbanded on the approach of the  
Russians. Tlie town surrendered, and the pur- 
suit of Abderrahman was entrusted to Colonel 
Scobeleff, who pressed it with. remarkable 
vigour. Several towns surrendered, but t he  
principal leader made good his escape. At- 
fended by a small band of faithful Kipohaks, 
he still roamed the hills of Ferghana, cutting 
off detached parties, and refusing to reoognis e 
the triumph of the Russians. 
So far, however, as organised resistance on 
the part of the people of Khokand went, it had 
* 
'dl been overcome, and General Kaufrnann was 
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mann was 
at  liberty to conclude a treaty of peace with 
Nasreddin. As this treaty, although drawn 
up, and requiring the cession of Namangan to 
Russia, was practically inoperative, it is unne- 
cessary t o  consider it here. In  the meanwhile 
Abderrahman had again succeeded in gathering 
a force around him, and had taken up a strong 
position at  Andijan, where another Khan bed 
been set up as a ruler iu the land. A strong 
force was sent against this place under General 
Troitzky, one of Kaufmann's favourite officers,, 
who after overcoming the most desperate 
resistance offered during the campaiga, in- 
flicted a defeat upon the enemy, and destroyed 
the greater part of the town. But although 
checked, the enemy was far from being dis- 
persed. I n  fact he was bolder than ever, and, 
when General Troitzky withdrem to Namangan, 
followed him up with unusual audacity. The 
Russians seemed unwilling to admit the partial 
nature of their success, and General Kaufmann 
evidently persuaded that the chief portion of 
his task was accomplished, forthwith returned 
to Khodjent. Scarcely had ho left Margilan 
before the pnppet ruler Nnsreclcli~~ was deposed, 
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and compelled to take refuge in Russian terri- 
tory. The few advantages obtained by a 
treaty that had not yet been ratified were lost 
before they had come into effect. The task 
which it was thought had been carried out so 
well and successfully had to be recommenced 
from the beginning, and the troops in the act 
of returning to their positions were ordered 
back to the territory recently occupied. 
The whole of Khokand burst into a flame. 
Scobeleff obtained decided successes a t  Naman- 
gan, Balyktchi, Paita, and Sarkhaba. He 
ravaged the country of the Kipchaks round the 
Kara Darya, and obtained a "crowning vic- 
tory" a t  Andijan in January 1876. H e  in- 
flicted another defeat on Abderrahman in 
person at Assake, in consequence of which 
the I(ipchak chief surrendered. With the sur- 
render of the man who had alone given life to 
the cause, all resistance ceased. Nasreddin 
was deposed and became a Russian pensioner, 
other 'royal pretenders were executed, Abder- 
rahrnan being placed in honourable confinement. 
Khokand became the Ru~lsian province of 
Ferghana, and thus was the historic name 
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revived of the country which had been the 
home of the wisest and most moderate of the 
conquerors of India. 
It is not easy to grasp the individuality 
of Abderrahman by means of the extremely 
meagre evidence which we possess. A11 we know 
of him, and indeed it is all that is of any prac- 
tical importance, has been here narrated. Alone 
among Central Asiatics he offered a continuous 
resistance during nearly six months to Russian 
soldiere. So far as it is possible to judge, the 
springs of his conduct were love of country, 
and the legitimate pride of a martial race. He 
has many claims to be considered a sincere 
patriot, and he has certainly afforded an ex- 
ample which other Asiatics should not be slow 
to imitate if they still preserve that desire for 
independence, which is the first and only true 
token of patri~t~ism. 
province of 
historic name 
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MOZAFFUR EDDIN. 
A RULER of Bokhara occupies by right of birth 
a high position in the eyes of Central Asiatics. 
Not only is he held to be a great temporal 
chief, but he is also the spiritual head of the 
Mahomedans of either Turkestan. Shorn as 
he has been of many of his most cherished 
possessions by Russian violence, and with the 
prospect of recovering them growing more and 
more visionary every day, it is true that a 
Bokharan ruler can find little consolation in  
the circumstances under which he holds the 
small amount of power that may still be his. 
It is a task scarcely less thankless than d a -  
cult for him to restrain the varioua impulses 
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which are constantly rising up and urging him 
to head the fanaticism of his people in a greab 
struggle with the Russians. Each day that 
passes away finds these expiring elements of 
patl*iotism and fanaticism becoming weaker and 
weaker, and the Bokharan prince left more . 
and more at his own inclination to follow that, 
safe policy which he adopted after the cnm- 
paign that closed with the annexation of Sa-- 
marcand. The remembrance of the former 1% 
rth 
ics. 
3ral 
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greatness of Bokhara is becoming a tradition ; 
and it may be confidently cxpected that this 
process of natural decay will continue until it 
has passed away from the public mind, unless 
some exterior influence should be introduced,. 
by a complication in the Central Asian Ques- 
tion, to quicken the "still" life of theso. 
gradually expiring rulers. 
Mozaffur Eddiu Khan succeeded his father 
Nasrullah as Ameer of Bokhara in the year 
1860. The earlier events of his reign com- 
prised chiefly his relations with hk neighbours 
of Kkiokand. He wm apparently 'desirous of 
emulating the achievements of his father, who. 
had not only over-run Khokand, but had cap- 
13 
i 
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tured and, beheaded its Khan. Although his 
sown authority was not as widely recognised as 
a strong ruler would have desired, he set him- 
self up as the arbiter of dl questions connected 
with Turkestan. He had designs on Balkh, 
whence. Dost Mahomed had expelled him; he  
loolced with a coveting eye towards Merv, 
which had once been won by a Bokharan 
mler; and he boldly set himself up as tho 
jndge on all questions of dispute in the in- 
ternal affairs of Tashkent and Khokand. For  
a few years he waa able to play with some 
dignity and effect the part to which he as- 
pired. But in 1864 the situation underwent 
a complete change. He, who aimed at  playing 
in Central Asia the part that Louis XI. hacl 
played in France, and who affected to regard 
B i v a  and Khokaud as that monarch did Bur- 
gundy and Brittany, saw the prey which he 
held as peculiarly his due slipping from his 
grasp. The Russians had in that year entered 
Turkestan, and were laying close siege t o  Tash- 
kent. If the game was not to be lost, t ha t  
event compelled him to bestir himself. 
General Tchernaieff, by a prompt advance 
1 
I 
B 
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upon the Syr Darya and by the capture of the 
ferry at  Chinaz, averted for a moment the 
danger from Bokharan intervention. But after 
Tashkent had surrendered, this Russian suc- 
cess did not prevent the Ameer unveiling his 
hostility. An embassy, coizlposed of Messra. 
,Struve, son of the distinguished astronomer, 
'Tatarinof, and Glukhoff sky, and other oacera, 
was sent by Russia to Bokha~a, with the inten- 
tion of discovering what were the Amesr's t rue  
feelings towards Russia. His reply was terse 
:and emphatic; he ca,st several of the envoys 
.into prison. Before Rhokand, therefore, was 
more than half conquered, Russia's relations 
with Bokhara had changed from those of 
friendship to declared hostility. 
In  January 1866 Tchernaieff crossed the Syr 
Darya, and advanced from Chinaz upon Jizakh. 
But his force was very weak, and he found 
Jizakh to be stronger than he had expected, and ' 
that the Ameer had assembled a considerable 
I army for the defence of hi@ dominions. Mozaf- 
I 
j .fur pretended, notwithstanding, to be disposed 
i 50 yielil to the Russian demands, a pretence ! Tihernaisff, either f eigning or being weak enough 
13 * 
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to credit, seized as an  excuse for retreating, and 
abandoned the Russian envoys to their fate. 
When Mozaffur interfered, in 1864, in the 
affairs of Khokand, and placed Khudayar, for a 
second or a third time, upon the throne, he re- 
tained possession of the important town of I 
Khodjent, on the banks of the S y r  Darya. 
The ~uskians coveted this highly important t 
position, and were little clisposed to recogniss 
Bokhara's claim over a town which was clearly I 
Khokandian, and to which they looked as part 
of the spoils of war. General Tchernaieff was 
replaced by General Romanoffsky, in conse- 
quence of the retreat from Jizakh, and i t  be- 
came his successor's immediate task to repair 
that disaster, and effectually to curb the hostile 
attitude of Bokhara. In  April 1866 Romanoffsky 
moved down upon Khodjent, after having col- 
lected at  Chinaz a large supply of provision& 
etc., which had been sent up the river by water 
from Kazala. In that month he routed a con- 
siderable body of Bokharan cavalry, and in  
May advanced across the Syr Darya to en- 
counter the main army of the Ameer. 
The two armies came face to  face oa the 
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plaiu of Irjar on the 20th of May, and a 11atde 
immediately commenced. The Russian army 
numbered four thousand men and tmenty guns. 
The Bokharan is computed to hayo mus- 
tered forty thousalld men, with twenty-one 
guns ; but of these barely five thousand mere 
regular Bokharan troops. Such confidence 
did he fcel at  this time in the valour and 
efficiency of  hi^ army, that the Ameer had 
previously announced his intention of retaking 
Tashkcnt I The battle began by a skirmish 
with the smarms of irregular cavalry tllat 
covered the front of the Bokharan intrench- 
ments. These mere slowly but completely 
driven in upon the main body. Por some 
time after this advantage the battle raged 
furiously, and several of the intrenchments 
had to be carriecl at  the point of the bayonet. 
Tho arrival of a fresh Russian detachment with 
artillery on the opposite bank of the rivcr proved 
the  decisive turning-point in the day; and 
after that illcicle~lt the Bokharan army broko 
and fled in all directions. The Ameer, who 
was present, retired with a small detachment 
t o  Jixakh, leaving in tlio hands of the Russians 
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his artillery, his treasure, and untold stores of 
marlike munitions and provisions. No official 
statement was published of the loss on either. 
side; but i t  has been computed that the Bok- 
harans lost over one thousand men-a total 
which seems moderate consiclerillg the bitter-. 
ness of the figlzt-and that the Russians suffered 
a loss of only tmeuty or thirty wounded. But. 
although the price paid for this victory is no t  
exactly known, its results were so great and so, 
important that it would not have been dearly 
purchased a t  a much more serious cost. The 
prestige of Bokhara was annihilated, and Russia, 
secure in her own atrength, became doubly 
secure through the panic that unnerved all 
Asiatics after the signal overthrow at Irjar, 
The practical results of the battle were imme- 
diate, and the most important being the c a p t u r ~  
of the fortress of Nau, which stands half-way 
between Khodjent and Ura-tepeh. An advance 
was then made upon Khodjent., and on the 
29th of May this city was surrounded and at- 
tacked from two sides. It surrendered a t  
discretion after a heavy bombardment of 
five days, the Russians admitting a loss of 
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eleven killed and one hundred and twenty-two, 
wounded. 
af ter  his defeat at Irjar, Mozaffur sent. 
back the Russian envoys to Tashkent laden 
with presents. But th.e Ameer did not yet 
give up the game as lost. He had been 
beaten in the field, several of his fortresses 
had been wrested from him, but there still re- 
mained to the reputed head of Islam in Central 
Asia other armies and other fortresses where- 
with to carry on a war. After the fall of 
Khodjent a truce of some months' duration. 
ensued, but in the early winter of the same, 
year the attitude of Bokhara was held to 'be so. 
equivocal that a further aclvance was deter- 
mined upon as necessary. Ura-tepeh and Ji-. 
zakh were the two principal outposts remaining, 
to  the Ameer after Chinaz and Khodjent had. 
been wrested from him. They each guarded a. 
road to Samarcand, the former, one from the: 
east, and the latter, one from the north-east. 
The Russians closely besieged Ura-tepeh on the 
6th of October, and on the 14th it fell into 
their hands. The greater part of the garrison 
appears to have escaped, and the Russians 
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euffered a loss of two hundred killed and 
wounded, according to  their own admi~sion. 
Allnost on the same clay Jizakh shared the 
g.a,me fate, being carried by assault, af ter  a 
short bombardment, despite its natural strength 
and the number of its garrison. The latter 
fought bravely-particularly its leaders, who 
were neaTly all killed on the walls-but appa- 
l~elltly with little shill. The result of these 
triumphs, complete, and obtained with little loss, 
was that Bokhara, saw itself compelled to sue for 
peace. Mozaffur Eddin himself recognised the 
impossibility of cdntinuing the struggle alone. 
a He made overtures at this time to  the 
Ameer of Aghanistan for an alliance, and as 
affairs happened to be in a very troubled state 
in Cabul, he entered into particularly close re- 
lations with Faiz Mahomod Khan, Governor of 
Balkh and one of the sons of Dost Mahomed. 
H e  even made propositions to our Government, 
which politely snubbed him ; but although he 
could find no allies in his extremity, the trrrbu- 
1.ence and fanaticism of his people urged him to 
again draw the sword which had been scarcely 
sheathed. 
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' After the fall of Jizakh the Russian generals, 
who had been continually reprimanded for their 
activity, took so sanguine a view of the concli- 
tion of things in Turkestan that the following 
official announcemeut was sent home. " Per- 
fect tranquillity reigns throughout the count,ry 
of Turkestan. The war with Bokliara, as far 
as regards Russia, is a t  an end. The Governor- 
General (Orenburg) hopes for a long continu- 
ance of trauquillity, provided the Ameer of 
Bolrhara abstains from a renemal of hostilities. 
Amicable relations with Ichokand are con- 
firmed, and commerce is everywhere re-osta- 
blished. Many caravans come from Bolchara, 
and go thither. Even the West Siberian corps, 
ordered to the territory of Turkestan, returns 
home again." But notwithstanding this lull 
in the strife, it was uncertain how long it 
would continue. Six months after the cap- 
ture of Jizakh the " Illvtllide Russe " declared 
that Russia had entertained no negotiations 
or diplomatic relations with the Ameer Mo- 
zaff ur. 
I n  September 1867 Kaufmann became Go- 
vernor-General of the newly-constituted pro- 
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vince of Turkestan, and he at once pursued 
the negotiation of a treaty which had been 
drawn up by his predecessor, General Krjihan- 
offsky. The draft of this treaty was sent to  
the Arneer for approval, but instead of replying 
to  the proposals made to him he began to dis- 
cuss other matters and to correspond with 
Kaufmann upon various minor topics. Mo- 
zaffur's procrastination assumed a still more 
dubious aspect when he refused to surrender a, 
Russian officer and three soldiers who had been 
carried off by robbers on the Jizakh road. T h e  
officer-Slushenko by name-mas tortured and 
compelled to adopt the Mahornedan religion. 
The immediate consequence of that act was  
that Kaufmann began to mass troops for an 
advance on Xamarcand, and the b e e r  to raise 
levies from amollgst his subjects. 
Unfortunately for the latter, heno longer ruled! 
a united people. His internal foes were not less. 
formidable to him than his external. If h i s  
own inclinations alone had been consulted, it is. 
probable that he would not have gone to w a r  
with Russia under any pretext whatever. He 
had already tasted enough of the pleasures of 
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such warfare. But he mas no longer a fres 
agent. The ulemas of Bokhara and Samw- 
cend were urging him on to resume the " holy 
war." His eldest son, Katti Torah, was in- 
triguing against his authority, while his. 
nephew, Seyyid Khan, stood in open defiance 
a t  Shahr-i-sebz. The latter soon obtained the. 
position of an independent prince, but Shshr- 
i-sebz, having cast off the Bokharan yoke, 
recognised the leadership of its own chief 
known as Jura Beg. It was at  such a mo-. B 
I+,." 
ment as this, with Bokhara like unto a house. 
divided against itself, that Mozaff ur had t o  
enter upon his third and final war vith the, 
Russians. 
Colonel Abramoff, as commandant of Jizakh,. 
took the first step towards punishing the as- 
sailants of Lieutenant Slushenko by making an 
attack upon the village of the robbers. I n  ths. 
meanwhile Mozaffur hail been deserted by ths. 
Afghan prince, Iskander Khan, a sou of Sultan 
Jan of Herat, who went over to the Russians;; 
yet unable to resist the demands of his people, ho 
declared a " holy war " against Russia. G.ene- 
ral Kaufmann, who was said to be on the eve 
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of setting out for St. Petersburg, but who had 
previously, a fact well known, sent a letter to 
the Kazi Kdian of Samnrcand, demanding the 
surrender of that city, thereupon ordered an 
advance to be made into Bokharan territory. 
This was decided upon early in the month of 
May 1868, and on the 13th the first brush with 
the Bokharan army took place on the hill of 
Tchnpan-ata, on the banks of the Zerafshan 
river. It resulted in an easy triumph for the 
Russians, who crossed the river in the face of 
a heavy fire and drove the enemy out of their 
intrenchments. The surrender of Samarcand 
quickly followed this success, for the inhabit- 
ants shut their gates of their o m  accord 
upon the Bokharan army, and voluntarily wel- 
comed the Russians. After the surrender of 
$amarcand desultory fighting took place be- 
tween the Russian army and the irregulars from 
Shallr-i-sebz and other cities. I n  these en- 
counters the Russians were uniformly victorious, 
but to resist the attacks necessitated a scattering 
of their forces, which gave new confidence to the 
Ameer. 
He was collecting a fresh army near Katti 
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Kurgan, a town forty miles west of Samarcand, 
which had been garrisoned with a small force 
by General Golovatcheff; and his cavalry had 
already cut the Russian general's communica- 
t.ions with Jizakh and Tashkent. The neigh- 
bourhood of Samarcand also swarmed with 
armed men, who, if not very formidable in 
the line of battle, were certainly much to be 
feared in more irregular warfare. A large 
body of cavalry-said to number fifteen thou- 
sand men-was at Chelik threatening Yany 
Kurgan and even Jiaakh, and wherever Gene- 
ral Kaufmann turned he found a foe to be 
elioountered whom it was most difficult t o  
reach. In  this emergency General Kaufmann 
thought his best plan .to be an adva~ice to the 
relief of Katti Kurgan, but the moment he left 
Samaroand the Shahr-i-sebz army attacked i t ;  
and although Major Stempel and the small 
garrison defended the citadel with the greatest 
heroism, it narrowly escaped capture. In  fact, 
nothing saved it from surrender but the with- 
drawal of the troops from Slial~r-i-sebz under 
their leader Jura Beg, who mas misled by a 
report that KauImann mas ret~zriiing. 
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I n  the meanwhile Kaufmann had relieved 
the garrison of Katti Kurgan and defeated 
the army of the Ameer in a pitched battle at  
Zera-bulak. I t  was only several days after the 
attack upon Samarcand that Kaufmann heard 
of what was taking place in his rear, and he 
hurried back with all despatch to rescue the 
much-reduced garrison. Mozaffur Eddin then 
made an unconditional ~ u r r e u d e ~ ,  and had the 
Russian Government granted Kaufmann full 
powers on this point, he would have annexed 
the whole of the Khanate. The annexation of 
Samarcanci was in itself a triumph with which 
any governor-general might have rested con- 
tent, and the practical results of this 1868 cam- 
paign were so great as t o  be scarcely realisable 
a t  the time. Mozaffur Eddin was permitted to 
retain his personal authority, and received 
assistance in putting down the seditious move- 
ment which his son, Katti Torah, and several 
other chiefs raised up against him. These were 
all repressed, and in 1869 Katti Torah became a 
fugitive, and his father's authority more firmly 
established witbin the territory that remained 
to him than it had been during the three pre- 
$ous years. His feelings towards the Rus- 
sians became less inimical after they had 
occupied in his name the town of Earshi, 
and then restored it t o  him. Encouraged by 
this and similar friendly acts, a younger son 
of the Ameer, Jan Torah, went on an embassy 
t o  St. Petersburg, where he stayed for some 
time. One of the principal objects his mission 
had to obtain was the restoration of Hamarcand, 
but his diplomacy in this direction, it  is scarcely 
necessary to say, completely failed. 
With the annexation of Sa~narcand the mis- 
understandings between Tashkent and Bok- 
hara terminated. Since that year, if we except 
the clouds which appeared upon the horizon 
during the progress of the Khivan campaign, 
the relations of Russia and Bokhara have as- 
sumed the cordiality that marked thorn in the 
days before the advance of the Muscovites into 
the country of the Eirghiz. Tho same b e e r  
who threatened Russia so nearly vhen Tcher- 
naieff was besieging Tashkent is now her very 
good ally. His old dreams of ambition have 
vanished. He is content with his temporal ad- 
vantages. The army which he i s  permitted to 
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retain numbers some twenty thousand men: 
but it :is of a very nondescript character, an4 
quite unadapted for modern warfare. Mozaffur 
bears precisely the same relation to Russia that 
the Khan of Khelat dici to us after the signa- 
ture of the Treaty of 1854. The pi.incipd 
strategical points within his frontier, such as 
Charjui, may be garrisoned whenever Russia 
deems fit; and a right of way has been thus 
obtained up the Oxus. 
The present Ameer has no heir to his dominions 
vho mould be absolutely pleasing to the Rus- 
sians, but he has several relations who lay claim 
to the succession who would be positively dis- 
pleasing to them. His death may, therefore, 
be expected to produce the complete dismem- 
berment of the Bolrharan state and its incor- 
poration mith the government of Turkestan. 
At  the present moment, and under the condi- 
tions that obtain, the Bokharan Government 
has no discretionary power over its acts, and 
in whatover Russia decides upon it must ac- 
quiesce. Tho people themselves are said to be 
extremely hostile to Russia, but from what Mr. 
Schuyler has told us it is clear that this senti- 
MOZAPPUR EDDIN. 
ment is neither EIO bitterly inimical, nor 
deeply rooted as has been asserted. Mozneur 
Eddin does not possess the power to disobey 
t h e  orders sent from Tashkent, and it is very 
doubtful whether he feels the inclination. 
It must be remembered that there is no 
qua~lter  whence the Ameer can expect assistance, 
H e  appealed to this country in 1867, and he re. 
oeived neither sympathy nor encouragement. 
He had previously made overtures to the Cabul 
Ameor for a defensive alliance against both 
Russia and England, aud he has subsequently 
t o  his reconciliation with Russia inveighed 
against this country in his correspondellce with 
$here Ali. We have no evidence as to the part 
he in the negotiations which led up to  
the despatch of the Stoletoff mission, but as 
all the native emissaries from Tashkent came 
through his country, we may be sure tl.lat it ms 
not that  of a neutral. The long-standing rela- 
tions between Cabul and Bokhara, the claims 
that  Bokhars advances over Balkh and the neigh- 
bduring districts, forbid the suppositioll that 
Mozaffur Eddin would remain an unconcerned 
I spectator of the dismemberment of Clabul. ,  a,  % 
I 14 > :1, I /^ 1 9  
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He may remember the part his father played in 
the days of Dost Mahomed, and aspire either ' 
to be the protector of the cause of the Baruck- 
syes, or, if that cause be utterly wrecked, t o  
extend his dominion up to the slopes of t he  
Hindoo Koosh. In either case he would be  
willing to act as the puppet of the Rusaians and. 
to play the game they might sketch out for him.. 
His ambition and vanity mill urge him to further 
General Kaufmann's aggressive designs, and his 
hostility to England, thinly veiled through out 
his career, will render any enterprise calculated 
to injure our interests palatable to him. 
Quite recently he has given the clearest 
token of his Russian sympakhies by affording 
marked facilities t o  Russian exploring expe- 
ditions, and in a still more unequivocal manner 
by the assembling of troops, and the collection. 
of supplies at Charjui. 
Various opinions have been expressed on  t h e  
subject of Mozaffur's personal character. By 
one writer he has been described as a mixture 
of Louis the Eleventh and Heliogabdus. It itr. 
.affirmed that he punished his subjects with. 
deatlh for the very same acts of immorality 
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which he himself committed in <' tho most bare- 
faced manner." If  these allegations were true, 
he probably reconciled the matter with his 
conscience by the old theory that what mas 
good for the ruler mould be very hurtful for the 
ruled. V$mbBry formed, however, a much 
more favourable opinion of his character, and 
represents him as <'a well-intentioned man, very 
strict, and of irreproachable character as regards 
his personal conduct." On the other hand, he 
was generally adinitked to be a bigot, and op- 
posed to all reforms that owed their origin in 
any way to tho influence of the unbeliever. Ho 
strove for many years to govern his people well 
according to his lights, ancl ho took as his 
motto "Govern by Justice." The period during 
which he treated his chief dignitaries with 
marked severity represented the most striking 
portion of his administration. The slightest 
offence in the royal eyes met with the punish- 
ment of death. No doubt it wag much owing to 
this brutal onergy against his nobles that his 
moderation tornards Ilia people nppe~rod in the 
public estimation to be cnl~a~icod. It passed at 
last into a eaying, " He destroys tho elephants, 
14 * 
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but protects the mice " ; but Mozaffur forgot 
that the sources of his strength came from the 
elephants and not from the mice. As one of 
the consequences of this mistaken policy, many 
of his chief vassals fell off from him, so that 
when the crisis in his contest with Russia 
arrived, he had to head a divided st& against 
a great national peril. He owes i t  to Russian 
assistance that his authority has been preserved 
in the highlands of his territory, and during 
the last ten years, as his independence has been 
becoming more and more a thing of the past, he 
has had greater opportunity for indulging in the 
moroseness which formed part of his character. 
It is probable that he is nothing lotli to recon- 
cile himself to the duties of his new position, 
and to ~linlc the independence of the native ruler 
in the secnrity of a, Russian vassal." 
* A very interesting account of an intci-viem with this 
prince mill be found in Ms. Eugene Schuyler's Turki- 
stan," vol, ii. p. 82 et sey. 
GENERAL KOLPAKOPFSKY. 
OF all the Russian generals who have won their 
way t o  fame iu the campaigns which have made. 
Cent ra l  Asia an appendage of the Czar, none 
deserves to stand higher than Generd Kolpa- 
koffsky, a t  the present time officiating as Go- 
vernor-General of the province of Semiret- 
ohinsk. If the next Governor-General of 
Turkestan should be selected either for his 
mili tary attainments or for his intimate ac- 
quaintance with the peoples and political cir- 
cumstances of Contra1 Asia, there can be no. 
d o u b t  that  Raufmann's successor should be the. 
subject  of Ghis memoir. Not only does he oxcel 
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every other officer in the service in the qualifi- 
cations specified, but lie has litterally speaking no 
rival in them. Nor are these the sole recorn- 
mendations to render him eligible for the post. 
He has already exercised supreme power at 
1 
i Tashkent as Kaufmann's deputy on three 
I 
i occasions, and he can therefore plead pra'ctical 
I acquaintance with the duties of the post as 
1 a n  additional reason in favour of his being 
.I 
selected to fill it. 
I Kolpakoffsky was born at Kherson in the d yeay 1819. His father was a subaltern officer 
in that district. He entered the army as a 
I 
I commo-n soldier in the .Lublin infantry regi- 
I ment at the age of sixteen, and :received his 
?" 1 commission in 1841, when he was twenty-two \ 1 years of age. He served for many years in 
I '  the Caucasus, and took .part in the operations 
i n  Trltnsglvania against the Hungarians in 1 :~ 1848. I n  1852 he went to Siberia, .at that 
/ 1 1  
. I time the most promising field in Oentral Asia i ,  1 for the energy and ability of Russian soldiers, 1 ,  and he has remained there ever since, for Semi- 
I ' 
I retchinsk is quite as much a portion of Siberia 
i as .it is of Turkestan. At first he was stationed 1 
at the great penal settlement of Berezof, and 
,during six years little opportunity offered for 
sthe display of any exceptional talent. 
In  1858 he was transferred to the district of 
Ala-tau, and with this change his public career 
may be said to have fairly commenced. Rus- 
:sia was on the eve of commencing her second 
period of activity in Asia. The solicl achieve- 
ments of Peroffsky had paved the way for 
brilliant triumphs by more fortnnate generals, 
- 
and Colonel Kolpa~offsby as commandant of 
t h e  fort at  Uzun-Agatch-a place north of 
Lake Issik ICul and west of Vernoe-was in a 
favourable position for reaping a fair share in 
,;the dangers and prizes that are to be met and 
won at  a time when each annexation is but the 
prelude to another. In  October 1860, when 
.feverish excitement prevailed among the Rho- 
kandians a t  the rumoured preparations on the 
.aide of the Russians for a fresh advance, Kolpa- 
koffsky had under his command at the fort 
-above named :a force of eight hundred men and 
s ix  guns. A generd league was formed between 
the Khokandians and the Kirghia tribes for the 
purpose of expelling the Russians from the pro- 
. ...,...-,.. " .,.,... - ..--\..- _ - -, . - . . . . 
-,-I 
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vince of Semiretchinsk. They intended to sack 
Vernoe and to lay the Russian forts level with the 
ground. The best of the Khokandian generals, 
Khanayat Shah, placing himself a t  the head 
of a force computed at thirty thousand men, 
advanced upon Uzun Agatch, in the full ex- 
pectation of obtaining a decided triumph. 
Khanayat Shah entrusted the attack to one of 
his subordinates, but the Khokandian, either 
awed by the bold demeanour of the Russians, or 
being at  heart a coward, delivered the assault 
i n  a half-hearted manner and was beaten off. 
Messengers were sent after Kolpakoffsky who 
happened to  be absent a t  Kastek, where the 
attack had been expected, telling him of the 
danger of the garrison. By a forced march he 
gained the rear of the Ehokandian army, and 
attacking it without hesitation, succeeded in 
inflicting a severe defeat upon it. Khanayat 
Shah retreated precipitately into Khokand, and 
this brilliant victory greatly enhanced the re- 
putation of the Russian soldier. It is impos- 
sible t o  say what disastrous results might have 
accrued if the Russians had not been successful, 
and that they were successful was altogether 
due t o  the energy, courage, and skill of Colonel 
Kolpakoffsky. 
Ten years passed away before Kolpakoffsky 
found another occasion for appearing promi- 
nently in public, a t  the time when the anarchy 
in  K d d j a  afforded a pretext for Russian in- 
terference. Kolpakoffsky had then become s 
general, and risen high in the service, holding the 
same appointment that he does at  the present 
time, via. Governor-General of the province of 
Semiretchinsk (the country of tho seven rivers). !r 
After the expulsion of the Chinese from the 
region of the Ili by the Tungan-Tarantchi in- 
surgents a period of confusion ensued in the 
affairs of that once prosperous territory. Despot 
succeeded to despot, and the inhabitants derived 
no benefit from the frequent ch~nge.  As many 
of them as could do so fled over the border 
into %ussian territory, and were placed in 
settlements round Vernoe and Kopal. Of 
these refugees a, large proportion was of the 
$olon tribe, which enjoyed special privileges 
from the Chinese. Kolpakoffslcy took a pro- 
minent part in alleviating the distress amongst 
theso exiles, and for his good servicea in this 
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respect the Emperor of China conferred upon 
him " the dignity of Mandarin of the first 
class, with a robe of honour embroidered with 
dragons, which, being placed on the same 
footing with a decoration, he received the spe- 
cial permission of his own Emperor to wear on 
atate occasions."* It is true that in 1870 it 
,appeared as if Abul Oghlan, the actual ruler of 
Kuldja, was disposed to live on friendly terms 
with his Russian neighbours, but frontier &is- 
putes occurred frequently. These, added t o  
the  apprehensions caused by the growing power 
*of Yalroob Beg in Eastern Turkestan, snpplied 
the  Russian authorities with an adequate ex- 
cuse for occupying Kuldja. Orders were issued 
to the Russian general to  carry out the design, 
and Ko~pakoffslq crossed the frontier into the 
country held by the rebellious subjects of the  
Emperor of China. 
The campaign mas of the briefest. On the 28th 
4of June the first encounter took place, on the 3rd \ 
!of July Abul Oghlan surrendered, and on the 
I 
i 
* ~Suhuyler's " TurlriAan," vol. ii, p. 184. 
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4th his capital fell into the hands of the Rus- 
sians. This almost bloodless campaign marked 
&he year 1871, and the credit for it rested ex- 
clusively with Rolpakoffsky. He found himself 
.not able, howevey, to prevent a barlsal-ous mas- 
sacre of a lmge number of Tungaili and Chi- 
nese by the Tarautchis. I n  every other respect 
the operation was carried out with remarkable 
(success, but it did not enjoy great favour at St. 
.Petersburg. The Foreign Office saw clearly 
that it might entail a t  some future time a corn- 
plication with China, and the Russian authori- 
,ties have always deprecated and st,riven to 
:avoid such a contingency. They could not in 
%he face of General Kolpakoffsky's decided acts 
.!;order a withdrawal from the occnpied pro- 
vince, butthey officially informed the Chinese 
\Government that, whenever it sent  a sufficient 
.force, Euldja ahould be restored.* Rolpa- 
ikoffsky received the Cross of St. George, not, 
Ihomever, by the pleasure of 'the ,Czar, but by 
* A treaty has recently boen signed between Russia 
la;n'tl China, by the terms of which Euldja is  to be restored 
t o  China. 
. . .... ., . - -  ,~ ..-. . ..- . . . . . , .  . .. ... , 
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the voluntary decree of the Chapter of the 
Order. 
I In 18'73, during the Khivan expedition, 1301- 
/ pnkoffsky acted as Kaufmam's deputy a t  Tash- 
kent, and while holding this post he endeavour-ed 
I to persuade the St. Petersburg Government t o  
approve of the occupatlion of Khokand. The 
moment was particularly auspicious in one 
sense, and not less inauspicious in another. Had 
the undertaking been sanctioned, the Russians 
would probably have encountered little or no  
opposition,' as the Khan was at the moment 
Yery unpopular with his subjects. If this had ' been done, in accordance with Kolpakoffsky's 
advice, events would have been anticipated by 
i! three years, and the bitter campaign of the  
1 winter of 1875 might have been avoided. But, 
I 
I 1 on the other hand, the Russians were actively 1 I? engaged in inflicting punishment upon Khiva, 
I I 
I 1 
and it was felt to be inadvisable to take the 
settlement of the fate of Khokand in hand 
I 
1 
a t  the same time. Not only was the larger 
portion of the Russian troops available in 1 
Turkestan engaged a t  a remote spot, but the I  
Russian statesmen had found it sufficiently dif- 
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ficult to allay the suspicions of England with 
regard to Khiva without raising fresh ones by 
acts of aggression in Khokand. For these 
reasons Kolpakoff sky's suggestion was not acted 
upon. 
In 1875, when the war in Khokand broke 
out in earnest, Kolpakoffsky was for a second 
time acting as Kadmann's deputy, and it be- 
came his duty to announce the determination 
of the Russian Government to annex the re- 
maining portion of that Ehanate. As the 
official proclamation put it, the Czar had been 
induced to listen to the prayer of the inha- 
bitants to become Russian subjects. Under 
General Kolpakoffsky's direction the final ar- 
rangements were made for the administration 
of the new provillce of Ferghana, and General 
Scobelef was appointed its first governor. 
In 1873, while the Khivan war was still in 
progress, Kolpakoff sky entered into direct 
communication with Shers Ali, and to him 
belongs much of the credit for having re- 
minded the Ameer in delicate but sufficiently 
distinct language that Russia was a great 
Power, and one moreover rapidly drawing 
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nearer and nearer to the northern frontier of' 
that potentate's dominions. It is asserted 
that Kolpakoff sky is more amicably disposed 
towards England than either. Kaufmann o r  
any other of the Central Asian generals; but 
it is difficult to find in his public acts any 
proof of this confident assertion. When Kauf- 
mann left Tashkent for St. Petersburg in 
the spring of the year 1879 Kolpakoffsky 
took his place for a third time as governor-. 
general. 
Notwithstanding the intimate practical ex-. 
perience which he has acquired with the work- 
ing of the supreme administration in Turkestan, 
it was well known that had Kaufrnann's re- 
signation taken place this autumn-as it cer-, 
tainly would have but for the rising at Cabul-- 
Kolpakoffsky would not haye been his suc- 
cessor. The prine, for it is now regarded in 
that light, and not as "a banishment to the outer. 
confines" as it used to be termed, was to be re- 
ierved for either Prince Dondoukoff Korsakoff or. 
some other favoured European counsellor. Yet, 
no one has higher claims to the post, and cer-. 
tainly there are few Russian officers who mould 
~ntiers of! 
3sserted 
iisposed 
lann or 
t,ls ; but 
,cts any 
n Rauf- 
surg in 
tkoff sky 
~vernor-" 
ioal ex-. 
e work- 
rkestan,. 
nn's re- 
s it cer-. 
3 abul- 
iis suc- 
sded in 
he outer. 
,o be re= 
gakoff or. 
.or. Yet! 
md cer-. 
.o mould 
fill it with greater advantage to the state, than 
the Governor of Semiretclzinsk. 
The remarkable difierence bekween Kolpst- 
koffsky and every other Russian officer of note 
is that he has always striven to understand the 
people whom he governs. Not only has he 
acted upon this principle for the purpose of' 
being the better able to perform his duties, 
but, if we take the evidence, as we well may, 
of those who b o w  him best, 'he has also done 
this with the laudable objoct of putting him- 
self in accord with the subject populations. 
It is sufficient to contrast this conscientious 
method of performing his duty with the very 
opposite plan that has been followed by the 
present Governor-General to show how fay 
superior as a man and a public servant Kol- 
pakoffsky is to Eaufmann. It is true that he 
is most intimately acquainted with the great 
Kirghiz people, but he has also devoted close 
attention to, and playedj a large part in the 
direction of, affairs in the other parts of Cen- 
tral Asia. 
About the Eirghiz and everything that con- 
cerns them there is no one competent to speak 
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with a tithe of his authority. He has lived 
among them, he speaks their language, and he 
is known and trusted by them. His energy, 
his untiring horsemanship, have earned for him 
among these primitive people the soubriq~~et of
"the Iron Seat." I n  addition to dl these 
recommendations, he is a good soldier, an ex- 
cellent administrator, a, practised diplomatist, 
versed in the secrets of the Chinese, as well 
as of the Central Asian, policy of the Russian 
Government. ' His private virtues are, by all 
accounts, not less estimable than his public 
qualities are worthy of laudation. Not only 
does he eclipse his comrades as a soldier and 
an administrator, but he is equally pre-eminent 
for the purity of his life and the spotlessness 
of his honour. 
GENERAL TCHERNAIEFF, 
A L T H O U ~ ~  many years have elapsed since Tcher- 
naieff played an active part in deciding the 
progreas of events in Central Asia, his name 
is connected with so many of the most remark- 
able Ruseian achievements that it would be 
impossible to ignore his career, even if the 
marked intereat which he has taken in Central 
Asian matters, since his dsparture from Turk- 
estan, had not served to keep his nnme promi- 
nently before the Russian people. On his 
recall Tchernaieff, disappointed of what he 
considered to be his legitimate prize, consti- 
tuted himself tho critic of the Central Asian 
administration. With his practical knowledge 
1 5  
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of the subject, he has been able to say much of 
great weight, if it must be alloved that he has 
also often permitted his personal feelings to get 
the better of his judgment. 
He began his military service in the Gnards, 
served on the Danube in the campaign against 
the Turks in '185.3, and was afterwards one 
of the defenders of Sebastopol. When the 
war in the Crimea closed, the Russian Go- 
vernment turned its chief attention to crush- 
ing the people of the Caucasus. I n  those 
operations Tchernaieff played a considerable 
part. . When the Caucasus was thoroughly 
pacified he left for Orenburg, where he was 
appointed Chief of the Staff to Katenin, Peroff- 
sky's successor. He had the good fortune t o  
arrive at a critical, and also a most opportune 
moment. Russia was about to resume her 
operations on the Syr Darye. 
Tchernaieff - at the time a colonel- was 
placed at the head of two thousand five hundred 
men, and Colonel Verefkin-an able officer who 
played a prominent part in the attack on Khiva 
in 1813-had the command of another force 
about half the strength. This occurred in the 
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year 1864. The ostensible object before these 
officers was to establish a fortified line of 
oommunication between Orenburg and Westeru 
Siberia. They practically accomplished it in 
J u n e  of that year, when Auliata and the town 
of Turkestan were captured. The more im- 
portant cihy of Tchimkent, which lies at the 
southern apex of hhe triangle and equi-distant 
f rom those places, fell into his hands in 
October. The place was carried by assault, 
almost a t  a rush; and its fall caused a great 
panic throughout the Khanate of Khokand, 
for it  was the strongest fort on the north, 
and the Russians had taken it without any 
apparent difficulty. The fate of the rest of 
Khokand might be inferred from the fall of 
Tchimkent. 
Elushed with hia success, Tchernaieff fol- 
lowed up this advantage by marching on Tash- 
kent. He thought it one of those occasions 
when boldness became prudence, but he was mis- 
taken in his surmise. On the 15th of October 
he erected a battery in front of the waU~ of 
Te~hkent ,  and after a short bombardment the 
engineers declared the breach to be practicable. 
15 * 
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The assault was delivered, but the Khokan- 
dians repulsed it, inflicting upon the Russians 
a loss of sixteen killed and sixty-two wounded. 
TchernaiefE felt himself obliged to retreat 
to Tchimkent, and the Khokandians did not 
leave him undisturbed throughout the ensuing 
winter. The recapture of Turkestan represented 
the main object before Alim Kuli, the Regent, 
who failed to realise his object. A graphic 
incident in this winter campaign was the de- 
fence of Ikan by a small band of Cossacks, 
who, after losing more than half their number, 
cut their way though the Ehokandian army, 
and succeeded in reaching Turkestan in safety. 
I n  the spring of the year 1865 Tchernaieff 
took measures for the renewal of the attack on 
Tashkent. Ho began by seizing the small fort 
of Niazbek, which commanded the water-supply I 
of Tashkent. He then took up a position close 
to the city, and made reconnaissances in force 
around the suburbs. The garrison was at this 
I 
point reinforced by Alim Kuli and a small 
army, and the Khokandian general, either 
(distrusting the fidelity of the townspeople, or 
1 
1 
aonfident in his superior numbers, resolved 
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u p o n  attacking the Russian camp. The attack 
was repulsed, although at one moment it almost 
s e e m e d  as if success would have attended it, 
and Alim Kuli fell in the attempt. With him 
e x p i r e d  the last of the great king-makers of 
C e n t r a l  Asia. The city still held out, although 
each day found the hearts of its defenders 
g rowing  fainter and fainter. As a precaution- 
ary measure Tchernaieff occupied Chinaz and the 
f e r r y  across the Syr Darya. That move eff ectu- 
d l y  shut out all prospect of help from Bokhara. 
Pa r t i zans  from Bokhara succeeded, however, in 
m a k i n g  their way into the city, and took a 
prominent  part in the later stages of its de- 
fence .  Tashkent finally surrendered after an 
assau l t  on the 27th of June, and a %st quan- 
tity of spoil fell into the hands of the victors. 
T h i s  result was most creditable to Tchernaieff, 
for he had captured, with only two thousand 
men and twelve guns, a large and strongly 
fort if ied place held by thirty thousand men 
with more than sixty guns. 
B u t  if his military dispositions reflected 
c r e d i t  upon him as a general, his arrange- 
m e n t s  with the local authorities after the eur 
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render of the town were certainly not less ad- 
mirable. His simple habits appeared not less 
prominent than his courage. On the very even- 
ing of the formal surrender he rode through 
the streets attended by a few Cossacks. He 
a ive attracted general sympathy by taking a n t' 
bath. We are told that no sooner had he 
finished his ablutions than one of the crowd 
offered him a bowl of tea, which he accepted 
without any signs of hesitation. It was by such 
conduct as these incidents are a sample of, tha t  
Tchernaieff endeared himself more than any 
other Russian officer to the people of the 
Khanates, and he is still known amongst 
them as  Shir Naib, the Lion Viceroy. 
I n  the  campaign which ensued with Bokhara 
after the fall of Tashkent, Tchernaieff's pre- 
liminary operations were not attended with 
good fortune. He sent envoys to Bokhara, 
who were cast into prison. He marched a 
certain digtance into Bokharan territory, and 
then, deceived by the specious representations 
of the Ameer, he retreated. He  showed him- 
self too trustful in his dealings with a deceitful 
court, and he had in consequence to accept the  
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responsibility for a check, which his enemies 
magnified into a reverse. He was recalled 
from Central Asia, and replaced by Roman- 
offsky, the victor of Irjar. 
On his return to  Europe he left the army 
and established himself in Moscow as a notary. 
I n  November 1867 he passed the necessary ex- 
amination, and it is asserted on good authority 
that a kind-hearted capitalist advanced the 
,caution-money necessary for him to obtain the 
right to practise as a notary public. I n  this 
capacity he does not appear to have been very 
fortunate, as he was subsequently concerned 
i n  several commercial projects, none of which 
had any remarkable success. At  the same 
time he became coallected with the Moscow 
presg, and contributed a series of important 
articles on the affairs of Central Asia to the 
columns of the (( Russki Mir." 
One of the most remarkable of these ap- 
  eared in that journal on February 2nd (14th) 
1875. It was upon the gubject of the part the 
Khan of Khiva had played in the Kirghiz 
troubles. One of the chief accusations against 
that ruler had been that he had instigated tho 
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I 
I I Kirghiz to rebellion. Tchernaieff :combated 
1 ,  this view, and concluded a pregnant article I with the following significant passage." "When we are quiet, our neighbours are quiet, but a s  
I S  soon as we excite the discontent of our own j i 
4 j Kirghiz, some of our neighbours are imme- 
diately found t o  be to blame." But his prin- 
cipal theme has, been the financial maladminis- 
tration of Turkestan. I n  that he has a subject 
which he perfectly understands, and one which 1 
constitutes the great blot in Kaufmann's sys- 1 
tem of government. I n  1872 he drew up a 
paper on the subject, which created great I 1 
sensation, and the Minister of Finance con- I 
sidered it to  be of sufficient importance t o  
bring before the Czar. Kaufmann had to exert 
all his influence at Court to overcome the op- I 1 1  
'i position which was steadily rising against him. 
He succeeded then, and has since had similar 
good fortune. There was much truth in Tcher- 
naieff's criticism, although not altogether free 11 \ 
from a suspicion of malice, but Kaufmann's 
I 
# Schuyler's " Turlristan," vol. ii. p. 331. 
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position was too secure to be endangered by 
hostile articles in the press, or by the machin- 
ations of discontented place-seekers. 
In 1876 Tchernaieff reappeared in public life 
as commander of the Servian forces. Of this 
pa r t  of his career nothing need here be said. 
It exercised no influence upon the affairs of 
Central Asia. The ability he showed in that 
campaign has not yet been rewarded, but i t  is 
understood that the Russian Government holds 
$hat he has a strbng claim for the service he 
t hen  rendered. I n  1878 i t  was rumoured that  
he was to receive a special command in Central 
Asia in the event of war with England. The 
war-cloud cleared off, and Tchernaieff remained 
at St. Petersburg. He may yet, however, re- 
appear on the scene in which he first won his 
way  to  fame, and there are few Russian generals 
who have more solid claims than he has t o  
exercise a high command. He is especially 
suited for dealing with Asiatics. 
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NOOR TBRDI KHAN." 
OF the Turcomans as a race much has recently 
been heard. Their victory over the Russians 
at Geok Tepeh has won for them a wide re- 
no wn. The working-out and decision of their 
fate will form the next stage in the Central 
Asian Question. It is, therefore, most probable 
that  during the next few years we shall b e  
hearing a great deal about this people, and 
%hat all authentic sources of information will be 
* I am indebted to Major Francis Butler, 9th Regiment, 
the  well-lmown traveller in, nnd explorer of, the country 
of the Turcornaus, for kindly imparting to me most of the  
particulars of the career of this chief, and dso of that of 
the  Governor of Kooohan. 
eagerly inquired for. But if much has been, 
and if more is likely to be, heard of these prim 
mitive clans, it is extraordinary to find how 
little is known of the individual Turcornan. 
No book that has yet been published attempts 
to give a biographical description of any of 
their chiefs, although these are now called upon 
t o  taka an active part in a war which must 
be of the greatest importance, and probably 
pregnant with the moat vital consequences both 
to England and to Russia. I t  is, therefore, 
with the greater satisfaction that I find myself 
enabled to sketch some portion of the career 
of one of the most influential and able of the 
chiefs of the Turcomans. 
Noor Vordi Khan of Akhal is described by 
one acquainted with him as the beau 
idBa1 of a leader of irregular cavalry. His 
qualities are essentially those which fit him 
for ruling n, people whose instincts lead them, 
Eke true children of the desert, to be extreme 
in all things, with a passionate longing for the 
excitement of war and the chase, with a not 
loss kcen desire for the friendtrhip of others, 
and an equally bitter hetrod towards those who 
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incur their antipathy. As we expect such a man 
to  be, he is an extreme representative of his 
class. He possesses the race characteristics in 
an exaggerated degree. I ts  virtues and its vices 
are depicted in his person, with superlative force. 
There is not a popular sentiment with which he 
has not the liveliest sympathy; but as a leader 
of men should do, he sees farther into the future 
than his followers, and knows better than any 
what will be the wiser course for the Turcomans 
to pursue. He is fully impressed with the spirit 
of the proverb-which does not always hold 
good-that boldness is prudence, and, as will be 
seen, he has acted up to his belief in all things. 
Nadir Kuli became Nadir Shah by demon- 
strating qualities such as Noor Verdi has shown 
himself to possess. The latter can hardly hope to 
emulate the conquests of the greatest of his race, 
but, although to aspire t o  the crown of Persia 
may be forbidden him, he may yet play the part ! 
of champion of the independence of all those 
who still rejoice in the name of Turcomans. 
Noor Verdi is at the present time about 
fifty-five years of age, and his personal ap- lit 
pearance is strongly in his favour. He is de- i 
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scribed as being five feet tan inches in height, 
of imposing presence, and with very handsome 
features. His long jet-black beard was, two 
years ago, unstreaked with a trace of silver, 
and his personal vigour showed no sign of 
decay or the advance of time. For many 
years Noor Verdi ruled over the Akhals from 
his fort at the village of Akhal, and nothing 
occurred to interfere with the even tenour of 
his existence. The Akhals could pursue their 
daily course of life without dread of Rnssia, 
and the outside world scarcely knew of their 
existence. It is true that the northern frontier 
01 Khorasan has for generations been the scene 
of an internecine war, which rendered it di&cult 
for any, even for those most disposed, to culti- 
vate the arts of peace in the valleys and beyond 
the ranges of the Kopet and Euren Daghs. 
The  feuds betweon the tyrannical governor and 
his mercenary troops on the one side, and the 
freedom-loving people on the other, have been 
handed down from generation to generation. 
The  loam land of the valleys and mountain 
slopes watered by the Atrek and its aHuents, 
has been enriched with the blood of those who 
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should have made it prolific with their labour, 
just as it has been watered by the tears of 
human grief and suffering. The child has in- 
herited the wrongs of the father, the antipathy 
of races has been perpetuated. The Persian 
came, and what was once a smiling paradise 
was turned into a region which the children of 
the soil scarce dared to cultivate. He brought 
in his train the Kurd and the dregs of the 
Turkish race. He built his forts, and he gave 
the land at first to successful soldiers, and then 
to  unscrupulous governors to fatten on. Yet, 
despite all these disadvantages, the Turcomans 
held their own in the remoter glens and beyond 
the mountain lines. Their villages were small 
forts, their cultivated plains were restricted to  
the vicinity of these forts, their horses, as on 
the Scotch border in the Middle Agos, stood 
saddled in their stalls night and day,-yet the 
Turcomans throve. The Persian grew feebler, 
the Shah's authority became the shadow of a 
name, the Kurd governor more independent, and 
in many cases inclined to show indulgence to- 
wards the Turcoman,-the Akhal and the Teke 
multiplied the more. The prospect of a better 
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futm-e TVRS hegi~lning to appeal1 over tho hori- 
zon mllon the Russian ilivasion came on the 
Akllala liko n, thmidcr-cloud-but me anticipate 
tlie 11rogrms of events. 
Noor Vcrdi h:d soon after his accession to 
tho cllicftnin,gllil~ strivcn to coma to torms with 
tho l'arsians. Ho pcrcoivad that thc intcrmit- 
tent yet novor-consing W~LL' W ~ E I  a source of 
wc:ikncus to 110th sitlos, and he tliouglit tillat it 
moult1 rcclouncl inoro to his credit to arrange 
tho clifficulty by nn ~inilerstanding ~ ~ 4 t h  he
noighl~ouring Persia11 governor of Koochan than 
by czttcml~ting to do fio 11y forco of arms. This 
governor* had nmrricd a relation of Noor Verdi, 
a lady of rornnl-khlo ~ t ~ c n g t h  of chr~l'act;or, and 
perhaps through lior influonce, but certainly by 
eolno means, tho Turcoman chief and the 
Persian govornor came to the arrangement 
that; thoPo mas to be peace between them, and 
that dl raids were to cease. This arrange- 
ment was strictly adhered to until about six 
* For tho mroer of thin governor seo tho following 
rkotch. 
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years ago. - On that particular portion of the 
Khorasan frontier an unusual tranquillity pre- 
vailed for years, and then by an act of 
treachery on the part of the Persian this 
brief period of peace was dispelled, and the old 
state of confusion revived. It came to pass in 
this wise. 
The Governor of Bujnoord, another Persian 
town on this bordei- lying west of Koochan, had 
accumulated in his hands a large .number of 
Turcoman prisoners, taken during a succession 
of raids into Akhal territory. Noor Verdi, fol- 
lowing up the policy of amicable arrangement 
which he had already carried out with the suc- 
cess we have seen in the case of Koochan, 
made overtures to the Governor of Bujnoord 
for the redemption of these prisoners." The 
preliminaries were agreed upon, and Noor 
* It is quito an usual occurrence on the Khorasan fron- 
t ier for Turcoman prisoners to be bought back by their 
friends and relations. There is a fixed value set upon them. 
An ordinary Turcoman fetches sixty tomans, a chief's son 
Inope in proportion to his rank. A Turcoman woman sells 
for  five hundred tomans, some ae high ae a thouskd. 
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Verdi sent a long caravan with horses, sheep, 
carpets, &c., towards Bujnoord for the pur- 
pose of effecting the release of his imprisoned 
kinsmen. That caravan represented much of 
the wealth of the small Akhal community. It 
had taken, no doubt, much labour to collect, 
and the savings of many a thrifty peasant mere 
willingly expended upon i t  in order that the 
greed of a Persian governor might be satisfied. 
I t  carricd with it the hopes and the longings of 
families-doomed, alas ! to a bitter disappoint- 
ment. 
The tidings of this rich train sped to Koochan. 
We have seen that the governor of that town 
had bound himself by an agreement with Noor 
Verdi I<han neither to molest the Akhals nor 
to seize their property. But promises sit 
lightly on the conscience of a, governor of the 
King of Kings. The prize was so great that 
the temptation proved irresistible. Shuja-ud- 
Dowlah resolved that the caravan should never 
reach Bujnoord. He took his measures ra- 
pidly and secretly. He confided his intentions 
to no one, and hastily collecting such of his 
troops as were within reach, intercepted the 
16 
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caravan en route to Bujnoord, and returned 
in triumph with the whole of the booty to 
Roochan, The prize was indeed valuable, and 
the  blow to the akhals was the greater inas- 
much as the prisoners at Bujnoord remained 
uni-ecleemed. Such was the consequence of a 
Turcoman reposing confidellce in the honour of 
a Persian. 
Noor Verdi swore to be avenged upon the 
governor for his treachery, and he assembled 
his fighting men for the purpose of either re- 
covering something of the loss or of securillg 
an  equivalent. The Akhals, not less eager 
than their chief, gathered round him to the 
number of six thousand men. Every prepara- 
tion was made for an immediate advance against 
Roochan, and a large number of the women, 
children, and old men of the clan were hid 
away in a glen for sa,fety, while the young men 
went out to fight in order to avenge the insult 
and the wrong that had been done to the Akha 
people. But there was a traitor in their ranks, 
a spy in thempay of Shuja-ud-Dowlah. He car- 
ried this:inforrnation to his employer, and while 
the Akhals were advancing with an easy mind 
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i n t o  Persian territory, their crafty antagonist 
' had outflanked them, and carried off their 
women, children, and old men at a swoop from 
-their place of safety. This second blov was 
more  t h a n  they could bear. The Akhals yotired, 
leaving t h e  Governor of Koochan a second time 
tr iumphant.  As is usual with more civiliscd 
peoples, they vented their rage ancl disap~oint- 
m e n t  on their leader. They made Noor Verdi 
$10 scapegoat for their misfortunes. 
Noor Verdi's influence vanished, alicl the 
;blame f o r  these disasters being laid a t  his cloor, 
h e  was obliged to leave Alchal and flee to 3ilerv. 
F o r  upwards of three years he remained on the 
banks of the Murghab, and then he vel~turocl t o  
-pay ,only a visit to Akhal, where he found that 
'his b a d  fortune had beon almost forgo$ten, and 
tha t  t h e y  were willing to recognise him again as 
their chief. But the danger on the side of Russia 
was becoming imminent, and he had resolved on 
playing a greater part than he possibly could 
d o  a s  chief of Akhal alone. His son Berdy 
'Bourad Khan* succeeded to some of his autho- 
* This chief is said t o  h a ~ e  been killed at Gaok Tupeh. 
16 * 
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rity, although the northern Akhals entirely 
cast it off. In fact the Akhals split up into a 
number of petty chieftainships, and if there 
was any central authority generally recognised 
during these years, it was not that of the chief of 
Akhal, but of Mahomed Shah the saint of Karya. 
During the absence of Noor Verdi in exile 
among the people of Merv, the Akhals, enfeebled 
by their struggle with the Governor of Koochan, 
were called upon to encounter a more serious 
peril from the direction of Kizil Arvat and 
the Atrek in the shape of a Russian invasion. 
A t  discord with themselves, with faith shat- 
tered in the only man competent to lead them, 
dispirited by their misfortunes in theil. rela- 
tions with the Persians, the Akhals saw little 
prospect of being able to carry on a defensive 
war with General Lomakine. They decided to  
avert that war by a voluntary surrender. In 
August 187.5 a deputation of their chiefs 
waited upon General ~ ~ o m a k i n e ,  and tendered 
their submission in the following speech, "We 
are surrounded on all sides by the Mervites, 
Khivans, Afghans, and Persians. They all 
have sought to make-us subject to their autho- 
-- . " . , . _-  . .< 
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+ity. Our independence could not by any pos- 
sibility continue. Without awaiting, therefore, 
a u r  enslavement by the force of arms, we have 
resolved to submit of our own accord to the most 
powerful of our neighbours, who will know how 
t o  guarantee our security. Prom this day hence- 
forth we are the servants of the White Czar, 
and me are ready to fulfil all his desires. We 
are  thoroughly acquainted with warfare. Say 
but  the word, and we will place five thousand 
horsemen at your service. In  return we pray 
you to submit to the Whito Czar the humble 
prayer of our people that he should graciously 
confirm to us the enjoyment of the liberties and 
immunities granted by the decrees of Timour 
and Nadir Shah." * 
I n  the meanwhile Noor Verdi had not been 
wholly idle at Merv. The death of Kousheed, 
the Khan of Merv, in 1877, appeared to offer 
him an opportunity for advancing his position 
in that place. He took a prominent part in the 
selection of that chief's successor, and, indeed, 
1 * Correspondence respecting Central Ada, No, 1. (1878), 
page 52. 
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he seems to have himself aspired to the post. 
However that may have been, he was not chosen, 
and, with great tact, managed to figure as t he  
supporter of the successful candidate, while he 
let it be generally known that if elected he 
would not refuse the dignity. As it happened, 
Kousheed was succeeded by his son Baba Khan,, 
who is the present chief of Merv." 
The election of n new chief was followed by 
a council of war upon thc policy to be pursued 
with regard t'o the Russian invasion of the 
Akhal country. At that council peaceful views 
did not prevail. No inclination was mahifested 
to irnploTe the favourable consideration of tlio 
White Czar. I n  August 1878 Noor Verdi, 
Baba Ehm, and other chiefa bound themselves. 
by a solem11 oath to fight. With the Koran 
* Another of Kousheed's sons had visited afghanistan- 
This visit gave rise to rumours that an alliance hacl been 
formed between the chief of Merv and Shcre Ali for t h e  
purpose of mesting portions of Khorasan and Seistanfrom 
Persia. This son, on his retuin journey horn Herat in 
1877, was attacked m d  captured by the Sarik clan of 
Turcomans, which holds the country sound Penjded, 
There is repeated reference to this son in the corre- 
spondence presented to ParLiament in the years 1878-79. 
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before them, and the sword between the leaves, I I 
than in which way no oath holds good in Tur- 
coman land, they swore that they would not 
yield their villages> their honour, and their lives . 
t o  the  mercy of the Muscovites. The Akhals 
of Beurma and E z i l  Arvat might, by a well- 
timed show of surrender, endeavour to propitiate 
t he  Czar and his representatives; but neither the 
t rue  Akhals nor the Tekes would imitate their 
kinsmen's weakness. Accordingly during the 
winter of 1818 the Turcomans worked diligently, 
and made their preparations with good cheer- 
Noor Verdi now back among his own people, and 
foremost in the patriotic work. At  Geok Tepeh, 
Ashkabad, and along the line of the Tejend the 
strongest positions were made stronger by art, 
and when Lomakine, hastening impetuously 
forward, fearful lest Tergoukasoff should win 
the  laurels lze had always coveted for himself,. 
reached the first of those places he found the  
Turcomans in position and prepared to fight. 
The Russian regiments rushed madly upon 
the earthworks, only to be hurled back. I n  
the  hand-to-hand fighting on what in a regular 
fortress would have been the glacis, they were 
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crnshed by numbers. I n  a short day's battle 
they lost more men than in any encouater they 
Lave yet fought in Central Asia-more than 
they did at the capture of Tashkent 01- Samar- 
cand, more than a t  Irjar, or Makhram, more 
tLnn in the whole of the campaign against Khiva. 
Xoor Verdi cloas not appear to have been pre- 
sent at this battle ; but he arrived immediately 
afterwards vith a cavalry force from Ashkabad. 
T l~ e  main credit of the success belongs to him. 
It was he vho planned it, although it is quite 
possible that he was himself indebted for his 
inspiration to an ullusual source, and it was he 
who, above everyone else, breathed fresh spirit 
illto the sinlcing hearts of his followers. 
But what he has already accomplished is as 
nothing compa~ed to what he will be called upon 
to do, if the Russiaiis are t o  be kept permanently 
out of Turooman land. He has prese~ved the 
Akhal villages from the soldiers of the Caucasus 
for at least this winter, but they are sure to re- 
turn in greate~ numbers, and with a more pru- 
dent general. Noor Verdi will, therefore, have 
not onlyto strengthell his earthworks a t  Geok 
Tepeh and Ashkabad, but also to procure better 
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arms for his followers. The nondescript wea- 
I pons mhich sufficed a t  Geok Tepeh will not avail 
hereafter. Nor can he close his eyes to the 
ever-present danger to'Merv from the side of 
Charjui. Noor Verdi knows that the capture of 
Merv by the Rus~ians would strike terror to the 
I heart of every Turcoman, and that the Akhals mould then, probably, come to the conclusion that  further resistance would be futile. Against 1; that  danger, which Kaufmann's return to Tash- 
' I kent mould lead us to regard as the more im- 
~llinent, Noor Verdi must provide quite as much 
as  against the return of a larger army from 
1 Urasnovodsk and Chikishlar. The prudence 1 and valour which he has hitherto displayed 
I 
li marrant the assumption that his future plans mill be marked by the exhibition of the same 
qualities. Although not the ruling chief of 
Merv, Noor Verdi is accepted by the Teke 
Turcomalls generally as their leader, and on 
4 his personal character depends more than upon 
i any other single circumstance the future fate of 
i his race. It may be the destiny of the Turco- 
mans to share the same doom as the Erghiz, i but if they steadfa~jtly obey the commands of 
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Noor Verdi they may possibly maintain their 
independence for many generations. After 
their valiant conduct at Geok Tepeh they may 
certainly be expected to fight like brave men, 
and thus give a fresh exemplification of the 
truth of Gibbon's saying that "it , w o ~ ~ l d  be
su~peduous to praise the valour of a Turk."* 
* It,may beinteresting t o  state that Berdy Mourad Khan 
told Colonel C. M. Macgregor in  1875 that the Turcomanns 
of Merv were resolved to resist tho Russians, when they 
came, to the bitter death. His boast that the Tekes were 
not afraicl of the Russians, and, Inshdla! would ahow 
them what a good sword could do," reads less "vain- 
glorious " now by the light of the fight at Geok Tepeh 
than it appewed to be when uttered to Colonel Macgregor. 
SHUJA-UD-DOWLAR 
T E ~  Ameer Hoosein Khan, or, as he is better 
known, the Shuja-ud-Dowlah, that is theBravest 
of the State, hereditary chief and governor of the 
frontier city and district of Koochan, is one of' 
the most important personages in Persia. 'His 
relation to the Shah is very similar to that of 
some of the greater barons to their Sovereign 
in the -Middle Ages. He is practically inde- 
pendent, and the only proof of his being a 
Persian govelnor and not an independent prince 
is furnished by the sums of money and presents 
he sends to Teheran. On the northern frontier 
of Khorman his word is virtually law, and 
most of the smaller governors would follow his 
example in any course he might adopt. 
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Shuja-ud-Dowlah became Governor of EOO- 
chan on the death of his elder brother some 
eighteen or twenty years ago, the office havillg 
. been hereditary in his family for several gene- 
rations. He married one of his brother's 
ridows, a Turcoman lady, very rich and a re- 
lative of Noor Verdi. She became the con$- 
dnnte of all his plans and the favourite among 
his four wives. She is still living. At the 
present time Shuja-ud-Dowlah is about fifty 
years of age. He is a pure Persian by race, and 
in personal appearance resembles a Jew or rather 
an Afghan. He  is a short-about five feet five 
inches-slender man, very dark in complexion, 
with a prominent nose. He is passionately at- 
tached to sport, and justly considers himself a 
first-rate shot. His days are spent away in the 
mount;ahs in pursuit of game, and he leads as 
active a life as most Europeans. His scholarly at- 
tainments are fair, comprising a little French and 
English, and he speaks Turkish perfectly. He is 
moreover a great reader, taking especial plea- 
sure in Professor Owen's works which have been 
translated into Persian. Politics are, of course, 
a favourite st'udy with him, and he has very de- 
1 cided views upon the subject of the Russian I t 
advance into Kara Kum, which will be touched 1 
upon further on. I t  may not be rash to say that 
he is fully resolved to turn the coming compli- 1 
1 cations to his own profit. He  is very much ad- 
I dicted to European oustoms, priding himself on his taste in dress, and wearing trousers and a i military frock coat. He has also been infected f 
by other of our customs, and among them, by a 
partiality for wine, of which he considers him- I L 
self a connoisseur. His district is famed in 
Khorasan for its vineyards, and the Governor , I
has a special white wine made for his own t 
private use. Added to  all the qualities that I 
have been either expressed or suggested it must 1, 
be stated that he is a good soldier, and possessed 1~ with a more than ordinary allowance of courage 8 i 
and nerve. As a companion he can be most 
amusing, and his bonhomie is infectious. From 
all this he would appear to be a very agreeable 
and enlighteued man. There is a darker side 
to tlze picture, as might be inferred from the 
act of treachery described in the sketch of 
Noor Verdi Khan. ;d 
For several years after the death of his d 
a1 
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brother the Governor carried on the work of 
administration without any event of importance 
taking place ; but about ten yeam ago the Shah 
aummoned him to Teheran. Without any sus- 
picion on his mind he obeyed tLs summons and 
went to the capital, where he was at  once cast 
into prison. The Shah had resolved on placing 
his eldest son in charge of the frontier of Kho- 
rasan, and it was held to be necessary to get the 
Governor of Koochan into his pomer, as it was 
ahrewdly suspected that he would not willingly 
surrender his rights as a semi-independent chief- 
tain. Shuja-ud-Dowlah lingered in prison : the 
Prince Royal went to Meshed. Alter he had 
remained in close confinement for one month, 
the commander-in-chief , who was a personal 
friend of his, came to him one night, and told 
liim that his death had been decided upon. 
His head was to be placed in a sack, and he mas 
t o  be smothered between two pillows. Shuja- 
ud-Dowlah, seeing no avenue of escape, ex- 
claimed " Kismet ! " and prepared to meet the 
mevitable. 
The commander-in-chief left him, secretly re- 
solved, however, that he would spare no effort to 
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s a x e  his friend, and so well did he plead his. cause 
before the Shah, that not only was the Governor 
released from prison, but he also received per. 
mission to return to Koochan. Shuja-ud-Dowlah 
was not slow to avail himself of the permission 
granted to him, and forthwith set out for his 
place of residence. When he reached Koochan 
he was astonished to find the gates closed 
I agai'nat him. His eldest son, Abdul Hassan 
Khan,  had taken advantage of his father's mis- 
fortunes to set himself up as an independent 
ru ler  ; and when the father returned, the son 
refused to recognise his superior rights. In 
tihis i t  is very possible that he received indirect 
encouragement from the Prince Governor of 
Khorasan. 
The youthful aspirant reckoned, however, 
wjkhout his host. Shuja-ud-Dowlah was not 
yet in the mood for resigning power and in- 
dependence. H e  summoned round him his old 
followers, he proclaimed his return throughout 
fihe districts of Koochan and Bujnoord, and he 
soon found himself at the head of a sufficiently 
numerous force to enable him to take the field 
against his rebellious son. He attacked Koocban, 
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and expelled Abdul Hassan from the district. 
Thus did Shuja re-establish his authority in 
Koochan after it had seemed that he woulld 
never see the outside of a Persian prison. The  
vanquished pretender fled to  Teheran, where he  
received a different reception to his father. In- 
stead of being thromn into prison he wals honour- 
ably entertained there, and the Shah promised to  
take steps for his advancement. I n  a short 
I time it became evident that Shuja would be  i inattentive to the mandates of the Persian @ V ~ C ~ O ~ ,  and the thought occurred to the Shah 
that Abdul would be a useful person to em- 
ploy as a spy upon his actions. He accordingly 
gave him a letter t o  his father requiring him 
to appoint him his secretary in the admiui- 
strxtion of Koochan. 
Unable to refuse, yet unwilling to  comply 
with this direct request upon the part of the  
Shah, Shuja feigned obedience, but secretly 
formed the intention of murdering his son at 
the first favourable opportunity. Abdul heard 
of this, and fled, on this occasion to the Tur-  
comans. 
An episode occurred about this time which 
will throw considerable light upon the condi- 
tion of this frontier. Noor Verdi Khan had a 
very beautiful daughter, the fame of whose 
beauty penetrated even to the Governor's resi- 
dence at  Koochan, and Shuja-ud-Dowlah re- 
I solved to obtain possession of her. With that 
view h e  made overtures to an adventurer-% 
kind of Bertram Risingham-and promised him 
a considerable reward if he would oarry off the 
maiden from the village of the Akhal ohief. 
The offer was accepted, and the ruffian pro- 
ceeded to Akhal, where he remained for several 
days waiting a fwourable opportunity for exe- 
outing his purpose. At last the opportunity 
offered itself, and one evening when the maiden 
left her  hut he rushed upon her and stunned 
her with a blow. Mounting a horse which he 
had ready saddled, he rode off and made good 
his escape from the pursuing Turcomans. The I 
danger on this occasion lay before, and not 
behind. 
On his way to  Koochan with hi~c prize he 
met Shuja's son, who, spying the maiden, 
asked him whither he was taking her. The 
man replied, (( To Koochan," " Oh, I will 
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save you the trouble." " That cannot be, 
because I am taking her to your father." 
IL Never mind my father; I must have her. 
Here are three hundred tomans if you will 
surrender her without resistance. If you re- 
fuse, I must take her by force." The man, 
seeing opposition would be futile, consented,, 
and pocketed the money. Thus did the Go- 
vernor of Koochan's son win the daughter of 
the Akhal chief; fort~mately for him, as the 
event turned out, he married her. 
Once among the Turcomans Shuja's son 
raised the standard of revolt. He did not find 
it difficult to assemble a band of followers, 
when his declared object was the capture of 
Koochan. In this enterprise he fared well, 
carrying all before him in the field, and 
compelling Shuja to ret,ire into the city. On 
one occasion the latter was even driven t o  
seek safety in a mosque. Reduced to these 
straits, the Governor had recourse to negotia- 
tion, in which he was more successful t hm 
he had been in arms. By promising to use his 
influence to obtain for his son some high posb 
in the Persian service, he induced Abdul to 
disband the Turcoman army. The son vas 
made commander of the troops at >lcshed, 
b u t  did not hold this post long, for, having 
failed in some fresh intrigues, he fled to tllc 
Turcomans a second time. His previous con- 
duct, especially the abduction of Noor V e ~ r l i ' ~  
daughter, had made him an object of hato 
rather than of love to the Turcomans. It was, 
therefore, doubtful what would be his reception 
among them. Abdul Hassan, equal to tho 
occasion, rode into the Akbal encampment nt 
night, and went straight to Noor Verdi's ow11 
tent. Once inside, the laws of h~spitslit~y 
secured him from molestation. The next day 
t h e  assembled Akhals clamoured for the blood 
of the man who bad carried off the daughter 
of their chief. Noor Verdi, leading forth 
his guest, asked him what he had donu 
with his daughter. Abdul replied that 11e 
had  married her. Upon this he was for- 
given and treated as an honoured guest. 
That  marriage saved him. I n  January 187s 
his name was mentioned among the proposed 
delegates from the Persian Government to be 
sent to  Merv. 
17 * 
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With the exception of these disputes with 
his son, Shuja-ud-Dowlah has never been dis- 
turbed in his authority, and is, practically 
speaking, omnipotent in i ts  exercise, save in 
cases of life and death. Short of these, he 
can do pretty much as he pleases. His punish- / 
ments are as st rule very severe, and take the i 
form, in most cases, of mutilation. It is said 1 
there are not a hundred men in Xoocban who 1 
have not had their noses cut  off, and many have 
also lost their fingers, ears, &c. The bastinado 
is also used freely, and is sometimes found to 
be as fatal as the noose or the axe. 
It has been mentioned that  the neighbouring I i governors, Allahyar Khan of Dereges, and Yar 
Mahomed of Bujnoord, are subordinate to the 
Governor of Koochan. They have their omn 
individual troubles and difficulties to deal with, 
but these do not prevent them from combiniilg 
I 
in the annual raid that is carried into Turco- 
man territory every spring. These chapours or 
raids are the event of the year. General prepara- 
tions are made for them as  soon as the snow 
melts on the mountains, and these are usu- 
ally completed by the month of May. It is 
difficult t o  give the amount of spoil which is as 
a rule obtained in these annual expeditions, but 
an average computation would place it at  thirty 
thousand pounds. This is the impost raised 
upon t h e  Turcomans by force of ,arms for the 
purpose of satisfying the demands of the Shah. 
They of course lead to counter-raids on the 
part of t h e  Turcomans, and these are the more 
frequent and the more daring in proportion 
as the number of the prisoners taken by the 
Persians is smaller. 
Various schemes have been tried for the 
purpose of putting a stop to these expeditions, 
1 but as y e t  they have proved in vain. The 
i 
Persian governors have limited their chapowrs 
only by regard to their power and resources. 
Some years ago the Shah sent a general to 
investigate the matter on the spot, and he de- 
cided that no more raids should be made, and 
that e fine should be paid to the Shah. The 
fine was paid, but the raids continued-the fine 
being paid out of the proceeds of raids organized 
for the purpose. These lacts are an expressive 
commentary upon the fitful efforts that are made 
by the Persian Government to carry out reform. 
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A governor possessilig any ordinary amount of 
tact can always stave off a searching inquiry 
into his acts by paying an extra sum into the 
royal exchequer. 
I n  conclusion, something must be said of the 
actual pomer of Shuja-ud-Dowlah. He is the 
possessor of a large extent of rich territory, 
and with it he acquires control over the largest 
number of camels and horses in Khorasan. He  
has an armed force of twenty thousand men, 
a nucleus of whom has been well armed and 
carefully drilled. His city of Eoochan-natu- 
rally strong and surrounded with walls-supplies 
him with a centre for his power, and a basis 
mhence he can act with effect. He also holds 
in it the true key to  the whole of the northern 
trade of Khorasan. I n  a popular cause his 
strength would be augmented by that of Buj- 
noord, perhaps of Dereges as well. It is a 
legitimate subject for inquiry what would be a 
popular cause. 
Persian though he be, Shuja-ud-Dowlah is 
bitterly anti-Persian in inclination. He believes 
that his country is decaying, and that the days 
of the Shahdom are numbered ; nor has he any 
.... - 
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faith in the regeneration of Persia as an antono- 
mous state. He may be wrong, or he may be , 
right ; but such is his belief. E e  also dislikes 
his countrymen, and owes the Shah a grudge for 
his treatment at Teheran years ago. These 
views have obtained a strong holcl upoil the 
:somewhat morbid nature of this enlightened but 
despotic Persian governor. He has expanded 
them by a close consideration of the advance of 
Russia from the Caspian and of England from 
the Suleiman; his conviction being that Rho- 
rasan must become the dependency of the one 
empire or the other. He is willing, if not 
*anxious, to assist; towards effecting either con- 
summation. He is swayed by no predilections 
in  the matter, but is simply intent on supporting 
the  winning side. It is very possible that in 
this his imagination has got the better of his 
reason, but we cannot be inclifferent to the senti- 
ments of the most powerful man in Khorasau. 
His aid might prove invaluable to the Russians 
a n  the occasion of their next advance from the 
Atrek. His active suppo~t would, on the other 
hand, be the best weapon in the armoury of 
the Turcomans. 
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YAKOOB KHAN. 
MAHOMED YAKOOB KHAN, late Ameer of Cabul, 
is a name with which the English reader is by 
this time tolerably familiar. Whether for good 
or for  evil, he will be inseparably connected 
in history with some of the most memorable 
events in Anglo-Afghan relations ; and now 
that his career in his own country has finally 
closed, and that he has been compeIled to swell 
the list of those unsuccessful chiefs who live 
upon the bounty of the Indian Government, it 
may be expected that aurmise will be rife upon 
the question of what might have been, and that  
some little attention will be paid to the st,ory 
of a life rich, even among the numerous ad- 
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venturers which the soil of Central Asia has 
produced so abundantly, in varied incident and 
stirring episode. 
Mahomed Yakoob is the third son of the late 
Arneer Shere Ali. Of his brothers, Mahomed 
Ali, the eldest, was killed at  the battle of IKujh- 
baa in 1865, and Ibrahim, the second, is still 
alive. Yakoob was born in the year 1849, his 
mother being the daughter of the Momund chief 
of Lalpura, a village situated on the northern 
bank of the Cabul river near Dacca. Of his 
early life at the Court of Dost Mahomed we 
know nothing. He first appeared upon the scene 
after the fall of Herat, whither he had accom- 
panied Shere Bli ill the train of that prince's 
father. The capture of that fortress was fol- 
lowed by ihe death of the aged Ameer, and the 
latter event led to the proclamation of Shere Ali 
as his successor. It  soon became evident that 
Shere Ali's claims would be disputed, and appre- 
' hensive lest his power should slip through his 
fingers in the centre of the state while absent 
at Herat, he hurried back with the victorious 
army to Candahar. 
It -is not  clear for what reason Shere Ali 
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nominated his third son in prefei*ence to his 
,elder brothers to the responsible charge of go- 
verning Herat. They may have been in some 
other part of the kingdom, or Yakoob may have 
hatl some special attraction at that time, which 
he  afterwards lost, in the eyes of his father. 
But whatever the reason, Shere Ali marched 
eastward, leaving Yakoob behind him as his 
representative in the West. While the fortune 
.of mar was veering from one side to the other 
round Cabul, Candahar, and Gbizni, the 
J3oy Yakoob mas governing Herat, Badghees, 
and Perrah in all tranquillity. The western 
portion of Afghanistan enjoyed undeT him a 
quietude and immunity from disturbance that 
made it the one spot of peace and promise 
midst the troubled waters of Afghan affahqs. 
Yakoob hacl not long been installed at  Herat 
when the wanderiug dervish, who explored 
the count;ries of Central Asia in search of ad- 
venture and for the edification of Englishmen, 
known now to the world by his writings as 
Professor Arminius Vfimb6ry of Pesth, reached 
that city. He, like every other traveller, was 
received in durbar by the ruler, whom he 
YAKOOB KHAN. 267 
-found engaged in the congenial task of re- 
viewing his troops. Something in the manner 
ar the face of tlie wayworn dervish attracted 
h is  attention and excited his suspicion. Desirous 
af taking him off his guard, Yakoob twned sud- 
denly upon him with the exclamation, "You 
a r e  an Englishman ! " The sang f~oid of the 
European proved equal to the occasion. He 
repeated an appropriate text from the Eoran, 
and  the boy-ruler, if not convinced, was at least 
%oo abashed to renew his inquiries. This is the 
first glimpse we get of the man who is now a, 
pensioner of the Indian Government. I n  many 
respects it is the most vivid we possess of him. 
From the time of VBmbBry's visit to the year 
1868 is a long stretch of time to pass over 
without stopping. We are compelled to do so 
for want of materials. I n  many ways those four 
years were important ones, both for Afghanistan 
and for Yakoob. The cause of Shere Ali, which 
at one moment promised to be triumphant, 
had been finally cast down. In the sight of 
most men it had been irretrievably ruined. The 
principd cities, all the eastern country, were in 
tihe hands of his brethren. North, as well aa 
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south of the great mountain range, his autho- 
rity had been repudiated. The chief supporters 
of his cause had either been slain in battle or 
had abandoned him. His soldiers had been 
dispersed to all quarters by frequent disaster, 
his artillery captured, his treasure expended. 
He had nothing left save his confidence in Allah 
I 
and fate. 
There remained to him, indeed, the province 
of Rerat, over which his son continued to ex- 
i ercise sway as his lieutenant. During those years of warfare Yakoob had been drilling the 
d Heratees, and gathering in the resources of 1 
the districts entrusted to his care. All power 
was centred in his hands, and although not of 
very formidable pl*oportions, it was, a t  least, 
unquestioned so far as it went. It requires no 
stretch of imagination to suppose that when 
Shere Ali, sick a t  heart and with small hope of 
better fortune left, retired to Herat, he was in 
the right mood to listen to and approve the 
daring and sanguine schemes suggested to him 
by his son, who, as yet knowing nothing of 
defeat or disappointment, was full only of the 
ignorant audacity of youth. Yakoob showed 
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$bere Ali his trained regiments, he pointed t o  
his well-supplied arsenal, he dwelt upon i;he 
enthusiasm of his followers. He may also 
h a v e  observed that their opponents were in- 
f la ted with a belief in their invincibility, that 
t h e y  were certainly at  feud with each other, 
and  that  much of their armed strength lay 
nol*th of the Hindoo Koosh. Whether these 
arguments were used, or whether the son p u t  
khe father aside and acted upon his o m  behoof, 
t h e  fact is cleas that it was Yakoob Khan who 
b e g a n  the campaign of 1868 on his own re- 
soLlrces, and with supreme control. Xhere Ali  
bad failed. It remained for his son to inaugu- 
r a t e  ;L more S U C C O S S ~ U ~  era. 
While, therefore, Aaim and his son Surwar 
were acting the parts of despotic rulers a t  
Cabnl  and Cstndahar, and whfie Abderrahmm 
resided in a very dissatisfied mood at Ballc11, 
Yakoob, nzarching from Herat and Ferrah, ad- 
vanced in the direction of Girishk and the 
Helmund. At this nioment Yakoob may be 
said  t o  have been at  liis prillle. Ho was only 
ninctecn years of ago, but hllo Afglistns, espe- 
cially those of the ruling family, are then a t  
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their best. Dost Mahomed was, perhaps, the  
sole exception of an Afghan retaining possession 
of all his faculties until, past the middlo of life, 
Yakoob had been accustomed to exercise com- 
mand from his boyhood, and his home had been 
the camp, his society that of soldiers. He was 
also deeply impressed with a sense of his father's 
wrongs. He aspired to be his saviour. The 
prize of victory would also be  for him a double 
one. Not only would it obtain for him a great 
military reputation, but  it made it morally cer- 
tain that he mould become his father's heir. 
The claims of a man who had saved his cause, 
who had restored a lasting tranquillity to the 
whole of the country, could not be passed over. 
So,  doubtless^ thought the young prince as he 
marched on Candahar. 
Surwar, Azim's son, left Candahar with the  
garrison and such, of the tribes as he could 
gather round him for the purpose of contesting 
the fords of the Helmund. His antagonist had 
been too quick for him. Girishk, the family 
castle of the House of Poyndah, was in Yakoob's 
hands mhen Surwar reached the banks of the 
Helmund; and with it he had virtually won 
of the passage of the river. Still, 
to do him justice, Surwar showed himself not 
unworthy of the reputation of his father. H e  
held his position on the eastern aide of the 
river, and did his best to check the ad- 
vance of the Heratees. His efforts were in 
vain. Neither the headlong impetuosity of 
the  levies of Heyat nor the tactical ability 
evinced by their leader was to be refused. The 
battle of the Helmund was Yakoob's maiden 
victory, and the high promise which it held 
forth was more than justified on many a later 
field. 
The victory at Girishk entailed the surrender 
of Candahar. Surwar fled northwards, and ' 
the government of Aaim collapsed in the 
southern portion of the kingdom. The snow 
was on the ground, the timid merchant had not 
yet thought of sending his goods through the 
passes, the peasant had not begun to sow the 
seeds for the harvest in the uplands of Afghan- 
istan ; but it was no part of Yakoob's plan to 
rerriain in idle dalliance at Candabas. With 
the eye of a true soldier he had hit upon the 
fatal blot in the generalship of Bhere Ali and 
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his opponents. It was delay, the tardiness of 
following up a success, which had lost Shere 
Ali the fruits of victory. His son would, above 
all things, avoid the repetition of the blunder. 
His blows should not only be hard, but they 
should be quick. I n  that sense he may be said 
to have introduced a new and striking feature 
into Afghan warfare. 
Almost before Aaim had received intelligence 
of the fall of Candahar, Yakoob was in full 
march for Ehelat-i-Ghiljie. That fortress, the 
natural strength of which is so great that it  
may, without exaggeration, be styled the 
strongest place in Afghanistan, surrendered 
without a blow. The rulers of Afghanistan 
have always neglected it, partly because of the 
apathy which has characterised all their mea- 
sures for the improvement of the national 
defences, and partly because they have been de- 
sirous not to arouse the hostility of the Ghiljies. 
I n  Yakoob's hands it became the advanced 
base for a decisive movement against Ghizni 
and Cabul. Shere Ali at this juncture arrived 
with reinforcements. By this time the snow 
mas beginning to disappear in the vaolIeys, and 
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there was reasonable promise t h d  warlike opt- 
r a t i ons  could be carried on in the nortllcll*n 
quar te r s  of the state. The advance t o  Kllelal; 
developed into a march on Ghizni. The tolvll 
7 and fortress of Ghizni opened its gates. 
I commandant, with a small body of dcspe- i ra te  men, withdrew into the citadel, but t~l:~t,  
I fact presented no significance. Yakoob felt 
that he could ignore the small force holdillg 
I 
I t h e  citadel, as he was in possession of tho 
grea te r  portion of the fortress. He ma;rchccT 
northwards on Cabul, which at once surreii- 
deyed. Azim fled to Balkh, there to join 
Abderrahman, who by this time had collectcil 
an army, and was on the point of marching 
for the purpose of coming to con- 
clusions with his cousin. Abderrahman had 
few doubts that the conqueror of Shero Ali 
w o - ~ ~ l d  have less success against the son. Al- 
r eady  in his mind he was, for a second time, 
the arbiter of the fate of Afghanistan, and 110 
expected that the guerdon of his toil on this 
occasiou would be that he, as Afzul '~ sol), 
wo-Llld receive the Ameership. In  dl this hc! 
I was reckoning upon too sanguine premises- 
18 
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Rapidity of motion had mads Yakoob's cam- 
paign a promenade of triumph after triumph 
from the banks of the Helmund to the gates of 
the Bala Hissar. He did not fail to employ 
the same means now at the crucial point of the 
I war, and the like fortune attended his measures. 
While Abderrahman was engaged in the diffi- 
1 
1 
i cult task of leading his miscellaneous forces- 
part Usbeg and part Afghan-through the 
defiles of Sighan, Yakoob, with a smaller army, 
had taken up a strong position in front of 
I Bamian, and was in readiness to do battle for 
I the defence of the road to Cabul. We know not 
I 
I 
i with which side the action began, but the result 
I 
I was a complete victory for Yakoob. The Khan 
of MaimenB, with whom Yakoob had entered 
into relations while ruling at  Herat, at  this 
moment made a hostile demonstration in the 
rear of Abderrahman, and compelled him and 
I his uncle t o  retire into Kohistan instead of 
upon Balkh. There he gathered round him 
the nucleus of his army, and strove to seize 
I Cabul by a coup de maim. Yakoob was again 
too quick for him. When Abderrahman reached 
1 
the vicinity of the city he found Yakoob and 
i i ,  
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his  army drawn up in readiness to receive him. 
Foiled in his attempt, he withdrew in the direc- 
tion of Ghizni, followed by Yakoob. He 
managed to effect the relief of the garrison of 
the citadel of that place, but the effort cost 
h im dear, for Yakoob attacked him and inflicted 
considerable loss upon his rear-guard. Shortly 
afterwards, being compelled to give battle a t  
Tinah Khan, Yakoob's star again shone in 
hhe ascendant, and Abderrahan and Azim 
were obliged to flee t o  Persia. Tho campaign, 
which had been boldly conceived, had been 
boldly carried out; and the closing days of the 
year 1868 saw the complete success of the plan 
which had been formed a t  its commencement. 
The civil war that had devastated Afghanistan 
during five years had finally terminated, and 
its close brought; credit to Yakoob Khan above 
every one else. 
The war had scarcely concluded when Shere 
'r Ali  set out from Cabul to visit Lord Mayo. On 
that journey Yakoob did not accompany him. 
The conqueror of the country remained behind 
to  be its pacifier. While at Umballa the Ameer 
expressed the most friendly sentiments towards 
18 * 
1 
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his son. Yakoob was depicted to the English 
officials as a warrior and a hunter-a man of 
action. But already in his heart the Ameer 
felt desirous of making his youngest son, ,Abd- 
ullah Jan, his heir. He was secretly afraid of 
Yakoob, and had very little faith in his show 
of obedience ; and therefore, although Yakoob 
was generally accepted as his successor, no 
formal proclamation was made of his being the 
heir apparent. For a time Yakoob was Go- 
vernor of Cabul, and then he held the same 
post a t  Candahar. But it soon became evident 
to  him that Shere Ali had either forgotten or 
wilfully ignored the greatness of the obligation 
he owed him. The desire to humour a favourite 
wife overcame the father's sense of gratitude, 
and Yakoob, seeing that his presence a t  Can- 
dahar would not prevent the nomination of 
Abdullah Jan a t  the first favourable oppor- 
tunity, retired to Perrah. 
A t  that place Yakoob collected a small army, 
and with it  in 1871 he made himself master 
of Herat. For three years he governed Herat, 
Ghorian, and their dependencies for himself. 
Shere Ali had the prudence to leave him to his 
1 
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own devices. This mas the period when Captain 
1 Marsh visited Herat, and was very hospitably 
I entertained by Yakoob.* He found the Heratees 
exceedingly well disposed towards England, and 
their ruler shared their sentiments. Yakoob 
was actively engaged in the task of creating an 
army. He  had regular regiments, both of in- 
fantry and of cavalry. He had also constructed 
si> smooth-bore six-pounder guns, and stored 
I up a large number of miscellaneous weapons. 
Captain Marsh computed that, in all, Yakoob 
could bring ten thousand men into the Geld. 
He pronounced the young ruler to be a very 
rising man and one of whom we should some 
day hear a great deal more. Yakoob Khan 
appears to have governed Herat with the same 
, 
* Captain Marsh gives the following description of 
Yakoob Khan at this time in his book (LC A Ride through 
Islain," 1877). " He was drcssed in a European military 
braided blue coat, with black trousers, socks, the Eeratee 
sliecpskin 7culla or hat, aid a fine cloth choga; and his. 
gold-belted sword lay in front at  his feet. He is twenty- 
six years old, well bred, has a pleasant intelligent face, 
not very fail., middle height (five feet three inches (?)), 
small hands and feet, slight moustache, with a slightly ' 
yetreating forehead, good voice." 
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ability and success on this second occasion that 
he had done upon the first. &though often 
reduced to straits for want of money, he does 
not seem to have resorted to acts of tyranny 
for the purpose of replenishing his coffers. 
But the inadequacy of his resources for the. 
task of administering the affairs of a large pro- 
(; pince compelled him at  length to make over- 
tures to his father. He asked that a sum of i money might be given him so that he should 4 + govern Herat as lieutenant for Shere Ali ; and 
the result of the communications that took 
t place with that object in view was that Ya- 1 ,  f koob left Herat and went to Cabul, trusting 
1, ,: to his father's promise to permit his return 
u in safety. This was in October 1874. On t h s  
30th of the month Yakoob reached Cabul, 
where he received a friendly greeting from his 
father. Trays of sweetmeats were sent to the  
different stages where he halted, by the Ameer, 
Abdullah Jan, Ibral~im Khan, and others. Hs 
I was accompanied by two or three chosen com- 
, panions, among them his father-in-law, Yallya, 
Khan, and one hundred cavalry. Yakoob met, 
I I as we have said, with a friendly reception from 
I i  I 
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Sbere Ali, whom, "according to the custom 
of the country, he tvaited upon, and kissed 
His Highness's feot." * no brought with him 
, numerous presents, hcluding '( thirty-six 
horses of superior breod and some choice cloth 
manufactures of Hcrat, such as ' k~~rlr , '  ' Icalru- 
ma,' carpets, woolle11 ' clnris,' &c." A11 those 
mcro ncccptod, and in rcturn the Ameer scnt 
him coolrcd food from the royal lritchcn and 
assignccl him a cash siafat, or allowance. 
Yakoob stipulated that ho should not bc do- 
1 tainecl more than ten days, that he should be 
excusccl ~vaiiting on or seeing the ]leir apparent, 
and Lhat lic shoulcl bc nllo\vccl to take his ad- 
herents back with him. All thcsc points vere 
1 agreed to by tho Amec-r's representa;tives, mllo 
mere two Ghiljio olziefs. On tho very clay when, 
in nccorda~lco with this arrangement, Yakoob, 
shorllcl have beon pormittccl to leave Cabul, he 
was by tho Ameer's orders placecl in custody. 
Tho 8th of Novcmber fowzcl the young sirdar 
not a traveller on his journey back to Herat, 
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hut the occupant of a state prison. The 
Viceroy of India-Lord Northbrook-made 
representations to Shere Ali upon the subject 
of his breach of faith, but he took our in- 
tervention in an ill sense and cherished up 
against us a grievance upon that score. I n  his 
letter to Lord Northbrook he wrote, " Mention 
before a father of the evil actions of his son 
~mdoubtedly tends to inci-ease the father's 
I .shame. Sincere, intelligent friends, owing to 
i their sound judgment and far-sightedness, do 
6- not like, under any circumstances, to  put their 
faithful friends to such shame." 
So it came to pass that Yakoob Khan, the man 
who had reconquered a lost kingdom for his 
sire, and given a settled government to  a large 
province for several years, received as his re- 
ward a place of confinement instead of honours. 
His services had been great, and his ability 
admitted; but, whatever the provocation, he 
had been a rebel. He had acquired possession 
of Herat by main force. It was impossible 
that the Ameer or his advisers should show 
themselves indifferent to what had happened. 
Shere Ali, anxious to have as his successor the 
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child Abdullah Jan, knew that his dynastic 
schemes would have small chance of succeed- 
ing if Yakoob were to consolidate his authority 
as  Governor of Herat. His own death - ~ o u l d  
be the signal, he could not fail to perceive, 
for  a civil war in which his favourite son woulci 
be  inevitably defeated. When Yakoob enterecl 
t h e  Bala Hissar his fate was sealed. Not t h e  
sacred oath sworn upon the Koran at Herat  
by the Ameer's envoys, not the venerat,ed 
-privileges of a guest, co~zld save the man who 
h a d  been marked as dangero~zs by the king. 
Neither the rites of religion nor the unpol- 
luted example of eastern custo~n avail in 
Afghan eyes to probect either the stranger 
mithin their gates, or the too promineut or 
too ambitious vassal whose slaughter the ruler 
has  decided upon. 
From November 1874 until December 1878 
t h e  figure of Yakoob Ehan disappeared from 
Afghan politics. It was even uncertain whether 
h e  had not been summarily disposecl of. His 
friends-and he had many-endeavoured to 
obtain his release. His father-in-law ancl 
several Ghiljie chiefs offered to go bail for 
him, but aJ1 their efforts were in vain. Y a -  
koob remained a ~risoner, and it was n o t  
until the death of Abdullah Jan in August, 
1878 that his friends began to have any solidk 
hopes of obtaining his pardon. But even 
then Shere Ali showed no great eagerness to 
release him. Yakoob's name was not men- 
tioned, indeed, until after the war had oom- 
menced, and when brought out of confinement, 
the outer line of the afghan defences had 
been pierced by the English army, and Shere  
b l i  mas on the point of leaving his capital 
for Afghan Turkestan. The suddenness of 
this resolution is best shown by the Ameer's 
own words upon the subject. Writing on t he  
'I 19th of November to the Viceroy, he speaks 
of him as his " undutiful son, the ill-starred 
I wretch, Ya.koob Khan." In  his &man, dated 
22nd of December 1878, appointing Yakoob 
his representative, he styles him "our elder 
and beloved son." * 
It was in December 1878, therefore, that, 
I 
* Afghan Correspondonce, No. 7. (1879), pages 5 and 8- 
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after more than four years imprisonment, Pa-  
koob returned to public life. The withdrawal 
of Shere Ali to Balkh left him in possession of 
most of the attributes of power, but neverthe- 
less he made it clear that he mas only acting in 
the place of his father. This is shown in his 
letter of the 20th of February 1879, to Major 
Cavagnari, in whicli he said that he would 
" bring every human effort to bear on my es- 
alted father in the hope that, perhaps, the  
friendship of this God-granted State with the 
illustrious British Government may remain 
constant and firm." Within a meek of writing 
t h a t  letter-on the 26th of February-the news 
of the death of Shere Ali reached Cabul, and 
Yalcoob at once sent our representative tho 
information " out of friendship." 
There is no doubt whatever that, in leaving 
Yakoob to act for him, it mas the intention of 
Shere Ali that he should be his peace-maker 
with the English Government. The mcasurcs 
which Yakoob adopted show this with suffi- 
cient clearness. Prom the very commence- 
ment his actions were conciliatory. With the 
object of establishing relations of friendship 
settling the quarrel between the States, he 
carried on a correspondence with Major Ca- 
vagnari from February until May. I n  all 
h e  mrote seven letters upon the subject, and 
i n  each it is possible to detect only the ex- 
-pression of a corclial amity, and an earnest 
desire to stand me11 with the Indian Govern- 
ment. 
On the 6th of MaT& the terms upon which 
peace would be concluded mere sent to him by 
order of the Viceroy, and in his reply, dated 
the 12th of the same month, Yakoob acquiesced 
in them all, save the one relating to the cession 
of tlie nominal control exercised by the Arneer 
over the passes, and of the districts of Sibi, 
Yisheen, and Ichurum. To that he made an em- 
phatic refusal. I t  mas " beyond tho strength 
aud capacity of the officers of his God-granted 
Government." From that date until the end 
of April, frequent negotiations took place be- 
tween the two Governments, and at last, after 
it had been arranged that Major Cavagnari 
should proceed to Cabul, Yakoob suddenly 
came to the determination to irisit the English 
camp. On the 11th of April Lord Lytton had 
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addressed a letter to him styling him Wali of 
Cabul and its dependencies, and this may be 
coilsidered to have been the first formal recog- 
nition by the Indian Goverament of his acces- 
sion to the Axneership. 
On the 3rd of May Yakoob left Czibul, and on 
tho 8th reached the camp of the advancecl Bri- 
tish force at Gundamuck. He was accompanied 
by several of his chief supporters, and an escort 
of between four and five hundred men. Ele 
was evidently pleased with tlie friendly and 
ho~lourable recegtiou which a~vaited him, and 
it is probable that, notwithstanding his appa- 
rent coolness, he was inciucecl by the impulses 
of the moment to exaggerate the advantages he 
might obtain as an ally of the English Govern- 
ment. l3verything was coloured with sang~zina 
expectations at Gundamuck, The Ameer had 
been summoned originally to power to xnalce 
peace. Tho Indian Government mas also 
much disposed to arrange the difficulties that 
had arisen with Shere Ali. So after less than 
three msoks' discussion Yakoob's objections to 
tho cession of terr i to~y Jvoro overcome and a 
treaty ~nsccl on tile cicnlancls fo~mulatcd three 
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months before by the Viceroy was drawn up 
and signed on the 26th of May.* 
The following description of the appearance 
of the Ameer at  this time is well worth pre- 
serving. It is taken from the '( Times " 
correspondeat's letter, dated May 9th :- 
" His appearance, I shoulcl. say, is decidedly 
aristocratic. He is of middle height, straight, 
and well built. His complexion is that of an 
Italian, and infinitely fairer than that of many 
of the bronzed warriors one sees in the British 
camps. His features are of the usual coarsely 
aquiline Afghan type. His expression is some- 
what stern and careworn, but indicates charac- 
ter and resolution. His beard is short and 
crisp, and at  his age, thirty-four," (he was only 
thirty years of age at this time,) C c  is doubtless 
of its natural black colour, undisguised by the 
cosmotics so freely used by Afghans when gray 
hairs appear. The b e e r  rode a well-bitted, 
light chestnut Turcoman charger, equipped 
@ The articles of the Treaty of Gundamuck will 'be 
found enumerated on page 21 of " Afghan Correspondence 
(No. 7.), 1879." 
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with European military saddle and bridle. He 
mas dressed in an Afghan cloak of the finest 
material of the country, made with evident 
attention to a becoming fit, and wore European 
trousers fastened under a neat polished-leather 
boot by chain straps. His head-dress was a 
close-fitting cap of Astrakhan wool. He sat his 
horse erect and well, and it was easy to fancy 
him the gallant soldier and skilful general 
which in his earlier years he so often proved 
himself to be." 
Yakoob soon became very popular in the 
camp. His " dignified and composed demeanour 
on public occasions," and "his entire freedom 
from either a cringing or a swaggering air," 
were much admired. Wonder was often ex- 
pressed how one who had so recently arrived 
a t  kingly state should have acquired so soon 
" the correct kingly air." As a matter of fact 
there was nothing to excite wonder in this. 
Not only is it notorious that Afghans of good 
birth possess great natural dignity, and that 
the Barucksyes have always been remarkable for 
pride of race ; but Yakoob had from his earliest 
youth been accustomed to command. As a boy 
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and as a man he had governed Herat ; and he 
had led armies in the field when English youths 
would be still in the school-room. It would 
have given ju ter  cause for wonder and as- 
tonishment if the grandson of Dost Mahomed 
had shown l~iimself deficient in "the correct 
king1 y air. " 
The negotiations at Gundarnuck closed in 
the same harmonious manner as they had 
commenced. Writing on the 30th of May to 
the Viceroy, Yakoob said that he had hoped to 
have had " the unbounded pleasure of a joyful 
interview " with His Excellency at Simla, but 
that various circumstances, prominent among 
which was " the anarchy prevailing in his kiug- 
dom," compelled him to put off his journey. 
But the pleasure was still looked forward to, 
and "towards the close of the next cold sea- 
son," that is t o  say in March 1880, he antici- 
pated having the pleasure of carrying out his 
visit to the Viceroy. In June Yakoob returned 
t o  Cabnl, and the British army had been with- 
drawn before the close of the month behind the 
western entrailce of the Khyber. Cavagnari, 
to whose tact and unflagging energy the success 
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*I of the delicate negotiations with the Ameer 
was mainly due, returned to Peshawur to make 
arrangements for his early departure for Cabul, 
I where he was to take up his abode as the 
! " permaneut British Resident." This was to 
be the reward for his great services, and it was 
the one which he coveted more than any other 
that could have been bestowed upon him. 
On the 14th of July Cavagneri, who had 
just been knighted, reached Khurum fort, and 
ten days afterwards entered Cabul. The fol- 
lo wing extract from a description* written by 
i 
himself of the scene on his entry into the city 
gives a graphic account of it :- 
"About four miles from the city, Sirdar Abdoolah 
Khan, son of the famous Sultan Jan, of Herat, accom- 
panied by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and an escort 
of cavalry, met the Envoy. Two elephants, with gilt and 
silver howdahs, had been sent for the use of the Envoy 
and his Staff. Close to the city tho whole of the Cabul 
garrison, consisting of two cavalry regiments, two bat- 
teries of artillery, and uine infantry regiments, were drawn 
up in close column, aud presented arms as the co~ tSgo  
passed. The bands played what they imagined was 
'God save the Queen,' but if the tune and time mere 
* See (' Times," August 30, 1879. 
19 
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somewhat faulty, the honour intended for the British 
guests by giving them their National Anthem was none 
the less appreciated. As the Envoy's elephant entered 
the gate of the Bala Hissar, or citadel of Oabul, a salute 
of seventeen guns was fired by a heavy battery (the siege 
train of 18-pounders which the British Gove~iiment i n  
former days gave to the b e e r  Shere Ali Khan) posted 
on some rising ground in  front of the city. The house- 
tops and shop windows of that part of the city through 
~Kich  the procession passed were crowded with sight-seeen, 
but the conduct of the crowd was orderly and reapectful 
in tho extreme. A guard of honour mas drawn up a 
short clistance from the gateway of the quarters appointed. 
by the h e e r  for the residence of the British Embassy, 
and as the Envoy alighted from his elephmt the Com- 
mander-in-Chief and the Finance Minister waited on him. 
and conveyed friendly inquiries from the Ameer. I n  the 
afternoon Major Sir Louis Cavagnari and Staff paid it 
formal visit to the Ameer. The bnilding in which the. 
members of the Embassy are loclged is vcry commodious,. 
and is considcred one of t l e  best clmelling-houses in 
Cribul. There are two houses, one four-storied, the other 
two-storied, connected by side walls, so that there is a 
spacious quadrangle in the centi3e. The superstructure of 
these houses is principally of wood, with slndl kiln-baked 
bricks Luilt in between frameworks of wood. This is said 
to be tho best style of building to withstand earthqualres, 
which are very frequent in Cabul. The houses had been 
thoroughly cleaned and whitewashed, and are by no means: 
uncomfortable. During the whole of the journey the 
officers and escort of the Embassy were the guests of the 
Ameer. Large trays of cooked food of various descrip- 
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tions were sent three times a day to the officers, and 
rations were served out to the escort and camp-follomer~, 
Fruit was supplied in such great profusion that the bag- 
gage animals mere seen feasting off tl large heap which 
the camp-followers were unable to dispose of." 
I n  a closing sentence he ' said that this hon- 
ourable and ostentatious reception woulcl. give 
a quietus to those pessimists who questioned 
the Ameer's power throughout his kingdom. 
The result shoved, unfortunately, that there 
was solid reason for questioning the stability of 
the Ameer's power. For nearly six veeks the 
English Embassy remained undisturbed in the 
city, and then, after some varnings had been 
given, there occurred that outbreak on the 3rd 
of September, on the part of the Ameer's troops, 
which resulted in the destructioli of Sir Louis 
Cava,gnari, his three companions, Mr. Jenkyns, 
Lieutenant Hamilton, and Dr. Kelly, aiicl. their 
escort - with two or three exceptions - of 
seventy-six men of the Corps of Guides. That 
terrible event roueed the greatest indignation 
in the breasts of all Englishmen, and well it 
might, for never in our history had worthier 
representatives of the country been done to 
so shameful and so unprovoked a death. 
1 9  * 
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The policy of Yakoob Khan had for some 
weeks before that occurrence become more tor- 
tuous than the results attained a t  Gundamuck 
would have led us to  suppose. Before Sir 
Louis Camvagnari had resided long st Cabul it 
mas made apparent by Yakoob's acts that his 
mind was in a vacillating state with regard to  
the value of the English alliance. He was evi- 
dently beginning to repent of the complaisant 
part which he had played. His objections t o  
the cession of territory recovered something of 
their original force. The reproaches of his 
brother Ayoob could not but exercise great 
inflnence upon a mind which, whether i t  had 
become unstrung by long confinement or not, 
was certainly tuned to the high key of one ac- 
customed to brood over great deeds. Those 
reproaches came fast and frequently; and they 
acquired fresh weight because they were reci- 
procated by the soldiers who, in the month of 
August, reached Cabul from Herat. In July 
the English Envoy was the most welcome of 
guests ; in August the Ameer was plainly tired 
of his presence. Yakoob has always protested, 
and still protests, that he had a sincere personal 
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1 regard for Cavagnari, and there appears in his 
conduct nothing inconsistent with the declaro- 
I 
, tion. It may be that througllout he was playing 
a part, and that his good temper in the nego- 
tiations with the English authorities ai-ose 
from a sinister purpose. We have no proof, 
however, of this ; and certainly he could have 
attained the same end with less difficulty by 
pursuing a straighter and simpler course. 
The probabilities are altogether in favour of 
the view that up to May Yakoob earnestly 
desired t o  come to terms with the English. 
With the signature of peace a great weight was 
taken off his mind. He knew that dangers and 
difficulties surrounded him ; but he thought 
that he could overcome them. He believed 
that his star would yet prove in the ascend- 
ant. On his return to Cabul he found himself 
brought face to face with the elements in t,he 
coulltry inimical t o  England, and in the silent 
struggle he fared worse than he anticipated. 
Before August ended he had become virtually 
powerless to arrest the career of the nation 
towards open hostility to England. The ques- 
tion he had then to decide was, whther he 
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should float with the stream, or endeavour 
t o  stem the national implse  by risking his po- 
sition. The doubt still tormented him, and his 
mind was vacillating between the two courses, 
when his soldiery took the matter out of his 
hands and decided the progress of events by 
massacring the British Envoy and his com- 
panlons. 
I There can be little doubt that if Yakoob 
had not been in this state of mental uncertainty 
he might have done much more than he did 
towards saving the lives of our countrymen. 
While admitting the extelluating circumstance 
of the effect upon a sensitive mind at dis- 
covering that the peace which terminated a 
I 
disastrous war was far from being popular 
I with his subjects, i t  is impossible to refrain from expressing a decided opinion that both 
as an ally and as a host Yakoob's conduct 
fell very far short indeed of what was required 
of him. The excuses he made for his apahhy 
and inaction were, a t  the time, palpably in- 
sufficient. They have since been conclusively 
shown to have been utterly false. Yakoob 
Khan did nothing on the 3rd of September, for 
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+be siinple and sufficient reason that ho was 
not prepared tjo run counter to the desircs of 
a large section of his people. Those mishes 
w e r e  being proclaimecl in an unmistakable 
1 
manner, and so far as possible Yakoob de- 
.sired to place himself in harmony with them. 
1Je probably never intended to go tho full 
length of a rupture with England; but the 
acts of his countrymen precipitated the ca- 
tastrophe. 
It mould, perhaps, be unfair to come to an 
 adverse opinion on the subject of Yakoob's 
conduct in leaving his capital for the camp of 
General Roberts, and of the incident* which 
.occurred on the eve of the battle of Charasiab. 
Nor should too much bo made of the chal*ge 
.that has been brought against him of having 
concealed letters from the Russian authorities 
while showing us " dummies." Such collduct 
would no doubt be very reprehensible in an 
European-it has been known, however, in our 
history-but as this is a case of an Afghan it is 
* He was visited by one of the Afghan leaders. 
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useless to descant upon its iniquity. Yakoob 
mould have played a bolder part if he had cast in 
his lot with the rebels, but then that wo~~lcl iavo 
been taken as evidence of his participation in 
their previous crimes. It was the preclominant 
element of weakness in his character that he 
wished to stand well with us, and hs was evi- 
dently anxious to save his personal reputation 
after the t.ragedy of the 3rd of September. For 
that reason he came to the camp of Sir Frederic 
Roberts, but he could not forget that he was 
an Afghan ruler, and, as such, bound to take 
care of the interests of his people. He found 
the English advancing with rapid and irresist- 
ible strides towards Cabul, and in the eye of 
each soldier he saw the fixed resolve to exact 
a very terrible revenge for the murder of tho 
gallant Cavagnari. He strove to avert the 
danger by counselling a delay ; but his argu- 
meizts were unavailing. The march on Clabul 
continued. 
Then he expressed a desire to leave our camp 
and t o  return to his capital. Perhaps he had 
resolved to place himself at  the head of his 
troops, perhaps to flee with his treasure t o  
T~zrkestaa. His desire was not colnplied with, 
however, and he witnessed from tho English 
camp the  flight of his army a t  Charasiab and 
the  entry into Cabul. H e  saw also the de- 
structiou of the Bnla Hissar, and then, sick of 
a titular rank which had brought him neither 
t h e  attributes of power nor the pleasure of 
tr anquillity, he abdicated. That act, which 
was taken by Afghans to mean that he was 
t i red of being an English nominee, served un- 
doubtedly to revive his sinking popularity ; 
and his name would infallibly have become 
t h e  rallying cry for those who were hostile to 
this  country. It was wisely decided that he 
should be conveyed to India, and the resolu- 
tion, suddenly taken, was speedily acted upon. 
W i t h  his arrival a t  Chunar, the place which 
the  Viceroy has selected for him to reside in, 
Yakoob's public life may be considered to have 
reached its close, for the present at all events. 
It is highly improbable that he will ever return 
as ruler to  Cabul. Such an event would be the 
stultification of all our recent policy. But Dost 
Mahomed returned after two years of appa- 
rently hopeless exile, and Yakoob Khan will 
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 doubtless beguile his time with the hope that  he 
will have similar good fortune. Taken in its 
whole, his cayeer is one of the most picturesque 
we have been called upon to consider, and if his 
manllood belied the promise of his youth it must 
be admitted that there have been few princes 
who had better right to comlslain of fortulle. 
H e  is the chief living representative of a re- 
markable family, and, if his character showed 
many of the faults and weaknesses of Afghan 
nature, he at  one time possessed in a high degree 
the military skill and personal fortitude which 
made the House of Poyndah the foremost among 
&he families of the Duraai-Abdalis. 
N O T E .  
- 
Since the preceding pages were writtien some 
further information has been received from 
India; but, until the Report of the Commission 
of Inquiry is published, the rumours which are 
current on the subject of the b e e r ' s  conduct 
should be received with diffidence. It is said 
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$hat Yalcoob Khan signed the  o r d e ~  for the 
a t t a c k  on the Residency, and, if proof of such 
.an act vere  in our hands, i t  was the height of 
weakness on the part of our authorities to 
refrain from at once inflicting the only punish- 
m e n t  adequate to  so heiilous and inexcusable 
a crime. The very fact that General Roberts 
did not include the Ameer among those who 
suffered for their guilt should be the clea~est 
token  that he possessed no proof of Yalroob's 
criminality. Moreover, it is not to be sup- 
posed that the Afghan prince mould have 
come into our camp at K ~ ~ s h i ,  knowing that he 
w a s  leaving behind him at Cab111 the proof of 
his having participated in the massacre of the 
3 r d  of September. His departure from his 
, 
capital-which expressed his repudiation of 
t h o  crime of his subjects-showed that he was 
s t i l l  anxious to preserve his good name among 
t h e  English; i n  fact, that his mind was still 
oscillating between his double duty as an Af- 
ghan  prince and as a British ally. If he had 
signed Cavagnari's death-warrant, if, indeed, 
I 
he had done anything more than make himself 
an  object for pity by his helplessness, and 
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want of resolution, he would have vanquished 
the doubts which beset him, and would never 
have come illto the British camp at all. The 
very peril which, on the supposition of his 
l~aving approved of the attack on the British 
Envoy, attached to him, personally, above every 
other, would have impelled him into a con- 
sistent course of hostility to  the English. He 
mould have cast all his treaty obligations to 
the minds as useless trammels, and would have 
figured as a new Akbar Khan. The balance of 
evidence is, therefore, in favour of the view 
that, while his irresolution and faint-heartedness 
were most culpable, his actions stopped short 
of being criminal. 
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Jowaki~, 48, 83. 
Jumrood, battle of, 19. 
Jura Beg, 203, 205. , 
KACHHI, 126. 
Eaxnran, 11, 12, 28. 
Kara Eirghiz, 180-181 ; 
murder of envoys from 
the, 181. 
Earategin, 169. 
Earshi, 207. 
Eastelr, 216. 
Katenin, General, 156, 226. 
Eatt i  Kurgan, 204,205,206. 
Katti Torah, 203, 206. 
Kaufmann, General, early 
career of, 85-86 ; all- 
pointed Governor-Gene- 
ral of Turkestan, 66 ;  
character of, 81-89 ; 
policy of, 90-94; cam- 
paigns of, 94-97; the 
part he has pla ed in S politics of Centra Asia, 
96-99; 201,203 ; his wc- 
ceasor, 213,222. 
Eaulbars, Baron, 112. 
Kenisar, 149. 
Khanayat, Shah, 216. 
Khelat-i-Ghiljie, 65, 272. ( Kherson, 214. 
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Khiva, rule of succession 
in, 95 ; 95,135 ; gardcns at, 
136-137; 139,141-14A. 
Khodjent,186,189, 196, 199. 
Khododad Khan, birth of, 
122 ; early years of his 
rule, 123-124 ; wars with 
his siydars, 125-131 ; a 
political blunder of, 126 ; 
expelled from Khelat, 
126 ; quarrels with Eng- 
lish Resident, 129 ; in- 
iterviews with English 
authorities, 130 ; renews 
his relations with British 
Government, 131 ; study 
of his career, 132-133. 
Khoja Wali Khan, 104. 
Xhokand, rising in, 114- 
115 ; 183-190,220,221. 
Khorasan, 231, 251, 263. 
Khudayax Khan, beconies 
Khan of Kholrand, 170 ; 
orders the murder of his 
minister, 171 ; attacked 
by Russia, 112-116 ; re- 
bellion against, 116 ; re- 
tires to, and then escapes 
from, Orenburg, 171 ; 
character of, 177-178. 
Khu Rum, 284. 
Khwarosm, 134, see Khiva. 
B y b e r ,  44. 
Eirghiz, 136, 139, 140,141, 
223-224, 232. 
Xirghiz, horclos, 147-149, 
156-157. 
Kitab, 169. 
Kizil Arvat, 244, 241. 
Koh Dalai, 108. 
Kolpnkoff sky, General, early 
Lifo of, 214 ; active service 
of, 214-215 ; coinrnand- 
ant of Uzun Agetch, 215 ; 
defeats insurgents, 216 ; 
occupies Kuldja, 217-219 ; 
appointedMandarin, 218 ; 
acts as Govel.nor-General 
at  Tashkent, 220,221,222 ; 
corresponds with Shere 
Ali, 221; his character and 
prospects, 222-224. 
Koochan, 239, 241, 251, 
251, 262. 
Koosh-bege, meaning of, 
102. 
Eopal, 217. 
Kopet Dagh, 231. 
Kousheed, Khan of Merv, 
245. 
Krasnovodsk, 139, 249. 
Krjihanoffsky, General, 202. 
Eujhbaz, 59. 
Kuldja, 91,108,217,218,219. 
Kurama, 101. 
Kurds, 238. 
Euren Dagh, 237. 
Kuropatkine, Captain, 115. 
LALOO, 47. 
Lalpura, 265. 
Lorna kine, General, 244,247. 
Lublin, 214. 
Lytton, Lord, 284. 
MA~AULAY, Lieutenant, 124. 
Macnaghten, Sir William, 
32. 
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Mahmoud, Shah, 4,13. 
Mahomed Ali Khan (Af- 
gha~ljstauj, 57,5940,265. 
Mahomed Ali Khan (Kho- 
lzancl), 170. 
Mahomed Azim, 15. 
Mahomed Khan (Khiva), 
birth of, 135 ; appearance 
and character of, 135- 
138 ; l~olicy of, 138-1412 ; 
requests aid of British 
Gavel-nment, 142-143 ; 
war with Russia, 143- 
145 ; concludes treaty 
with Russia, 145 ; be- 
comes a Russian vassal, 
145 ; his probable future, 
145-146. 
Mahomed Rafik, 57, 59, 61, 
64. 
Maholued Shah of Kayz ,  
:. 244. 
Mahomcd Yakoob, see Ya- 
koob Beg and Yakoob 
Khan. 
Maimene, 274. 
Makliram,l86 ; battleat,187. 
Malik Easim, 11. 
Mangishlak, 140. 
Margilan, 189. 
Marsh, Captain, 277. 
Masson, Mr., 121, 122. 
Mayo, Earl of, 71, 275. 
Mazar-i-Shereef, 76. 
Mehrab Khan, 120. 
Merewether, S h  William, 
129. 
Merv, 95,194,243,245,246, 
249. 
Meshed, 254. 
Mir Baba, 166. 
Mohun Id, 14, 21, 35. 
Mollah Mahomed Raisani, 
126, 127. 
Momuuds, 40, 265. 
Moldvie Abdullah, 47. 
Mourad Beg, 28. 
Mozaffi~r Ecldin, succeeds 
Nasrullah, 193 ; his po- 
licy, 194 ; desiglis in Cen- 
tral Asia, 194 ; throws 
Russian envoys illto pri- 
son, 195 ; war with Rus- 
sia, 195 ; takes I<hocljcnt, 
196; defcatecl at Irjar, 
197-198 ; loses fortresses, 
198 ; end of first wal; 
201 ; second war, 202- 
206 ; sends one of his  
sons to St. Petersburg, 
207; his actual position, 
208 ; his overturcs for 
alliances, 209 ; his claims 
ou Balkh, 209-210 ; cha.- 
ractw of, 210-212. 
Mulka, 47. 
NADIR, Shah, 1, 36. 
Namangan, 189,190. 
Nasreddin, 183, 184, 187, 
189. 
Nasrullah, 28, 170, 193. 
Nasseer Khan, 120. 
Nan, 198. 
Nawaz Khan, 120. 
Niazbek, 228. 
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Nicolai station, 140. 
Noor Qerdi Khan, 257, 259 ; 
personal appearance of, 
235-236 ; his rule a t  kk-  
hal, 237 ; his arrange- 
ment with Persian go- 
vemor, 239 ; his frontier 
policy, 240 - 241 ; war 
with Governor of Koo- 
chan, 243 ; flees to Merv, 
243 ; returns to Akhal, 
2413 ; resides at  Merv, 
245-246 ; prepiLres for 
Russ i~n  invasion, 246- 
247 ; arl*ivcs a t  Geok 
Tepeh, 248; his task in 
the future, 248-250. 
Northbrook, Lord, 280. 
Novo Alexandrovsk, 1411. 
Nur W~homed Khan, 101. 
OMAR KHAN, '76. 
Owen, Professor, 252. 
Oxus, 95, 144. 
PAITA, 190. 
Peiwar, the, '76. 
Peroffsky, General, 94,102- 
104. 
Pisheen, 15, 284. 
Piskent, 100. 
'PoyndaL mla%2>3 ;$'assin%. 
Prjevdsky, Colonel, 115. * 
P u r  Mahomed Mirza, 101. 
Purwandwrah, 31. 
QUETTAE, 75,131. 
ROMANOFFSKY, General, 94, 
196. 
Runjeet Singh, 9, 15, 26. 
Russia, activity of, 2 8-26. 
Russians, the, 111. 
" Russki Mil.," 231. 
SAMARCAND, 95, 20 ;-205, 
207. 
Saudeman, Mrtjor, 131. 
Sarawan, 125,127. 
Sarfmz E h m ,  meaning of, 
3 ; see Poyndah Khan. , 
Swkhaba, 190. 
Scincle, 15. 
Scobeleff, Colonel, l % ,  185, 
186, 190. 
Schuyler, Mr., 164, 174, 
182, 208. 
Bebastopol, 226. 
Seisten, '74. 
Selniretchinsk, 213, 214, 
217. 
Seyyid Khen, 203. 
Shah, the, 254, 256. 
Shah-i-sebz, 169,203, 204. 
Shttikhabsd, 63. 
Sheik Nizamuddin, 101. 
Sherc Ali, 221; birth of, 
53 ; chosen ]leil., 54 ; pro- 
claimed h e e l . ,  55 ; his 
wars with his broth. rs, 
55-69 ; drawn battle at 
~~j p h ,  5 7 ; 
with Afzul, 57; wine 
battle of ~ ~ j h b ~ ~ , ~ ,  59 ; 
takcs Candahar, 60 ; loses 
Cabul, 61 ; defeatecl. at 
Shaikhabad, 63 ; defeated 
at Khelat-i-Ghiljie, G5 ; 
flees to Herat, 65 ; allinn. c 
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with Faiz =~homcd, 66 ; 
victory assured to him, 
68 ; relations with Eng- 
lish Government, 10-16 ; 
his administration, 77- 
78 ; his reforms, 78 ; his 
army, 78-79 ; his death, 
76 ; character of, 19-84; 
personal appearance of, 
81. 
Shere ail Khan, 126. 
Shereef, 52, 58, 61. 
Shere Singh, 33. 
"' Shis Nail,," 230. 
Xhuja-ucl-Dowlah, 251 ; pur- 
suits of, 252-253 ; suc- 
ceeds his brother, 254 ; 
imprisonedby Shah, 254 ; 
released from prison, 255 ; 
ousted by his son, 255 ; 
defeats his sou, 256 ; his 
dealings with Turcomans, 
257; war with his son, 
258 ; his authority, 260- 
262 ; his policy, 241, 242, 
262-263. 
Shuja-ud-Dowlah, meaning 
of, 251. 
Shuja-ul-Mulk, 6, 13, '17, 
25, 26. 
Sibi, 284. 
Sighan, 274. 
Sikhs, 9, 43, 44. 
Simla Manifesto, 27. 
Sittana colonists, 46-47. 
8lushenk0, Lieutenant, 202, 
203. 
.Solon tribe, 217. 
Btempcl, Major, 205. 
Steppe Commission, 86. 
Stoletoff, Generd, 75, 139, 
209. 
Struve, M., 195. 
Sudosye, 2, 14, 17. 
Sultan Mahomed, 19. 
Sultan Regents, 149. 
Surwar Khan, 59, 67, 269, 
270. 
Swat, 40, 42, 48. 
Syrym, 149. 
TAJIKS, 100. 
Taj Mahomed Zehai, 126, 
Tnkhtapul, 76. 
Tmantchis, 219. 
Tashkent, 86, 227,228,229. 
"Tashkent Gazette," 187. 
Tatuinof, M.,'195. 
Tcheinai&, General, 89 ; 
early sei~ice of, 226 ; en- 
trusted with command on 
the Syr Darya, 227; his 
successes, 227-229 ; po- 
pularity with natives, 
230 ; campaign with Bok- 
hara, 230-231 ; recalled 
from Central Asia, 231 ; 
becomes a notary, 231; 
his w-ritings, 231-233 ; his 
late career, 233 ; passim. 
Tchiinkent, 173, 227. 
Tchinghiz, Prince, 146. 
Tchupan-ata, 204. 
Tehewn, 254. 
Tekes, 238. 
Temil; 155. 
Tergoukasoff, General, 247. 
Timour (Afghan), 1, 3. 
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Tinah Khan, 69, 163, 275. 
Toksoun, 116. 
Tootundurrah, 31. 
Trassylvanie, 214. 
Treaty with Khivrc, terms 
of, 145. 
Troitzky, General, 189. 
Tungani, 107,109,110,219. 
Turcomans, 95, 140, 234, 
235, 256. 
Turcoman oath, 247. 
Turfan, 116. 
Turkestan, 86 ; passim. 
U m s a ~ ~ a D u r b a r ,  71-72,73. 
Urnbeyla, 46, 47. 
7S1.a-tepeh, 198, 199. 
Uzun Agatch, 215, 216. 
VLMBBRY, Professor, 211, 
266-267. 
Vernoe, 215, 216, 217. 
Verefkin, Colonel, 226. 
Vickovitch, Captain, 26. 
WADD, 127. 
WaliMahomed (Shahgsssi), 
124, 125, 128, 129, 130. 
Washir, 163. 
Weinberg, M., 183. 
Wyllie, Mr. J., 81. 
YAEYA KHAN, 278, 281. 
Yakoob Beg, b s t h  and 
early career of, 100-102 ; 
appointed Kooshbege, 
102 ; commands garrison 
of Ak Musjid, 102-104 ; 
joins Buzurg Khan, 104- 
105 ; invades IIashgar, 
105 ; deposes Buzurg, 
106 ; independent ruler 
in Kashgarirt, 107 ; wars 
with Tungani, 107-110 ; 
employs Chinese troops, 
108; receives tiblc of 
Athalik Ghazi, 110 ; re- 
lations with England, 
111 ; relations with Rus- 
sia, 111-115 ; action 
during rising inKhol-i~nd, 
114 : and the return of 
the ' Chinese, 115-116 ; 
defeated at Turfttu and 
Toksoun, 116 ; death of, 
116 ; persona;l appeai3iLncc 
of, 116 ; character of, 
116-118. 
Ya;lroob Khan, 67-69, pus- 
sim ; birth of, 266 ; at 
Herat, 265-267,276-279 ; 
takes command of Shcre 
Mi's army, 267-269 ; his 
campaign against the 
confederates, 269-275 ; 
entrusted with adminis- 
tration of the country, 
275-276; falls into dis- 
favour, 276 ; captnrcs 
Herat, 276 ; visits Cabul, 
and is imprisoned, 279- 
281 ; released from con- 
finement, 282 ; negotiates 
with Major Cavaguari, 
283-285 ; arrives in Bri- 
tish c m p ,  285 ; 
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WOBKS BY THE SAME AUTHOR. 
-- 
Recently published. 8vo. 2 vob. 36s. 
With Appendices, and Two Maps (one beiug the latest 
Russian Official' Map of Central Asia). 
ENGLAND AND RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA, 
OPINIONS OF THE PRESS. 
Times, April 14, 1879.-(I Tho valuo of those two volnmo~ does 
not o o n ~ i ~ t  iu tho closely-'ensonod but well-worn arpments  in 
favour of a decided forwwd movement, so much us in the lucid 
and admirdbly written ohapters descriptive of the history of Rue- 
sian and English conquests and explorations in Central Asia, in tha 
olear sum~naries of the military strength of tho two nations in 
tho Esst, and in the brief recital of tho relationship existing be- 
tween tho two great PoweFs, and the Mahomedm Gtates, which, 
according to Mr. Boulger, must sooner or later inevitably be ab- 
sorbed into the one or the other. . . . The chapters devoted 
to Afghanistan, to Persia, and to a desoription of our frontier are 
worthy of close perusal. . . . His resum6 of Afghan history 
is an admirable summary. . . . There is much in Lho boolc to 
which the advocates of ' masterly inactivity ' will tako exception : 
on the other hand, there is muoh that makes i t  one of t,he most 
valuable works on the Central Asian Question that have yet beoa 
published." 
Standavd, April 24, 1879.-'I We have had no space to  fio more 
than to allude to many of tho mattcrs ombraced in this comprehon- 
sive worlr before us. The comparison of tho fighting strength 
which England and Rusaia nre rospeotivoly likely to  be able to  
place upon tho ground should thoso nations moet in, or on tho 
frontiers of, Afgliallistan, is worked out with mnoh thought and 
detail. Tho question of the nrmies of the native princes of Inc l i~  
i~ one in itself meriting an exhaustive oxamination and which wo 
can now only recommend for thoughtful perusal and examinatton. 
Mr. Boulgcr is rapidly becoming an omoritus in all matters relat- 
ing to Asiatic politics, and the book before us is one which every 
student anxious to forecast the futuro ought to road!' 
Blackwaod's Magazilte, May, 187%-If Mr. Boulger's two bulky 
volumes contain a quantity of information, which has becn care- 
fully compiled, and what is more to the purpose, thoroughly 
digested, and presentea t o  the reader in a very interesting manner 
for the purpose of vigorously enforcing a policy which apparently 
aims a t  nothing less than rolling Russia backwards to the Cau- 
casus, and beyond the Oxus ; and as a means to th t  end to soiw 
Herat, arm the Turoornm8, and practically administer the empire 
of Persia!' 
fit. potmsburg aa1os.-Three sopal-ate reviews :of this work ap- 
peared in the Bolos during the months of June and July ; and the 
description of Mcrv in the  first volume was quoted in e~tenso in its 
issue for August 1st. 
Saturday Rouiew, May 3, 1879.-" His literary power is not in- 
considerable, and his diligence, method of inquiry, and selootion of 
materials, as we have said, are worthy of praise. In the crowd of 
recent competitors for the  oar of the public on Ccntral Asian 
matters he is fairly entitled to take a high rank. His remarlrs 
on the composition of the native army of India ought to command 
attention from military mon; and on minute points of geography 
he appears to have spt~rod no exortions to  attain complete accuracy, 
and to  bring down tho results of explorations, pursued under trying 
circumstances, to tho very latest date. The very vehemence of his 
political convictions ought to insure him readers; and if we have 
eoleoted paasngos which oxhibit him in the light of an enthmiast, 
it is from no wish to detract hom the timely importance of his 
publication." 
Aeadenty, May 17, 1879.-" His resume of the relations of Russia 
with Tnrkestan and Persia end of our own dealings with Persia ancl 
Afghanistan will be found especially useful to those who wish to 
recall the events in question!' 
Guardian, October 15, 1879.-" Enough has probably been said to 
recommend EwgLmd and Russia in Central Asia to all who ~ n u h  
to thoroughly understand the position of tho Central Asian Qucs- 
tion. It has j u ~ t  he information which it is so difficult to know 
where to look for, and  which people want in order to come to a 
reasonable conclnsion as to  what should be England's policy in the 
&at." 
Pall Null :Gazette, May 30, 1879.-"Mr. Boulger's volumes oou- 
tain an imm~nse  amount of valuable information in regard to what 
is generally known as the Central Asian Quesdon!' 
Emantiaa, April 12,1879.-" It has been our fortune to go over 
most of the same ground covered by Mr. Boulger's volnmea, and we 
can declare, and especially as regards the Russian portion of tho 
book, that a better and more faithful description of Central Asian 
politics could scarcely be written. I t  is rarely that a writer can 
claim to have added two standard works to our literature within a 
few short mouths of each other, but Mr. Boulger can oertaiiily take 
credit Iui- this; and it will be s, grateful reward for his arduoua 
labours to kuow that his ' Yakoob Beg' and hia Central Asia ' 
will be regarded as the statesman's text-books for many years to 
come." 
Globe, May 10, 1879.-"At last we have the Central Asiatio 
Question dealt with on broad lines as a whole, and although many 
will probably disagree from the author's oonolusiona, i t  lnust bo 
allowed to him that  he has done his work in veiy thorough 
fashion, with an amplitudo of detail leaving nobhing to be de- 
sired," 
Morn,ing AdtJertiser, April 16, 18'79.-" Ransacking every possible 
source of information, leaving undealt with no single subject whioh 
hae any bearing on his theme, Mr. Bonlger has prodnced a work on 
the most interesting topic of the day whioh is at once exhauative 
and up to dato. Possessed previously of an intimate acquaintanoe 
with Contra1 Asian matters, he has now stamped himself as one of 
the greatest living authorities upon them. The policy whioh he 
advocates will probably not h d  favour with many, for i t  is bold 
and comprehensive, but the instructed few will realiae the fact tha t  
he has supported his views with cogent arguments. I t  is diffioult 
to review the book before us, so fnll and varied are its contents, so 
wide its soope!' 
Whitekall Review, April 5, 1879.-" This is the most exhaustive 
work on the greatest question of the day whioh has been published 
in  any language. It is also brought down to &to, for even the 
death of Shere Ali is mentioned. The author has evidently gone to 
eve1.y possible source for information-British and foreign books, 
newspapers, and the proceedings of scientXc societies. He also 
brings to bear on his subject the fruits of years of previous patient 
study and an impartin1 though bold and comprehonsive miud." 
Graphic, May 3, 1879.-"Among chapters of solid worth we 
might instance those on the military value of our native army, 
having regard espeoially to its officering ; on the forces Russia can 
bring into tho field on her two main lines of advance-lines, by the 
k a y ,  not always sufficiently kept distinct by English readers-from 
Tnshlrcncl, the hcad-quartors of General Kaufmaun, and from Trans- 
Caspiana, tho commancl oP Lomakine ; on tho schemes for ahorten- 
i n g  tho rlistances betwcon the Caucasus and the frontier either by 
n railway from tho Ca~piun t o  tlle Aral or by restoring the Osaa to 
i t s  pre-historic bod ; and on thc doLail8 at' Lomalcii~o's opor~~tior~s of 
last :~utumn on the 11llo from Chikisblar to Kizil Arvot f o ~  Merv. 
Altogether a 1v01.k to  bo taken in some respocts czcnb gyano, but 
as a cornpilstion, perhaps, the  best that could bo named for 
roadors clcsirous of being woll and qnicl;ly posted up-with the 
further ail1 of fat-sin5ilus or the l tuss~an official maps-in all the 
chief points, ~nilltary or goographical, of the frontier quesLion in 
Central Asia." 
I lZust~.ated L o n d o n  Netus, Api*il 26, 1879.-'I Wo find mu011 recoa- 
dito information upon this subject in the lesrned work of Mr. 
Domctrius Uoulger just publishocl." 
Hol15o NCIUY, May 9, 1879.-"Tho chapters on tho Anglo-1udis11 
army, on yccont English explorations in  Ccrltral Asia, on tho various 
routes loading from Russian territory into India, ai~cl on the Amou 
Dnrya, or Oxus, tare all of the highest intcrost, but our limits forbid 
ua from sttompling to indicate their contents. Whilst Lhe opinions 
which Mr. Boulger ~nunciates with 60 much energy and ability will 
b e  vory f a r  from commnnding univer8al assent, no one, wo think, 
can hositate to conaidor his book ono of the most vnlnable contribu- 
tions to the literatwo of the Central Asian Question which has yeb 
been pivon to the world." 
Bhqfiiipld Daily Telcgvn2~h, Third Notice, Nay 22, 18'79.-" T o  close 
these voluu~es with repot ,  for we have found them abou~~ding with 
information and containing muoh that  interested us docply. With 
a l l  Mr. Ronlger's views wo ci~nnol agree, but even whorc me differ 
from him we feel that ~ v o  11avo learnt much from his cltntemcnt of 
his case, ai~rl  wo corclially rccomrnend this work to all who take an  
inlercst in tho CouCral Asian Question, for they will find it a perfect 
mine of information." 
Alle~z's I?~diarb  iUaiZ, April 26, 1879.-" The soveral questions re- 
lating to our Asiatic Empire aro clealt with succossively in a mannor 
which, oven by oppone~~ls,  must be admitted to bc tha t  of a master 
of his ~ u b j e c t ;  theso i+oquil'e sepbrato a t t e~~ t ion  o oui8 part, and 
will, wo hopo, roccive carofnl pcrusalfrom our rendci-a. I t  ia nut too 
rnucl~ to sny that to  bo nnacquai~~tcd with Mr. Boulger's work is to  
bo deficic~~t in  tho Imowledyo wliich is essentinl to enable an exact 
jndgme~lt to bo forrned oP Jlussia and England in Contra1 Asis." 
UnitrcZ Scrvico Gazclte,  May 17, 1879.-" Sinco the publication of 
8 i r  Bowy lla~rlinson's invalnablo work ' Englancl and Russia in the 
xmst,' no boolc has appeared which in any way pretends to review t h e  
position of the two great Northern powors in Asia; such a want 
bas been long felt. To follow the devious windiugs of Central Asian 
politics, the  student or t11e soldier has hnd to turn from Elphiustone 
t o  Yasson, from' Knyo to Eellwsld, to wade through innumerable 
B l u e  Books, nnd theu to feel that he ia as far as ever from the solu- 
tion of tho quostion which one clay must bo settled by force of arms. 
T o  31r. Boulgor has fallen the happy lot of gathelillg the tanglod 
skeins  togethol; skilfully umwiutliug them, and presenting to  tho 
gene ra l  rearler n worlc fitly dedicatod to  the great champion of the  
onuse, Sii* Henry Rmlinaon." 
Weslc, April 10, 1879.-"In mauy respects this iil amork of exoep- 
fional merit. The author has erected n, monument to hia own 
ancl industry." 
Punity T a i ~ ,  April 12, 1879.-" This work presents a t  once an  
historical  compilation and a system of policy. Nr. Boulger displays 
v e r y  gFeat iilidust~y and i.ese;lrch, and his boolc will be extremely 
valuable a s  a work of reforonce to those who aim imperfeutly ac- 
quainted with the History of &airs in Central Asia." 
8uo. 16s. With Map and Aypendix. 
1 THE LIFE OF YAKOOB BEG, 
ATHBlrIII: GHAZI, AND BADAULET, AMEER 
OF IIBSHGAR. 
OPINIONS 01 TH1 PRESS. 
Times, Leading Article, 15th November 18'78.-"A very interesting 
a n d  instructive volumo." 
Times, Review (nearly three colnmns), 26th December 18'78.- 
" Undor the title of a ' Life of Yukoob Beg, the late Amecr of 
Kashgar, '  Mr. Boulger has given us a systematic hiatory of t h e  
1 kingdom ancl people of Kashgm: nncl i t  is  well that he has done so. 
. . . Tho publicatibn of Mr. Bonlger's volumo is, indeed, lnost 
. -opportune. . . . I n  Sir Bartle Frere's letter public opinion for 
t h e  first time found firm grounrl on which to base a national policy 
in  rolation to tho Russian advance in Central Asia; and now tho 
puhlication of Mr. Boulger's exhaustive volume supplies the most 
dotailed information as to the significance of that advitnce, and 
the errors we have to avoid in meeting it!' 
Sta~~dard, Review, 25th December 1878.-" Mr. Boulger has ren- 
dered a service equally to history, the public, snd the Government, 
in writing the hook before us. . . . Wo have only been able to 
deal with a portion of this able and exhaustive hook, hut we would 
earnestly advise all those who take an intorost in Central Asim 
poIitics to read the work before us from beginning to end. Not a 
chapter, not even a single page, ought to be ornitbed!' 
Daily Teleg~aplb, Leading Article, 7th November 1818.-" Tho 
answer is furnished by Yr. Boulger, in his remarkable and recently 
published work on ' Yakoob Beg and Kashgar! . . . Here, then, 
me have not merely o drematio ovent in contemporary history, but 
mhnt is virtually the advonl; of a new foroe, mhich Mr. Boulgor 
correctly defines as 'the Chhoso fnotor i n  the Central Asian Ques- 
tion.' " 
St. Potwsbu~g GO~OS, re vie^^, 23rd Fehruary (7th Maroh) 1879.-" A 
very important and interesting work. . . . Bhould bo studied 
by all Russian offioials in Turkestan." 
Daily Neurs, Roview, 26th November 1878.-" Mr. Boulger's 'Life 
of Ynkoob Bog' appeare opportunelp at n, time when it is desirable 
that no matters bearing upon the affairs of Central Asia should be 
mis~~ndorstood or imperfectly conceived. . . . While exhibiting 
something of the biographer's enthuaiasm for tho military and ad- 
luinistrative capacity of his hero, Mr. Boulger is so far from under- 
rating his enemies, that his guiclingp~~'pose i  to direot tho attention 
of his couutrylnon to the singular merits of tho Chineso as a mili- 
tary and a governing people!' 
Ulobe, Review, 8th January 1879.-" The arrival of the Ohine~e 
Envoy a t  St. Petersburg to discuss tho Kulja quo~tion will oocasion 
n general desire to become acquainted with the relative position of 
Russia and Chine in Central Asia; and no recent book, we believe, 
will throm better light upon the subject than Mr. Boulger's excellent 
biography of the late Athalik Ghazi. . . . For some consider- 
able time to come the volume will, in all probability, remnin the 
standard mork of reference on matters oonnected with Eashgaria 
and Kulja!' 
La Republipue F~anpaise, Roview, 6th February 18'79.-" Le 
tableau que nouB fait N. Boulgor do l'administration Chinoise en 
Kashgarie est des plus ourieux; c'ost uno v6iitable r6vklation. . . 
. . Y. Boulger a eu le talent do r6agir contre ces influences 
envahissantoa, ot nous lui en adreasone nos bion sincere8 compli- 
ments." 
Satn~rday Reuiew, 11th January 1879.-"Mr. Boulger has made a 
praiseworthy attempt to treat a aubject which lies under peculiar 
diaadvantagos. . . . Any book vhich attempts to throw light 
on the Central Asian problem is entitled to a henring, and the author 
desorves credit for research, pdns, and general accuracy. . . . 
We repoat, in oonclusion, that the author desorves credit for his 
compilation, aud think that readers may dorive p l ~ a ~ ~ e  from tho 
laborious career of the principal figure in the book, who, to borrow 
Mr. Tcnnysan's diction, roso suddenly through u little arc of heaven, 
and, without having wandored far, shot quite as fluddenly into dark- 
ness." 
Spectata~., 21st Docember 1878.-" This is a valuable book, and 
one which it would be hardly fair to critici~e in the ordinary way. 
The writer is evidently one of those mon who, having taken up en 
out-OF-the-way subject of study, become possessed by it, and gra- 
dually accumulate more information than they quite lmow what to 
do wit,h. He states tho evidence of Chinese ruthlessness as fairly 
as the evidences of Chinese business-wisdom. . . . Impartiality, 
indeed, is his strong point; the very objeot of his book being to 
dissolve the great mytht~s with which Englishmen have surrounded 
Lis 110~0.'' 
Academy, 14th December 1878.-" The author, aftor alluding to 
the revival of the Chi~ieso power as shown in the euppression of the 
Tae Ping and the Panthay movements, describes with some of the 
enthusiasm of sympathy the westward advance, steady and resist- 
less, of the great oxmy, disciplined and armed on the p e a t  European 
model, htllting at  times to sow and reap f i e  coin needed for its future 
anpplies, and encountering with oqnal skill and dotoinination the 
vast distanoes and other diEoulties of the march, and tho rosista~ice 
of the enemy. Mr. Boulger has a high opinion of the administra- 
tive skill of the Chinese, and its advantages to tho people uudei* 
their sway. Their tldministration of 'Kashgar was certainly, to  dl 
appearance, a rema~kable instance of liberal treatmenij of an 
alien rnce and creed!' 
Tho Times af India, 20th January 1879.-'I The Life of Yakoob 
Beg,' late Anleor of IZashgar, is an important addition to  our 
knowledge of a trans-frontier state, till recently a tewa iqrcognita. 
Mr. Boulger's work, moreover, has appen'ecl most opporbunely ; 
for at no previous period of tho history of British India is in- 
formation regarding tho bulwarks of the lndian Enlpiro lilroly 
to ercito an  equal amount of attention in England. Wo commond 
this work to all readers who take an interest in tho foreign policy of 
the Government of India!' 
OUGHT WE TO HOLD GAIUDAHARI' 
OPINIONB OF THE PRESS. 
Eman~incr, May 31, 18'79.-"In a pamphlet of some thirty pages,. 
Mr. Demetlius Boulgor discusses the question of our permanent 
footing in Southern Afghanistan. Ho aslcs on his title-page, 'Ought 
we to  hold Candahar ? ' and the tenor of his reply is an attinnative. 
There is much common sense in his views, and much tmth  in his 
estimate of the  dangers to be apprehended north and w a ~ t  of 
Afghanistan!' 
Allen's Indian Xail, May 19, 18'79.-" The question vhich MI!. 
33oulgor asks is alike pertiilent and opport~~ne.  . . If we do 
not make the move now, we shall bo forced to make it, perhaps 
under circumstances far less favotwable, a few years hence." 


